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BADGES OFFICE

M.B. TAYLOR

V.L. WILKINSON

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SPECIAL CONSTABLES IN THE FIRST AND SECOND WORLD WARS

Paper presented to the Police History Society Conference 20th October 1990 by Clare Leon, M.Phil. University of Leeds (1).

Introduction

During the nineteenth century, there was a two-tier deployment of specials. Temporary specials could be sworn in in large numbers during emergencies under the Special Constables Act 1831, while most boroughs also held lists of special constables who were annually appointed under the Municipal Corporations Acts of 1835 and 1882. Even with the introduction of regular police forces, specials continued to be relied on because of the small size of the new forces. (2)

At the turn of the century, special constabulary reserves were relied on to supplement police forces whose numbers had been diminished by regular reservists being called to the colours during the Boer War. A special constabulary reserve was created in Cambridge in the aftermath of Mafeking disturbances (3), and specials were also deployed in Watford on the 26th June 1902 when 200 were sworn in after a disappointed crowd rioted on the postponement of Edward VII's coronation proceedings, injuring four Hertfordshire mounted police officers (4). While some justices were confused about he interaction between the 1831 and 1882 Acts as far as their powers of appointment were concerned, others were using the office to give constabulary powers to park-keepers, and special constables were also being appointed routinely during elections (5).

In a parallel development, the practice of employing qualified police officers as an emergency reserve started to be adopted. In 1901 the Bolton Watch Committee instructed the Town Clerk to look into the feasibility of setting up a paid police reserve, and by 1905 had finalised plans to set up a reserve of police pensioners (6). In 1908, the Metropolitan police set up a "special reserve" consisting of mature first class sergeants and constables, to attend at state and ceremonial occasions. They were given extra pay, and were identified by a letter "R" on their collars, but were disbanded in 1913 (7). By 1909, the authorities were stressing the desirability of setting up organised reserves. A Home Office circular on the 15th April cites as good practice the scheme adopted by the Chief Constable of Nottinghamshire. He had got authority from his Watch Committee to temporarily add forty men to his force in case of emergency. If the need to use them arose, they would be uniformed and paid like regular police officers. They were to be deployed in a limited capacity on routine duties at police stations and on the simpler and less technical parts of police duty, thereby freeing trained constables for more important tasks (8).

From 1910 to 1914 there was a massive expansion in trades union membership, and the numbers of days lost due to industrial disputes also increased dramatically (9). The increase in trades disputes and the escalating amounts of violence that accompanied them meant that local police forces were becoming increasingly overstretched. During the South Wales coal strike in 1910-11, the Metropolitan Police, the Military and special constables were used on picket lines. However the use of troops caused widespread protest,

especially after the Tonypandy disturbances and the shooting of two local men at Llanelli (10).

The following summer, special constables were relied on during the transport strike as a first resort, in preference to the military (11). Their deployment appears to have been acceptable as far as the policing authorities were concerned. The Chief Constable of Nottingham reported '... no difficulty in obtaining any quantity of special constables of a superior type' to help police a disturbance at Ilkeston Junction on the 19th August (12) while in an account of a riot at Chesterfield station on the 22nd August, the Mayor, Charles Markham, reported that 'The Midland Railway Special Constables certainly saved the situation as far as damage to the station was concerned' (13)

But their deployment was unpopular among trades unionists who saw them as little better than organised thugs. According to a Labour MP, Mr. J. Jones:

".... in 1911 we had Bluebottles on top of the meat vans, and they were special constables, and very special constables. They were not used to break the strike, but to break peoples' heads..."(14)

Following the Agadir crisis, which had brought the country to the brink of war with Germany, and the June - August transport strike, the Home Office stressed the need to create a more permanent constabulary reserve. In September 1911 a detailed circular was issued to chief constables which set out both the justification for creating reserves, and their basic organisation (15).

The circular emphasised the importance of each police district keeping a classified register of "suitable persons", whose services would be available for the assistance of the police if any serious emergency should arise:

"A well-organised body of citizens ready for immediate enrolment as Special Constables would afford both to Police Authorities and to the public confidence that effective protection would be given to life and property. It would be especially useful if at any time a national mobilisation of the Reserves, for it would then enable the Chief Constable promptly to replace those Army Reservists serving in the Police Force who are called to join the Colours, and to provide the additional force needed for the protection of means of communication and public works from outrage and for dealing with undesirable aliens."

Several categories of reservists were to be created.

The <u>First Police Reserve</u> was to consist of ex police or army men who were trained and accustomed to discipline, who were to be taken into service on a limited engagement as County or Borough Constables. They were to be regularly employed on police work, either replacing army reservists or other constables withdrawn from their ordinary work for special duty, or could be utilised guarding points exposed to special risk of attack. They could also be given a small retainer in consideration of their entering into a signed agreement to serve when called on. (16).

The Second Police Reserve would consist of all those registered as willing to be sworn under the Special Constables Act 1831, or the Municipal Corporations Act 1882. Men so sworn were to be classified according to whether they were to be paid or unpaid, and according to whether they undertook to serve regular turns of duty or merely to assist when called upon in moments of danger. The remuneration provisions of the Municipal Corporations Act were felt to be insufficient to "secure good men of the paid class". Consequently the Home Office recommended that the section should not be used unless the statutory rate of 3/6d per day could be supplemented from some other source. By sl3 of the Special Constables Act 1831, special constables could be paid reasonable allowances to recompense them for their time, trouble and expense, and the Secretary of State was prepared to support Local Authorities who paid allowances under government railway strike provisions. During the contributed 50% of the cost of paid special constables up to a maximum pay of 6/- per day of actual work, for a maximum number not exceeding 50% of the regular force. If future grave emergency arose, the Secretary of State would consider whether a similar government contribution should be made. The Home Office saw the need to set up reserves as vital, and warned chief constables that Inspectors of Constabulary would be instructed to take into consideration the number and quality of the reserves, when assessing the efficiency and strength of forces (17).

This circular set the pattern of organisation adopted three years later at the onset of the First World War, and which remained substantially unchanged until the end of the Second World War. However, initially it met with a mixed reception(18), possibly because of doubts about the legal validity of appointing large numbers of special constables in the absence of the conditions outlined in the Special Constables Act 1831 (19).

The Commissioner of the City of London Police, J.W. Nott-Bower, responded by reporting on the viability of the proposals to the City of London Police Committee in November 1911 (20). He had had recent experience of organising special constables, as 1,648 had been enrolled during the Dock Strike that August. They were never deployed and were demobilised after the strike was settled (21).

Nott-Bower disagreed that police reservists could obviate the need for military assistance in grave emergencies, commenting that the knowledge that such aid was available was "the most valuable reserve of strength, and the greatest moral support, available ... the best means of preventing bloodshed, safeguarding property, and securing communities from riot, pillage and terror." (22) However, he agreed in principle with the need to form two-tier reserves, but felt that it was only feasible to enrol police pensioners in the First Reserve, because of the difficulty in ensuring that the services of ex Army or Navy men would be available in emergencies. Nott-Bower also considered it inadvisable to create a paid class of second police reservist, because few suitable men would be tempted by the meagre remuneration offered, and even if they were, their inclusion would discourage those recruits who were willing to serve without pay (23). He suggested the formation of a register of unpaid second reservists subdivided into those who would be prepared to undertake regular 8-hour tours of duty, and those who would only be prepared to undertake tours of duty at their own convenience. (24) The circular was also acted on by the Northumberland Court of Quarter Sessions, who appointed a committee to prepare a set of rules and regulations to be adopted by justices when circumstances arose which called for the appointment of special constables. The Home Office model of two separate reserves was apparently not adopted, but the Chief Constable undertook to keep a register of suitable persons who were willing to be sworn as special constables, to be revised each January, and to issue each person on the register with an identity card. Each special was to be equipped with an armlet and a staff, but "shall not under any circumstances carry any other weapon, and unless in case of active disorder, shall not exhibit or use his staff". (25)

As the political climate worsened, other authorities responded, in some cases over-enthusiastically; in November 1912, George Barnes MP., wrote to the Home Office in response to a query from the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, questioning the compulsory enrolment of special constables (26). The Home Office replied that although service as a special constable "when occasion makes it necessary" was a legal duty on able-bodied citizens in the same way as Jury service, a person appointed under the Municipal Corporations Act 1882 could only be required to act when the ordinary borough police were insufficient to maintain the peace (27)

1st World War

By 1914, attempts were being made to set up police reserves, but there was still confusion over the legal basis for their appointment. To remedy this, the Special Constables Act was passed on the 26th August 1914. The Act enabled the appointment of special constables for the duration of the war, even though the specific conditions laid down by the Special Constables Act 1831 and the Municipal Corporations Act 1882 were not present (28). The Act also extended the provisions of the Police Acts 1839 - 1910 concerning compensation for death or injury while on duty to special constables, and enabled further regulations to be made by Order in Council (29).

Enrolment for special constabulary reserves had started almost immediately war was declared, although the speed at recruitment progressed was often determined by the number of important undertakings in a force area (30). By the 15th August 1914, over 20,000 men had been enrolled as special constables in London, and by 1915 there were over 67,000 volunteers in the Metropolitan Special Constabulary(31). Other forces also responded to the call for a civil police reserve; for example, 10,000 volunteers enrolled in Manchester in 1914, 6,000 in Essex, 2,000 in Birmingham, 571 in Southend-on-Sea, 450 in Grimsby, 350 in Bristol and 227 in Salford (32). However it seems that public reaction was not universally enthusiastic. Seth cites examples in Denbighshire, where 300 specials were called for but only 97 enrolled; Ramsgate, where a shortage of volunteers led the authorities to use their powers under the 1882 Municipal Corporations Act to compel 500 householders to serve or be fined £5; and Leeds where the authorities had called for 2,000 volunteers in November 1914, but by the following June had only managed to swear in 1,086 (33).

Deployment

In the City of London, recruiting for the Police Reserve recommenced in August 1914, and 1,579 men were sworn in on the 19th August (34). They were organised into four divisions, each consisting of five general Companies. In addition, four reserve companies were set up, three of which consisted solely of employees of large organisations (35).

In November 1914 the Reserve was allocated street duties which consisted of guarding vulnerable points likely to be tampered with by enemy agents, and also attended at the Lord Mayor's Show for the first time. In January 1915, a parade was held at St Paul's Cathedral. Originally members of the CLPR were sworn in for 6 months and this period had now expired, so the Lord Mayor and Commissioner of the City Police wrote appealing to them to have their warrants extended for the duration of the War and six months after, and at the service, the Archdeacon "delivered a powerful address urging the men to continue their valuable Police work." (36) The following year they were issued with caps, boots and overcoats, and in July 1916 a deputation of CLPR appeared before the Court of Common Council and successfully petitioned that the force might be supplied with a uniform, which was issued that September(37).

They attended at several official functions in the following years, and in June 1915 began night street patrols, with each of the four divisions supplying from 26 to 32 men for each of the 4-hour duties, from 7 pm to 7 am. (38) The CLPR was called out for emergency duty at police stations during the Police Strike on the 31st August 1918, but did not carry out any active duties. They were out in force on Armistice day, and continued patrols until patrol duties were discontinued in March 1919 (39). Once routine duties had ceased, the Reserve was retained to help police official functions, and in June 1919 mustered in Hyde Park with the Metropolitan Special Constabulary, to be reviewed by the King (40)

The CLPR were also called out on air-raid duty on 46 occasions, the first on 31st January 1916 when 467 turned out, and the last on 6th August 1918, when 200 were present. Throughout that period the numbers available for air-raid duties fluctuated considerably: for example, on 4th July 1917, 50 men reported for duty but three nights later, when Fenchurch Street was bombed in the heaviest raid of the war on 7th July 1917, 1673 Reservists attended, while at the next raid on the 22nd July 1917, 329 turned out (41).

Although no detailed pocketbooks or records from individual reservists survive, the commendations gained by the CLPR give an insight into the wide range of duties they performed, although this insight must necessarily be biased in favour of less routine occurrences. These included commendations for arrests for unlawful possession, drunk and disorderly and drunk and incapable, for breaking and entering, loitering and for theft, for arresting a man who had escaped from Pentonville, and for arresting confidence tricksters. Police Reservists were also commended for stopping runaway horses, and for reporting contraventions of the liquor regulations.

The CLPR were also commended for more directly war-related incidents, for example in detecting and reporting fires and saving a woman's life during a fire. In another case a special constable was thanked by the assistant commissioner for perusing and translating Swedish correspondence in a case of trading with the enemy, while during the Fenchurch Street Air Raid on the 7th July 1917 another special constable was commended for stopping a runaway pony in Cloak lane and "While holding the said pony's head, was struck on the hand by a piece of metal (supposed shrapnel) during an Air Raid". Yet another was commended for good work and valuable assistance to the Detective Department during an inquiry relating to persons suspected of offences against the Defence of the Realm Regulations (42).

Given the constraints on war-time recruitment, and the high turn-over of both regulars and reservists to the forces, the numbers of recruits remarkably increased, so that despite losing 3,105 members of the Reserve to the Forces, by the 14th June 1919 there were still 2,148 members of the CLPR and 453 "Special" reservists (43).

The Metropolitan Special Constabulary performed very similar duties to the City specials, and often worked in tandem with them, especially during air-raids. Hadaway (44) documents how they were mobilised for air-raid duty on 58 occasions, and helped the regulars in war work which, in the Second World War, was allocated to the Civil Defence and Observer Corps, or the Home Guard. These duties included the guarding of Prisoners of War, and secondment to the Royal Navy as ack-ack crews. They also manned observation posts on the approaches to London to warn of incoming air-raids. These warning systems were initially rudimentary. The police blew whistles or rode about on bicycles with placards around their necks (45) However, these warnings became more sophisticated as the war progressed, when special constables were used to drive cars containing bugle-blowing boy scouts through the streets (46)

Away from the metropolis, special constables were also being deployed on a variety of tasks (47). A Manchester special, J.E. Chatfield, whose duties consisted of foot patrols in slum areas, recorded his experiences (48)

"The 'Special' with a sense of humour need never lack amusement. "Make your beats as interesting for yourselves as possible, gentlemen!" the Inspector once said. And that is just what, as a rule, we contrive to do. In war time there is, happily, very little crime of either a serious or comparative, trivial nature to occupy our full time. The "no report" which is the official pocketbook method of describing "slack business" gives us plenty of opportunity for observing the funny side of police work." (49)

Chatfield goes on to describe an incident involving the arrest of a horse:

"I had by the arm a man whose drinking had been "not wisely but too well" and who had developed an affection for me that was as sudden as it was unwelcome, declaring between his attempts to kiss me, that I was his long-lost brother and that he would never leave me! when we saw a horse straying about the street.

After a consultation between my colleague and myself, we decided that he should take the horse to the police-station, whilst I got rid of my maudlin companion.

"It soon became evident that management of strange horses was not one of my fellow 'Specials' strong points and as my 'boosey' friend was unwilling that I should leave him, such advice, as, from the little knowledge of horses, I possessed had to be offered from a distance, subject to the criticism of my parasitic charge. Anyhow the horse appeared as determined to resist being taken to the station, as we were that it should go. The more my colleague pulled the horse the harder the horse pulled the other way.

"Eventually the sound of the struggle, and the frantic clicking of the tongue, brought from a neighbouring stable yard, a man, who, it seemed, should rightly have been in attendance on the horse.

"In language which in, say, St. Anns Square, would be considered unnecessarily offensive, but in our own district is the common tongue he demanded the return of his horse!

"Now here a problem presented itself! By laying hands on the horse we had placed it under arrest! According to instructions, "once he has made an arrest the policeman must not on any account release his prisoner until he has charged him at the station!" Did that instruction apply to this horse? We didn't know! But the inspector said "use common sense"; so common sense we used, and liberated the horse; with a caution "as to its future behaviour". (50)

The Dog Rationing Order, which prohibited owners from feeding their dogs with any food that was fit for human consumption, and listed bread, sago pudding, rice, maize and oatmeal, as forbidden, also added variety to routine duties. Chatfield (51) recounts how specials were sent out to all the known dog-owners in the district with instructions on how they were to feed their animals. Perhaps unsurprisingly, public reaction to these visits bordered on the incredulous. One man called his dog over to him, and told him he wasn't allowed to eat cake or porridge any longer. He then asked "Can we give him beef steak or mutton chops do'st think?". The specials thought not. "How about 'am an' eggs?" The specials could find nothing in the order prohibiting ham and eggs. Stooping down and gently patting the dog's head, its owner whispered in its ear "then tha'll have to be satisfied wi 'am an' eggs!"

A less colourful account of what inevitably must have been tedious routine, is contained in the pocketbook of a Cheshire special, Mr. Scott, who was deployed from January 1917 to March 1919 (52) His duties consisted of a 3 hour shift from 10.00 p.m to 1.00 a.m each Sunday until April 1917, with nothing to report. In April he was on duty on two consecutive Wednesdays, and then on day duties on alternate Wednesdays and Sundays, interspersed with an occasional night duty throughout 1818, although he records that he was allowed Christmas Day off. On Friday 12th April 1918, he was called out from home at midnight for air-raid duty. On 23rd October, he reported that some metal fittings had been stolen from a public urinal, and

on the 27th did air raid duty at the police station, rather than going out on patrol. He continued turning out for duty until March 1919, with only one day of, for illness.

Thus, the deployment of specials in the First World War ranged from the highly dramatic to the mundane. Not only did they provide a large body of trained men to help-out en masse during air-raids (in some forces, service as a special was made conditional on successfully completing a course in First Aid) (53), but as the numbers of regulars diminished, they took over an increasing amount of routine patrolling.

Conditions of service: policy and problems

At the onset of war, the preference of the authorities was to enroll recruits to the second reserves who had sufficient income not to need to claim a hardship allowance (54), and initially volunteers were expected to go on duty with no uniform and no pay.

In Bolton, dissatisfaction with conditions first surfaced among men of the paid second reserve. In December 1914 the United Trades Council wrote to the Chief Constable requesting that the 3/6d daily allowance be raised to 5/-. The Chief Constable responded by dispensing with the services of the men who had complained (55).

As the war progressed and both regulars, and specials were enlisted, more men from poorer backgrounds were enrolled into the specials. The policy not to pay allowances resulted in severe hardship for many. Meanwhile, there was growing discontent amongst the unpaid reserves about the lack of provision of uniforms. Chatfield, noting the unpopularity of enforcement of the Restricted Lighting Order, and commenting on the lengths to which people made excuses for its infringements remarks;

"... even "Specials" are human beings, and if, as not infrequently happened, it was a wet night and water from the copings of back yard walls had been trickling down our necks, or, we had been up to the knees in open soughs, while searching for offenders down back passages, we were not always in a condition of mind to accept more or less lame excuses!" (56)

Poorer recruits particularly suffered from the lack of uniform. The Officer in Charge of the Special Constabulary in Hersham wrote complaining of conditions to the Surrey Commandant:

"Your attention is called not only to those Specials who have give up their leisure evenings after a hard days work in town or business, locally, but also to those of the Force whose livelihood is, obtained by manual labour, many of whom after a patrol in the pouring rain, had to turn out early the next morning in soaked overcoats and boots, as no suitable equipment was provided for police duty, and their slender means prevented them from purchasing a duplicate outfit."(57)

In some areas, particularly in the City of London, specials were expected to patrol away from home, and might have to spend the night on duty, but still got no allowances to help them buy food.

Seth notes that initially not only were Metropolitan specials not paid allowances, but that they were also expected to provide their own warm clothing for night duty, as well as coke for their braziers (58). Although provision existed under S8 of the 1831 Special Constables Act to reimburse specials, by s28 of the Police Act 1890 such expenses were to be met from the Police Rate. Specials were consequently put under pressure to forgo claiming expenses or had to undergo a humiliating procedure before being recompensed (59) . Ten days after the Metropolitan Special Constabulary was set up, the Home Office decreed that administrative expenses for the 20,000 strong force should not exceed £50 per week. This proved inadequate, and in November 1914 the Home Office authorised the reimbursement of In February 1915, local (60). out-of-pocket expenses authorities were authorised to issue caps, leggings and overcoats to those specials who could pay for them. A "special need" grant of $\pounds 3$ was made available to those who could not (61).

Dissatisfaction with these arrangements culminated in a call for a mass strike made by a rector in a letter to the Globe in October 1915, as being "the only action which will have an effect on our purile and vacillating Government." (62) The Home Office responded to the pressure by granting allowances for sustenance to specials on emergency duty, rail warrants and bicycle allowances. Special constables were also authorised to buy their own uniform caps, and could be reimbursed the purchase price. In November, every Metropolitan special who had completed 60 hours' duty was issued with a uniform coat and boots. In May 1916, the uniform was completed by the issue of tunic and trousers, and the qualifying period lowered to 20 hours (63).

Other followed suit, although the regulations were forces implemented differentially. Specials in Manchester were issued with trilbys, while Metropolitan specials were allowed a full uniform with a peaked cap, rather than the regular officers' helmets (64) City specials were provided with a uniform in September 1916 (65) while specials in Cambridge, after lobbying the watch committee from May to July 1916, were eventually provided with a summer tunic. Approval for full uniform was refused (66). Cambridge specials continued to protest, and in September 1916 were allowed provision for refreshments on long tours of duty. It was however not until March 1917, nearly three years after they had commenced weekly duties, that the chief constable was authorised to provide them with overcoats. Even then, this was to be a discretionary, rather than a general provision (67).

Lack of pay, uniform and allowances, were major issues during the war, and adversely affected the ways in which specials performed their duties, as well as the drop-out rate. Seth contends that these grievances may have affected recruitment and caused resignations (68). By 1916, the Metropolitan specials were experiencing a recruitment crisis, which prompted an appeal from a member of parliament, William Bull, for volunteers, which was published in the Referee in May 1916. He noted that since the beginning of the war, the use of special constables had resulted in a saving to ratepayers of £30,000 a month, which would otherwise have been spent on wages for the regular police (69).

Seth's speculations are reinforced by Ward's report which notes that, of the 40,500 odd resignations from the Metropolitan Special Constabulary during the War years, nearly 18,500 were for "private reasons" (70). Further, during the war period, over 55,000 Metropolitan specials retired because of ill-health. Over 5,000 died while in service, 27 as a direct result of exposure to the terrible weather conditions and many others because of illness brought on by exposure, especially where their period of service included five winters. (71)

Given the appalling conditions, the specials showed remarkable persistence in carrying on, and a substantial number served for at least three years; for example, at the end of the war 2775 specials in Essex qualified for long service medals (72)

Relations with the public

Public reaction to the use of specials on beat patrols was not universally favourable and their initial lack of uniform and experience meant that they were often not recognised as police officers. Chatfield's account contains several references to misunderstandings which resulted;

"One evening as my colleague and I were pacing one of the principal streets of our district a woman hurriedly came up to us and breathlessly enquired "if we'd seen a policeman". We, with assumed dignity, proudly attempted to assure her that "we were policemen". And with an eye to a possible 'case' desired to know her trouble!

It transpired that her brother-in-law was threatening to smash her windows. The specials asked her address:

"Knowing that two 'Specials' were on duty near the street she named, we told her so, and advised her to seek their assistance.

"Oh", she replied with staggering contempt, "I've seen them. I want a proper policeman! he'd take no notice of them sort." And off she ran to find her 'proper policeman'. "(73)

In another incident, which Chatfield blames on his inexperience, he and his colleague were hailed by two innocent looking young women who wished to know "Why the Specials were out tonight?"

"Thinking they meant the special edition of some newspaper, we replied that "we were unable to say". To which answer they sarcastically replied that, "that was just what they thought". "You look like as if you don't know what you're walking about for!"(74)

Public intolerance of specials existed elsewhere. In Hertford a member of the public complained that they made too much noise when out on air-raid duties, and in August 1916 the senior officer wrote to the sub-section leader that:

"I shall be pleased if you will kindly inform your men not to make any more noise than possible when calling out... and also not to talk loudly whilst out on duty nor to mention Zeppelins as we do not wish to cause a panic in any way." (75)

Reay describes the 1915 Lusitania Riots, during which 11,000 specials were deployed on the streets of London to prevent the looting of German owned businesses. Many specials agreed with public sentiment:

"... it may well be doubted whether amongst the thousands of Special Constables who did their duty so splendidly, who combated the fury of the crowds and protected the assailed Germans and their property, it would have been possible to find a man who did not heartily share the wholesome anger which provoked these riots.

"Happily the Specials all knew better than the crowds. They knew that if business or private premises were wrecked the sufferers were entitled to compensation out of a fund to which the wreckers themselves, as ratepayers, contributed; they understood, therefore, that the mob's way of expressing resentment was a sort of scratching the nose to spite the face ... (76)

Thus:

"It was just a little flow of humour when an officer at Camden Town was "pleased to report that a good many windows of premises occupied by Germans were broken, in spite of the efforts of the Special Constabulary to prevent damage to property"."(77)

Even though the specials were sympathetic to the anti-German feelings of the crowd, this did not prevent them from being attacked. These assaults may not have been deliberately directed against them as police, as specials had not, at this stage been provided with full uniforms:

"Few Germans - if our memory serve us - suffered any personal injury, although the "casualties" were 257, and 866 persons were arrested. Indeed, there were more broken heads, bruised bodies, and torn clothes amongst the Special Constabulary - who worked under the disadvantage of being in plain clothes - than amongst the rioters." (78)

After three years of seeing specials on patrol in Manchester, initial public hostility gave way to a grudging acceptance. According to Chatfield:

"No longer do 'Specials' arouse the curiosity of passers-by, or provoke jeering challenges from the 'rising generation', as it scuttled into the security of labyrinthian back streets and passages ... No longer do the weary-eyed unwashed 'ladies', seated on their doorsteps, opine loudly to nobody in particular, that "they'd be doin' more good in th' army same as other folks" No longer ... do the toilers, who do not toil, lounge about street corners and sniff at us as we pass,

or mutter sundry sarcastic comments on our appearance, and hint at the probability of early but undesirable alterations to our features ...

"Stranger still, perhaps we 'Specials' have become accustomed to ourselves; No more does the meeting with groups of beshawled mill girls cause us embarrassment, or their over-candid criticism and characteristic badinage leave us blushing and speechless... the one sided conflict of former days, has given place to more evenly matched duels of good humoured-banter... in fact, the 'Special' has become an accepted institution and is now as much part of the national life as the Boy Scout..."(79)

Although the public may have grown to accept specials, there is evidence that resentment persisted, fuelled by popular feeling that they were an organisation for conscientious objectors, and skivers. A humorous postcard of the period depicts a smartly dressed businessman wearing a special constabulary armband, ogling two pretty girls in a first-floor window, with the caption "I wonder if I shall be called up?" (80)

Another indication of how strong the resentment may have been, in London at least, is that during his address on the 26th October 1920 in which he presented the Freedom of the City to 415 members of the City of London Police Reserve, the Lord Major felt constrained to point out that the specials were not conscientious objectors, but consisted mostly of men too old to go to the front, or who were unable to enlist for medical reasons. (81)

Relations with the regular police

Initially the influx of volunteers was welcomed by the regular police. An editorial in Police Review on the 18th September 1914 commented:

"It is satisfactory to find that the Specials are harmoniously working with their professional brethren and that the fullest esprit de corps prevails amongst all sections. The regular Police are very ready to give assistance and helpful advice to their amateur comrades. One result is that those citizens who are doing their duty are more clearly realising the danger and difficulties of a Policeman's calling, and a sympathetic feeling is evoked which should increase the cordiality existing between Police and Public" (82)

However, the honeymoon did not last long. From the start, regulars resented the paid specials, and in a letter to Police Review in August 1914, a Kent County regular complained that the daily rate of 5/- exceeded the regulars' pay of 4/5d daily after ten years' service. Further:

"Among our Special Constables there are a number who have previously tried for our force and been rejected, when the pay was three shillings and threepence a day; and now it is five shillings a day they are taken on. Many of them are boys. Should anything serious turn up, I suppose it will be the permanent men who will be sent to attend to it, and the Specials will take our places at home ... "(83)

This prediction came true in Bolton in 1916, when a shortage of regulars meant that specials were taken off beat duty and put on point duties, freeing regulars for patrols (84)

Reay notes that during the Lusitania riots, "quaint mistakes" were sometimes made by regulars because of the difficulty of distinguishing specials in the dark from sections of the riotous crowds (85). This explanation is hardly convincing. By the time of the Lusitania riots, Metropolitan specials had been issued with armlets, truncheons and whistles, and were organised into divisions, rather than acting individually (86). In theory they should have been identifiable to regulars as police officers, and at the very least this example illustrates the lack of liaison or integration between regulars and specials.

In Surrey, hostility between regulars and specials reached a peak in November 1916 when a special wrote to the Purford and West Byfleet section leader, complaining of interference from an 'ordinary' constable in his enforcement of lighting regulations, and threatening to resign:

"My object in writing to you is to enquire whether police constables without any reference to the Specials - absolutely ignoring them - are to go round making their own requirements and laying down their own standard of lighting. If this is so a Special can have absolutely no authority in his own district ... " (87)

The petulant tone adopted by this special is hardly typical, but indicates the underlying resentment between the professional and amateur police.

Whatever bad feeling was seething under the surface throughout the war was brought to a head by the London Police Strike in August 1918, when the regulars took industrial action to try to gain union recognition. According to Reay (88)

"It is enough to say that when it was a question of leaving London to the tender mercy of the joyous criminal, the Special Constables did not hesitate. They carried on - until the Regulars were ready to resume - in no spirit of hostility to their regular comrades of the stipendiary service, with whom in the anti-German riots and the air-raids they worked side by side, but in response to the prompting the same sense of duty which originally induced them to accept police warrant cards and in fulfilment of the solemn covenant they had made with the community..."

Not only were existing specials deployed through the strike, but a new unit, attached to the Honourable Artillery Company, was created as a direct result (89)

The use of specials during the 1918 strike did little to improve relations with their regular colleagues, and probably contributed to the popular view of specials as strikebreakers (90). However, the strike itself was not an unmitigated failure; according to Judge (91), the strike had the effect of transforming police conditions. it also resulted in the 1919 Police Act which outlawed police unions

and created the Police Federation, and forced the government to set up the Desborough Committee to examine pay and conditions. A further consequence was that it assured the continuing existence of the Metropolitan Special Constabulary:

"Sir Neville Macready, Commissioner of Police, decided to keep the Metropolitan Special Constabulary Reserve in being... A great number of recruits would be needed, and his thoughts turned to the thousands of men returning to civilian employment... it was all done quietly, as is the major part of police work; no press or other publicity. Rumours however got about and the mere thought of increasing the Special Constabulary was unwelcome to a certain section of the community who dubbed them 'Strike Breakers'... Perhaps this was unfortunately encouraged by the unrest in the regular force itself." (92)

On the 18th June 1919 the establishment of a permanent, uniformed Metropolitan Special Constabulary Reserve was formally announced. (93).

The war ends but the reserves continue

"Now I can get back to the growing of sweet-peas" exclaimed one Jubilant (special) on the sounding of the Armistice (94)

After the Armistice, there was uncertainty about what should be done with the reserves. The 1914 Special Constables Act only enabled them to be appointed 'during the present war' (95): the peacetime situation was still governed by the 1831 Special Constables Act and the 1882 Municipal Corporations Act.

In December 1918 the Home Office sent a circular to chief constables thanking specials for their help and stating the need for emergency schemes was now over (96). In Hertfordshire the chief constable wrote that he hoped that even if the official specials were disbanded, a voluntary organisation on the same lines could be set up (97), while in the City of London a standing reserve, consisting of men sworn-in for three years and supplied with uniform, was kept on "due to the spirit of unrest". They could be called on for duty as the Commissioner deemed necessary, but their attendance at parades and ceremonial occasions was optional. Ward Companies of reserves were also formed, consisting of men sworn in as special constables for one year, on the understanding that they were only called on during emergencies(98).

The 1918 circular was quickly followed by a circular to chief constables in January 1919, which recommended the maintenance and expansion of the Second Police Reserves . Special Constables were to be retained during demobilisation, but their workload was to be reduced as quickly as the return of regulars from the Army, and the filling of full-time vacancies permitted. Active duty was to cease once peace was concluded, but the most capable specials who were not too old for future service were encouraged to register as part of an emergency reserve. Army returnees were also to be induced to register as special constables(93).

Dissatisfaction with war-time conditions of service had led to a

loss of good will, and special constables did not universally welcome requests to continue serving in peacetime.

Problems were experienced in Sunderland, described by the Chief Constable as being essentially a working man's town. The special constables had not yet been demobilised, but did not want to join the reserve unless the conditions of service were made clear (100).

In Essex, the Chief Constable reported that, following industrial disorders in 1917, he had been given permission by the standing joint committee to set up a First Police Reserve to augment police strength (101). He had hoped to raise the First Reserve from existing special constables, and to bring them into being as soon as the specials were disbanded, but had failed completely. Senior specials informed him that the pay was seen as inadequate and that a minimum of 10/- per day plus food and quarters was required (102). In addition, in the event of industrial disturbance, the specials would consider it their duty to be at their place of business. They also felt that their services during the war had not been properly appreciated, and in any event the men in the specials were too old for active service.

"I pointed out that powers existed to call men up for police duty in the event of industrial disturbances and that as a citizen it was their duty to take their share in the preservation of order.

"In reply I was led to believe that if any question of compulsion was introduced the men would not be likely to respond. The Force of Special Constables in this County is now "standing by" and although not actually disbanded, they are doing no police duty."

The chief constable concluded that the maintenance of a reserve was not practicable, although he had retained 50 sets of uniform in the hopes that, if an emergency arose some men would come forward (103).

The Home Office's response to the problems being experienced in swearing in reserves under the 1882 Municipal Corporations Act, was to seriously consider advocating compulsion to ensure that adequate numbers enrolled, as:

".... experience during the War has shown that men might be good soldiers though they refused to join the Army except under legal compulsion..." (104)

But this possibility was later ruled out, even though it was supported by the Constabulary Inspectors, on the basis that it would inevitably lead to the special constabularies being seen as a strikebreaking force, and was therefore impracticable (105).

A different approach was adopted in Birmingham, where specials joined forces with the regulars in open revolt over their autocratic treatment by the Chief Constable. The Head Special Constable, a Police Prosecuting Solicitor named Hill, was dismissed in April 1919, allegedly because he had failed to organise a reserve; only 170 of the 3,500 serving specials had put their names forward to join it (106). The specials' hierarchy resigned in protest, and

this sparked a wave of resignations from non-ranked specials. On the 14th April, the Police and Prison Officers Union Executive Committee called a meeting to express their thanks and gratitude to special constables, and their solidarity with Hill. The Birmingham Gazette reported that over 900 specials had joined the union: cordial relations between regulars and specials had resulted in the specials gaining experience of police conditions, and sympathising with regular grievances (107).

In a letter to the Birmingham Mail on the 17th April, one of the specials who had refused to enrol in the police reserve complained that the watch committee and the chief constable

"looked upon specials as a necessary evil; they would have preferred to do without them, but just tolerated them on sufferance... The Watch Committee's treatment towards the "specials" - as it has been towards the "regulars" - has been uniformly parsimonious... The Chief Constable's attitude has always been one of supercilious aloofness." (108)

On the 22nd April, the Chief Constable wrote to the Home Office, reinforcing the charge of aloofness by admitting that "I do not know what is going on in the Special Constabulary Office as I am not in touch with the working of that Department ..." (109)

The watch committee seem to have decided that the only solution was to dissolve the special constabulary. In May the Home Office responded, stressing the importance of creating a permanent police reserve under the control of the chief constable (110). In June, the Mayor visited the Home Office to express his concern that it would prove impossible to appoint a new reserve. The Home Office assured him that appointment was unnecessary, and all that was needed was to enrol men ready to act when called on. The meeting concluded with the Mayor agreeing to use his discretion, and the Home Office noting that the situation was entirely the fault of the watch committee for losing control of the specials to the Head Constable to start with. (111)

Industrial unrest escalated during 1919. A Strike Committee was organised by Lloyd George, and on the 3rd October 1919, the Government appealed for members of the London public to be sworn in to a Citizen Guard. This was a new organisation, designed specifically to help the police protect strikebreakers, and was an 'idiotic' proposal by General Macready, Metropolitan Police Commissioner (112). No figures are available for enrolment to the Citizen Guard, but these volunteers were probably used to drive vehicles in the week-long railway strike which ended early in October 1919 (113). Once it had ended, the strategy of using volunteers to combat industrial disorder was established (114).

In December 1919, the Home Secretary wrote to chief constables recommending that no further steps should be taken to form a citizen guard, but that special constabulary organisations should be reconstituted and strengthened to form permanent peacetime reserves (115). Some experienced specials from the war-time reserves were to be retained as a nucleus, but the bulk would be new recruits who signed up in order to help with specific public order crises as and

when they arose. The civil, locally accountable, and non-political nature of the organisation was to be stressed during recruitment drives, to counter public fears that the new reserves would be right-wing strikebreaking forces. (116)

Once again, problems surfaced in Birmingham because of the specials' affinity with the regular police. Although he had succeeded in attracting new recruits to the reserve by October 1919, and was continuing to enrol more (117), the Chief Constable informed the Home Office that they had complained that the uniform was distinctive and 'led to certain disabilities'. Consequently he was providing the new Special Constabulary Reserve Organisation with exactly the same uniform as the regulars wore. Meanwhile he wanted the Home Office's opinion on whether they should also be provided with identical collars. (118)

The notion that special constables could wish to be so closely associated with the full-time police caused consternation at the Home Office, and fears were expressed that too close an integration would act as a deterrent to potential recruits. Thus:

"... a Special Constable in police uniform is scarcely recognisable as the "ordinary citizen" discharging a duty incumbent on all loyal citizens by law - there are a good many citizens who are perfectly ready to do their duty as such but would be unwilling to assume the character of a police constable." (119)

The Chief Constable was consequently informed that the Secretary of State objected to police reservists wearing ordinary police uniform, although if they were issued with different ones, they could have numbers affixed to the collars of their tunics (120)

The political situation deteriorated throughout the winter of 1919, and on 2nd February 1920 a conference of ministers was called to discuss the threat of industrial action and the likelihood of revolution. The meeting was at first concerned with availability of the Army, and concluded that the country was practically defenceless. A Labour MP warned of sabotage during industrial action, and that there were groups preparing for Soviet government. He suggested that legislation should licensing people to bear arms, as experience in Ireland had shown that this was a practical way of keeping track of those in possession of them. Sir Robert Horne, the Minister of Labour, suggested instead that secret lists of reliable supporters should be prepared by Chief Constables (121).

Horne's suggestion was acted on, and in March 1920 the Home Office issued a secret circular to chief constables, warning that the military would be unable to give much assistance in the protection of vulnerable points or persons wishing to continue working, in the event of a widely extended strike. The whole responsibility would fall onto the police, with the assistance of a properly organised special constabulary. Military aid could only be applied for if riots threatened. Meanwhile there was to be no public appeal for specials yet, but arrangements should be made for their employment in large numbers (122).

A conference of chief constables from industrial and mining areas held in August 1920, agreed that chief constables should have greater discretion in deciding which special constables should be paid, and in response the Home Office issued a circular allowing the grant of an allowance of up to 10/- per day to men whom the chief constable was satisfied were otherwise losing wages which they could not afford, and that no other suitable men were available (123)

Although police reserves, serving under improved conditions, had been set up in many areas, they were prepared to exercise a surprising degree of militancy if required to be deployed on duties of which they did not approve. The Chief Constable of St. Helens reported a near mutiny when he called out specials in response to arson attacks by Irish Republicans, and tried to organise them on routine weekend patrols. He asked the Home Office's advice about the feasibility of prosecuting specials who refused to parade when ordered to do so, as

"if such a step is not taken to enforce the law, it is extremely probable that very few of the Specials will perform their duties." (124)

Meanwhile, forty delinquent specials had contributed to a defence fund, and instructed a local Councillor, J. Haslam Fox, to act for them. He wrote to the watch committee, requesting a meeting, but they washed their hands of any responsibility for specials and referred him back to the chief constable (125). The Chief Constable then wrote to the Home Office saying that he had received information that, on Mr Fox's advice, the specials were prepared to resist service and defy orders.(125)

The Home Office were unsympathetic. Although it was noted that "though an unwilling Special may not be of much value, it would be most unfavourable to countenance the idea that he can refuse duty with impunity", it was felt that the Chief Constable was rather a bully, prosecutions of the specials were unlikely to succeed, and in any case would have an adverse affect on recruitment (127)

The Chief Constable was accordingly advised that the Secretary of State doubted that Sinn Feiners setting fire to farms constituted an emergency justifying the calling-out of specials(128), and that in any case he did not think that specials could be called on to reinforce the police at weekends as a regular practice. (129)

Against this background, arrangements for emergency policing continued. The Strike Committee, now renamed the Supply and Transport Committee, coordinated the military, police and essential emergency services. and was responsible for the recruitment of volunteer specials. During the miners' lock-out in April 1921, special constables were enrolled in large numbers but not actually deployed(130).

Questions of when specials could lawfully be called out were raised later that year by Captain Sant, Chief Constable of Surrey. He was concerned that "in these days of unemployment agitations" a local situation could get out of hand and be beyond the power of a small county force to control. Even though this could not be seen as a national emergency, it would be useful to be able to call out

specials. He continued that when last inspecting specials, he had been informed that they were "more likely to die of inanition than of overwork, and ... the apathy which one meets with in the movement is much due to the fact that, as an emergency has to be declared before their services can be called on, the Special Constabulary are not likely to be of much use."(131)

Sant again raised the issue at a Central Conference of Chief Constables. The Home Secretary, Sir Edward Troup, in a novel analysis of the position governing appointment, referred to the December 1919 circular (132) and responded that unless they had specifically been enrolled solely for national emergencies, provided the specials were not able to say that they were being required to do something for which they had not bargained when they enrolled, and provided they were willing to act, they could do so even if there was no emergency (133).

The position governing the appointment of reserves had now become a complex mess. Inconsistent policy on the part of the Home Office indicated that deployment was now contingent on the priorities of the specials themselves. The established provisions of the 1831 Special Constables Act were invalid if, as in St. Helen's, they meant that individuals had to be coerced into acting on the anticipation of felonies, whilst if they were merely bored, specials could be called out anyway. Meanwhile, the Government spent over £58,000 in March 1923 on preparations to enrol large numbers of specials in the event of a national emergency, and on a stockpile of uniforms, armlets and badges (134).

By mid-1923, confusion over the conditions for appointing reserves and prosecuting recalcitrant specials, coupled with fears of political suicide if they were seen to be creating a force of strikebreaking conscripts and a desire to avoid the use of the military at all costs, compelled the Government to finally introduce legislation to clarify the position of the post-war reserves. On the 7th June, despite heated opposition from Labour MPs, the 1923 Special Constables Act was passed which legitimated the use of permanent special constabularies in peacetime.

The Inter-war years

Specials were deployed throughout the 1920s and 1930s. The STC's emergency arrangements came into operation during the General Strike, when 226,000 specials were mobilised across the country (135). In 1930, there were nearly 145,000 specials on the books nationwide, the highest number ever appointed in peacetime (136).

Early in the 1930s, the Metropolitan and City of London reserves were reorganised, mainly to get rid of dead wood. All were required to sign three year contracts. The City specials were formed into "A" and "B" reserves, depending on the frequency of duties and number of hours they were willing to work (137). In 1933 plans for setting up a uniformed reserve were discussed. The Metropolitan Receiver proposed getting rid of more than 5,000 men who had no uniforms, and another 2,500 who were aged over 50. Rather than attempting a weeding-out process of the non-uniformed men, it was decided "... simply to ignore them, unless they turn up on any occasion and this risk will gradually grow less" (138). The

official figures for enrolled specials were totally misleading: although records indicated that there were nominally over 19,000 specials in the Metropolitan Special Constabulary (139), only 3,500 attended a parade held on the 8th June 1934 (140).

The reorganisation was successful: in 1937 the Commander in Chief of the Metropolitan Special Constabulary reported that in the previous year 1259 new recruits had been enrolled, and there were a total of 7906 special constables of whom 43% were serving on the new terms. At his request, the Home Office approved an extension of the age limit to 53 from 50, before automatic transfer to the auxiliary reserve (141).

In August 1939, just before the outbreak of war, there were 12,199 active metropolitan specials, and roughly 900 auxiliaries and reserve officers. By December, this had dropped to a total of 11,243 officers available, including 4176 full-time specials, and 4896 part-timers, 316 auxiliaries, and 100 reserve officers. (142).

Elsewhere, special constables were also being trained and deployed in preparation for war:

In Portsmouth, the Chief Constable reported to the Watch Committee on the 3rd May 1938, that the special constabulary had been formed primarily for air-raid precautions, but that he was forming a uniformed reserve of 31 special constables who would all be ex-PCs. On the 7th February 1939 the Watch Committee authorised the Chief Constable to ascertain whether 50 members of the existing special constabulary would be prepared to serve in a paid police reserve, and by 18th April the Chief Constable reported that a First Police Reserve had been formed of 43 ex-PCs, that a Police War Reserve consisting of more than 352 men was to be formed, and that a special constabulary transport section, divided into full and part-time units, was in the process of being set up (143).

In Bolton, a recruitment drive was held in 1937, and in September the Chief Constable reported that there were 186 specials on the strength. He went on to recommend that six collapsible desks were purchased and that an Ericsson Telephone and a signal pillar should be hired so that the specials could be instructed in air-raid precautions, police duties, and company drill. They appeared to have patrolled fairly regularily, and in January 1939 were thanked for performing traffic control duties (144).

In 1937 over 700 specials in Essex had undergone a course in air-raid precautions, and steps were being taken to augment their numbers, while by 1938 1,250 men had been trained. By 1939 there were 506 auxiliaries performing full-time duty, consisting of 61 First Police Reserves, 163 special constables, and 272 war reserves. In addition there were 1955 voluntary part-time special constables performing duties, of whom 350 were working for more than 8 hours per week. (145).

Following the Munich crisis in September 1938, training for specials across the country was stepped up to include sessions in dealing with incendiary devices, and air raid precautions, (146). In addition they were already fully mobilised in some forces in response to the IRA bombing campaigns of 1934 - 1939 (147). By

September 1939, 180,200 part-time specials had enrolled in England, Wales and Scotland (148).

An Order in Council on the 28th September 1939 permitted the employment of specials on a full-time basis at 60/- per week. The Government would bear the whole cost of the auxiliary police including the Police War Reserve, part-time special constables, and the Womens Auxiliary Police Corps (149).

The option of appointing full-time specials, as opposed to Police War Reserves, was not universally taken up - for example Surrey did not appoint any (150). In the Metropolitan Police, however, 5,360 of the specials were taken on full-time, "for the preservation of the public peace and the protection of the inhabitants and the security of property", duties were assigned by regular officers. These full-time specials were expected to attend special training classes alongside their regular colleagues and subsequently, to go out on duty with them assisting in the day to day policing of London, and also to undertake duties associated with "war incidents" (151).

The outbreak of war in September 1939 put an immediate stop to normal recruiting for the police. Serving officers who were reservists of the armed forces were immediately called to the colours and their places were filled by the First Police Reserve. Within a few days of the declaration of war, over 20,000 police reserves had joined the Metropolitan Police and there were over 46,000 police, including special constables in London.

The Police and Firemen (War Service) Bill was published in 1939, which suspended the right of regulars to retire on pension, unless they had the consent of their Chief officer. At the same time policing was classed as a reserved occupation by the Ministry of Labour, which meant the serving officers and auxiliaries could not volunteer for the armed forces, although they still had to register under the Conscriptions Acts (152).

Deployment

A special in the City of London graphically described the day war was declared:

"On September 3rd 1939 I reported for duty at 10.45 a.m. The station ... was crowded. There was a good muster of Specials and War Reserves, ... It was a bit chaotic as we Specials had to be issued with steel helmets and gas masks ... We heard the Prime Minister's, announcement that the country was at war followed by the Inspectors order 'Get those men on the streets at once.

"The sirens were screaming overhead.

"The vast increase in police manpower brought an immediate increase in the number of points. All police boxes had a man standing by them. Guards were put on telephone exchanges, cold stores and buildings, which had basements designated as air raid shelters. Each main road was patrolled, the longer streets being divided into two ... I remember standing guard on an enormous stack of balsa wood, used for the building of

Spitfires, and the look of astonishment of the constable, who did not know what the wood was, when I lifted a huge bulk in the air and balanced it on one hand." (153)

Metropolitan specials were assigned to duties including patrolling and guarding vulnerable points, beat patrols and special duties (154). In the early weeks of the war, the part-time specials of the H.A.C helped marshall and escort to railway terminals all the thousands of London children who were being evacuated to the country, while others helped to deal with the sudden rush of aliens seeking registration. They also went out on nightly duties; attendance records for the three months ended June 1940 show that out of a total available strength of 31 H.A.C specials, the average weekly attendance was 25 and more than 3,300 hours of active police duty were performed (155).

Special duties also included helping alongside the regulars and other emergency organisations such as the Civil Defence Corps, the Home Guard, the Red Cross and the Auxiliary Fire Service with rescue work after bombings. It was also sometimes necessary to guard against looting in the chaos of the blitz, so specials formed "anti-looting patrols". The work was dangerous - 4 part-time specials were killed and 13 injured whilst on duty. (156)

Specials also had to enforce the strict black-out regulations, but Butler suggests that they were reluctant to enforce the law against ordinary workers hurrying home carrying torches, although there were sometimes drives against offenders. He concludes that ultimately the impossibility of obtaining batteries did more to ensure that the blackout was observed than the efforts of the police.

The winter and spring of 1940 were so quiet that the hours of weekly duty were reduced to four, but in August 1940 the blitz started, and air raids became a nightly occurrence. Butler recalls a raid on 29th December, when he lost three teeth in the blast:

"The sirens went at 7.10 p.m. I soon had to help to deal with a scatter of incendiaries, and about an hour later was caught in the blast of a high explosive bomb which hit an insurance company 's premises in King William Street ... I was told to 'Go home, you'll be suffering from shock by the morning'. I got as far as Moorgate station, where a Police Inspector told me to take over from the regular constable on the Underground platform ... somewhere about three in the morning, I had orders to clear the people into a train that had been sent to fetch them. This was the night when the wholesale warehouses of the Wood Street and Fore Street district were destroyed and I saw flames meeting across the width of Fore Street as I made by way to Moorgate... I did indeed suffer from shock for a few days, and faced the next few duties with a sad lack of confidence, which I did not disclose to anyone" (57).

The biggest raid on the City occurred on 10th may 1941. Butler was on duty at 3.00 p.m:

"... it was impossible to pass along Victoria Street, as both sides were on fire, and the middle of the road was far too dangerous for passage. Queen Street and Queen Street Place

were almost covered with hose pipes, relaying water from the Thames... I remember trying to break the upper windows with stones so that the water could enter, but there was no force behind the throw at that height... I saw the heavy iron doors which we had always regarded as fireproof curl up from the heat like sheets of cardboard... sometime.. the word was passed round that every Special Constable available was wanted the next morning at seven... I reported at 6.45 a.m. and was posted to a barrier across Cannon Street. The City was closed to everyone other than Civil Defence personnel... by some extraordinary instinct, my wife found me amid the rubble and brought me something to eat." (158).

As a result of his prolonged absence from work, Butler was threatened with the sack by his managing director. Fortunately "Four days later he returned from a visit to the city and gave me my first big promotion in the company." (159)

Shortages of police became acute in 1941, as many of the War Reserves had been called to the forces, many younger regulars had enlisted and many specials had transferred to the Home Guard. Following the 10th May raid, duties were stepped up: City specials were to do a minimum 10 tours per month. Failure to do the requisite number would result in the offender being struck off the strength. (160)

This apparently led to some confusion, with large numbers of specials turning up "on spec". An order from the Commandant in October 1941 requests duty officers to get members to indicate their availability in advance (161).

Outside London, specials and other auxiliaries were also involved in air raid duties; in Cheshire, a Police War Reservist was commended by the Chief Constable for his excellent work in extinguishing incendiaries in November and December 1940:

"There is no doubt that your action, combined with those of the Special Constables and Air-Raid Wardens co-operating with you in work, prevented these incendiary bombs from creating large fires. (162)

Regulations for taking prisoners of war from crashed aircraft in Surrey give an idea of what tasks specials in rural areas were expected to perform. If a special was the first to observe a crashed plane or a parachutist, they were to immediately notify the nearest regular, or telephone the superintendent of police for the area, and to satisfy themselves that nothing else needed to be done 'from a police point of view'. If the aircraft was friendly, they should announce their presence and find out if police assistance was needed. If the plane was unattended, the special should pass the information on to regulars and guard it until they arrived, not letting any member of the public go near.(163)

Butler continued to patrol throughout the next three years. Following VE Day nearly all the War Reserve, resigned, and there was another shortage of police in 1945, although night duty for specials ceased. He carried on doing an eight hour Saturday duty every fortnight:

"I continued to parade with the regulars, now often only eight or ten in number, and some attempt was made to keep the system of beats and patrols going. There were as yet no cars ..."(164)

Butler resigned after completing 25 years service, after a naval officer was murdered in a smash and grab raid:

"I found out that the utmost I could hope for for my wife if she was widowed while I was on police duty was thirty pounds a year, and I reluctantly came to the conclusion that my duty to my family bade me call a halt to amateur policing." (165)

Deployment of war reserves

The auxiliary police during the second world war consisted of 6 categories: the First Police Reserve, who were paid and uniformed retired regular officers; the Police War Reserve, who were either enlisted or conscripted for war service as full-time police officers, with a minimum age of 25 in 1939 which was increased to 41 in 1942 (166); full-time special constables (uniformed and paid, but not conscripted); part-time uniformed specials; part-time non-uniformed specials; and the Womens' Auxiliary Police Corps.(167)

As sources of recruits for both the regular and the auxiliary police dried up, the police war reserves were "frozen" ie: they could not resign without permission from the chief constable. In addition, the National Service Act 1941 gave power to call up men for service in the PWR as an alternative to service in the armed forces (168). These conscripts were allocated by the Home Office to the forces which most needed recruits, and were under the direct control of the Home Secretary.(169)

In Surrey, part-time special constables over the age of 35 were first urged to consider joining the PWR in 1939(170). By 1941 the shortage of police had worsened and they were asked if they would be prepared to serve full-time for short periods in other forces, after heavy air raids (171). In 1942 specials in recently de-reserved occupation, who were now liable for military service were informed of the conditions of service in the PWR.

They had to be aged over 41 and if accepted, might have to serve in any part of England, although Surrey vacancies were most likely to be filled by by specials from Surrey. (172)

At first the war reserves were employed solely on war duties, such as air raid precautions and guarding vulnerable points, but as the numbers of regular decreased they were used more and more for police duty so that "by end of war they were largely interchangeable".. (173)

Conditions of Service; police and problems

Voluntary specials fared better than in the First World War, as regulations were soon passed which enabled them to qualify for refreshment and uniform allowances, and travelling expenses.

In November 1939, the Home Office issued a circular giving the conditions for allowances for motor vehicles, bicycles, travel

expenses and meals, the cost of which was to be met by an exchequer grant. (174) However, the bill for these allowances could prove to be crippling.

On the 29th November 1939, the Chief Constable of Bolton outlined the financial implications of the circular to the Watch Committee. Bolton had a mobile company of 100 part-time specials, who were doing approximately 5,000 miles of patrol duty monthly. If paid at the specified rates they would receive in total allowances of between £700 - £800 annually, while specials who used their cars to drive to and from duty were averaging 3,000 miles a month, at cost of £400 - £500 per year. The Watch Committee consequently approved his existing practice of supplying them with petrol from the police pump, instead of paying allowances. There were also 500 other part-time specials who received approximately 6d per week per man in other expenses, or a total of £650 per annum. In addition, a boot allowance could be paid to specials doing more than 8 hours per week, if the watch committee approved (175)

Conditions of service were further clarified by a circular of the 25th November, which outlined provisions for paid sick leave for auxiliaries. Expenditure incurred on the PWR and WAPCs was to be met from the exchequer, while expenditure on special constables would rank as approved police expenditure for the purposes of the Exchequer Grant (176)

By 1940, the shortage of male recruits was beginning to be a cause for concern, and forces were encouraged to appoint women either as permanent constables, or, where they had previous police experience, as temporary First Police Reservists. Forces were also reminded that there was scope for employing more women as WAPCs on duties which did not require police powers, either whole or part time, in order to relieve regulars and male auxiliaries. These duties included driving police vehicles, the maintenance and repair of police equipment, clerical work, telephone and wireless work and canteen work. The limitation of paid WAPCs to 10% of the authorised establishment, laid down in a circular of the 22.8.29, was increased to 15%. As many unpaid WAPCs could be appointed as the police authority felt necessary (177)

This circular was quickly acted on. On the 12th September 1940 the Home Office wrote to the Chief Constable of Bolton approving his appointment of five full-time WAPCs (178) Butler notes the appearance of women clerks in the police canteen sometime in 1941 (179), while by 1941 Essex had appointed 21 WAPCs, and by the end of the war had 43 on the record (180)

Overall, the numbers of paid women regulars increased from 282 in 1940, to 418 in 1945, while by the end of the war there were over 3,000 unattested full-time WAPCs (181).

A further circular in October 1940 was presumably designed to avoid the scandal of specials falling ill on duty through lack of a proper uniform, and instructed chief constables that specials were to be provided with winter coats and linings, and that the boot allowance was to be increased to 1/- a week (182). Shortly after, sick pay and conditions for wholetime paid and unpaid auxiliaries, and special constables, were improved. (183)

The organisation of special constables and other civil reserves was incomparably better than during the First World War, with the Home office agreeing fairly early on to their being provided with allowances, meals and uniforms. Even so, problems still cropped up. Seth cites grievances over insufficient remuneration for full-time specials, with some having to draw National assistance in order to cope financially. By the time the Home Office increased their pay to 70/- weekly in 1941, the cost of living had also risen. He also notes that, unlike in the First World War, no special was prosecuted for refusal to carry out orders, but this may have been because most forces set up internal disciplinary procedures so that such offences were not made public (184).

The issue of steel helmets led to complaints in the City of London. Although vital for protection during air raids, they were heavy and uncomfortable to wear for prolonged periods. In November 1939, City specials were granted the concession of being allowed to wear peaked caps to and from duty, provided the helmets were worn when actually on duty (185) In April 1942, they were given temporary permission to abandon wearing them on day shifts, but were reminded that the concession would be revoked if circumstances changed. Meanwhile, they were to carry them to and from duty, and leave them at the Police Station when out on patrol (196) (186) op cit Memo Chief Staff Officer to all ranks, 28.4.42 This appears to have been a satisfactory compromise, as no further orders were made concerning their use until they were withdrawn in June 1945 (187)

There were no formal procedures by which specials could air their grievances until June 1943, when the Home Office informed chief constables that these should be set up (188). In the City this took the form of a representative committee, elected by secret ballot from among ordinary and ranked part-time specials. It was to meet quarterly, and attendance was to count as police duty.(189)

The shortage of raw materials and a convoluted bureaucratic procedure ensured that many part-time specials had difficulty in achieving official recognition for their war work. As an economy measure, issue of the long service medal, to which specials, were entitled after completing more than 50 unpaid duties a year, was discontinued except in the case of posthumous awards. In July 1944 the qualifying number of duties was increased to 120 per year (190).

In 1944, Major Nicholson, the Chief Constable of Surrey, entered into a long correspondence with the Home Office over eligibility for long-service bars to medals. These were initially awarded after three years of 50 war-time duties annually. Problems arose over the eligibility of specials who had enrolled at the beginning of the war. The Home Office wanted to calculate entitlement as running from the date when the Chief Constable received notification of eligibility from the Home Office. The Chief Constable wanted to calculate eligibility from the date when the individual concerned had performed the requisite number of duties, pointing out that between that date and the Home Office notification date they were in a kind of limbo, with none of the duties which they performed meanwhile going towards eligibility for a subsequent bar. As there were lengthy delays between their qualifying dates and the Home Office notification date (sometimes up to a year), this had serious knock-on effects for future awards (191).

The combined effect of these provisions was to ensure that, once the medals and bars were available for issue after the war, many specials did not receive them either because the calculation of qualifying duties was so complex, their records had been lost, or they had died or moved away.

Relations with the Public

In Essex, the Chief Constable commended the efficiency and remarkable keenness of the Special Constabulary in his annual report for 1935. He went on to say that

"I am doubtful if the value of this voluntary organisation is fully appreciated by the public as, in addition to providing a trained nucleus for times of emergency, a great deal of assistance is rendered to the Regular Police in carrying out their normal duties."

Major Nicholson also commented on relationships between specials and the public:

"Even though at times the attitude of the public may not be all that could be desired, and despite the stress of present conditions, Special Constables must always remember that they must at all times be civil, courteous and impartial...." (192)

Once the war was underway, the use of special constables was probably too commonplace to be remarked upon. The class differences between specials and the public they policed, noticeable in Chatfield's account, were unlikely to have been as great as during the First World War. Part-time specials were in reserved occupations, but after a year of war, so too must have been the public they policed. In addition, nearly everyone who was not serving in the forces was participating in some form of voluntary auxiliary work.

By the end of 1944, after the Home Guard had been disbanded, there was some scepticism about the need to keep deploying specials. On the 29th November, "Our Wartime Query Corner" in "Punch" featured a spoof query from a Special lamenting that:

"I don't know why it is, but throughout my two and a half years as a Special Constable I have never managed to find anybody doing anything."

"Punch" suggests that his is clearly one of the types of noble nature that acts unconsciously as a neutralising force where evil is concerned, and goes on to suggest a few ways of "starting something" while out on patrol.

City Specials had also queried the usefulness of remaining on patrol, and William Penman, their Commandant was stung into sending out a special order in response he pointed out that if lack of incident was a criterion of usefulness, the Home Guard had wasted nearly all their spare time over the past four years, but that their mere existence had been a deterrent to air-bourne raiding, as well as enabling regular troops to be sent overseas instead of having to remain in Britain. Similarly:

"the existence of the Special Constabulary and the duties they have performed have enabled many of the younger Regular Police to join the Fighting Services... and, in their place, every additional man on the streets during uneventful patrolling is a deterrent to potential evil-doers... we have frequently had to deal with incidents due to enemy bombing. and we may still be called upon for that purpose at any time. When that risk is over there will be crowds and processions and there will still be a depleted Regular Police Force." (193)

Relations with the regular police

There is little evidence to show that relations between regulars and part-time specials were anything other than amicable, although Butler indicates that the competence of specials may have been under-rated; as soon as he spotted trouble and sent to the sergeant for instructions, he would be transferred elsewhere and a regular would take over. However, in his case honour was vindicated on one occasion when he wrote down the details of some small incident before sending for the sergeant:

" He read my notes reluctantly, and told me to make out a report when I came in for refreshments, which in due course I did ... He read it through slowly, said to me "Hand it in to the office" and to his mates "Just like a bleeding regular he is" ... "(194)

The relationship between regulars and the Police War Reserve was more problematic, and may to have led to a tendency for regulars to conflate all types of auxiliary, resulting in post-war hostility directed against all specials.

Initially, Police War Reserves were conscripted, and few checks were made on their suitability for police service. According to a divisional station sergeant serving at Epping at the outbreak of the Second World War, there was initial resentment that fully trained and disciplined regular officers were being replaced by amateurs. He was in charge of sifting applications from aspiring Police War Reservists sent by the local employment exchange. One, a "beefy Irishman", was set to trench digging. Four days later a warrant was received for his arrest for non-payment of maintenance:

"We hung on to him until he had finished building the trenches, then brought him into the station, gave him a good meal, and arrested him!" (195)

Apart from the unsuitability and lack of commitment of some of the individuals supplied, there were wider political reasons for the unpopularity of the reservists.

As the war continued, more police officers who were armed forces reservists were called to the colours and their places were filled by more War Reserves. This caused great resentment, as some of the reserves were of military age. In 1940, the Police Federation unsuccessfully asked the Home Secretary to place a total ban on police recruitment. This resentment increased the following year when regular pay negotiations broke down, a major grievance being that many War Reserves were getting more pay than regular constables. (196)

In September 1944, the police Federation Committee submitted a long resolution to the Home Secretary, Sir Herbert Morrison. One of the points of dissatisfaction was "Scale B" pay (lower levels paid to new recruits as an economy measure, first introduced in 1931). "What was the use of the Police Council when it was unanimous (except for the Home office) in proposing the abolition of "Scale B" and the Home Secretary refused? At the same time, the service had noted 'with amazement' that steady pay increases had been given to Police War Reserves" (197)

The War ends but the reserves continue

On the 19th April 1945, the Home Secretary, Sir Herbert Morrison, stated in answer to a parliamentary question that while he was anxious for specials who so desired to be released as soon as possible, he could not give an undertaking that they could automatically be released from service. Even though the war had ended, there was shortage of full-time regular officers. Meanwhile Chief officers of Police had been asked to do everything possible to relax their hours of duty (198). In May, Morrison issued a "Message to the Police Forces of England and Wales" praising them for their services and asking them to carry on serving (199)

William Penman, the Commandant of the City of London Special Constabulary sent a circular to the City Specials congratulating them on the fact that over 80% had indicated that they intended to stay in the force when the "stop" on resignation was removed, and noting that excluding administrative and special duties, the CLSC had performed 193,671 tours of duty during the war (200).

In June 1945, the Home Office issued a specific message to part-time specials, thanking them for their services and hoping that, although they were now allowed to resign those who could would continue "to give your regular colleagues the assistance which they so much value." (201) This was followed by an open letter from the CLSC Commandant to all ex-specials serving in H.M. Forces, on 9.7.45, hoping that they would rejoin as the CLSC intended to continue on lines of the pre-war force, but better trained and smaller.

"It is felt, .. that it is better to have a force of, say, 1200 trained and keen men than to have a force of 2000 or 3000, many of whom very rarely put in an appearance." (202)

On the 18th July 1945, the Bolton watch committee resolved to release part-time specials and other part-time police personnel from the war-time restrictions on the right to resign, but gave no indication how those who remained were to be deployed (203)

In August, a CLSC news sheet outlined their future plans. Although it was too soon to give precise details, the force would remain an essential part of the City Police and would receive regular training in police duties and first aid. Meanwhile intensive patrol duties had been gradually diminished, but special duties at parades had increased. Specials were urged to continue with their membership (204)

By the end of the war, the numbers of part-time specials in the Metropolitan Special Constabulary had dropped to 2,469, but in 1945 they had performed 116,614 four-hour tours of duty as well as attending over 50,000 hours training. (205) The Chief Constable of Essex reported that during the war there had been a maximum of 1,970 part-time specials who had performed a total of 2,785,089 hours of war-time duty. (206)

Concurrently, dissatisfaction with conditions led to a deterioration in regular police morale, which was compounded by the offer of a minimal pay award at the beginning of 1945. According to Judge:

"The complete failure of the government to meet the expectations of the service ... increased the determination of many serving officers to get out of the police as soon as they were permitted to do so, and ensured that thousands of police serving in the armed forces went into other occupations when they were demobilised "(207)

About 12,000 police were still in the armed forces in 1945, although returners began rejoining in the summer. The lifting of restrictions on resignation and retirement led to a huge exodus of time-expired men and auxiliaries, and the Metropolitan Police alone lost 3000 officers in this way. Recruitment difficulties led to the award of a realistic pay-rise in 1946, but police pay was still too low to be attractive. Over a quarter of new recruits to the Metropolitan Police had left by 1947 which had a deficiency of 4,000 in its establishment of 20,000.(208)

The crisis in policing ensured that the services of special constables were heavily relied on after the war had ended, and led to the appointment of the Police Post-War Committee. In their recommendations concerning special constables, they specifically state that "they should not be employed so as to effect economies in the reg establishment" and should be deployed on police duties only as part of their training. The various Special Constables Acts were to be abolish and replaced by a new consolidating Act of Parliament. Women were to encouraged to join, all specials should be uniformed, and every police force was to have an establishment of special constables (209)

Summary and conclusion

The concept of a police reserve was not new in 1914, and the authorities had tried on several earlier occasions to establish civilian auxiliary forces, either when regular manpower had been depleted, or in response to trades disputes. The period 1914 - 1919 highlighted many problems with organising a national reserve, and the volunteers who served as special constables, experienced severe hardships as a result of government reluctance to provide adequate funding. At the end of the First World War, the continued deployment of reservists was initially seen as a transitional measure which would cease once regular numbers had returned to peace-time levels. However, the reserves were kept in being, despite the return of from the fronts high unemployment and the soldiers characterised the post-armistice period, because of fears widespread industrial disruption and revolution. A softly-softly approach to the continued mobilisation of volunteer police was adopted by the Liberal and Coalition post-war governments, who were reluctant to be seen to be setting up anti-trade, union forces. This led to doubts about the legality of their continued peacetime deployment, and confusion over when they could be compelled to serve. The Conservative government of 1923 resolved the problem by passing the 1923 Special Constables Act.

At the onset of the Second World War, the organisation of specials was almost a carbon-copy of that in the First, although there were some changes in their duties. The authorities also acted more quickly in ironing out problems experienced by specials, mainly because the legislation necessary to ensure adequate remuneration and compensation was already in place, and experience gained in the First War was acted upon. However the better conditions experienced by special constables in the Second World War may have been enjoyed at the expense of their regular colleagues; while the end of the First World War saw a nadir in regular-special relationships in some forces when specials were used during the police strikes of 1918 and 1919, the period at the end of the Second World War concretized the general resentment felt by regular police officers towards volunteer reservists.

Paradoxically, the use of special constables during the First and Second World Wars was instrumental in ensuring their deployment in peace time. Not only were they seen to perform reasonably competently under war-time conditions, but the end of both wars saw crises in the regular force. Ironically, these protests over poor conditions and low morale were a motivating factor behind the authorities' recognition of a continuing need for special constabularies, and ensured that they became a permanent feature of policing arrangements after the end of the Second World War.

Footnotes

- (1) The material in this article was gathered as part of research funded by Bath University, the Nuffield Foundation, and the Home Office. Thanks are also due to the Commissioner of the City of London Police for kindly allowing access to records held at the City of London Police Museum, and to its curator, Roger Appleby, for his patience in dealing with my requests for information.
- (2) Under the County and borough Police Act 1856, a force only needed one officer per 1,000 of the population, with a minimum of five, to be certified efficient. See Leon, C Special Constables in the Nineteenth Century in Special Edition Summer 1987, reprinted in Journal of the Police History Society, Vol 5 1990.
- (3) Cambridge Record Office Watch Committee Minutes (Cambs) Vol II, 20th April 1900
- (4) Osborne, N. <u>The Story of the Hertforshire Police</u>. Hertfordshire Countryside Publications (1969) 97
- (5) Macmorran, K.M. (ed), <u>Questions</u> and <u>Answers from the Justice of</u> the <u>Peace 1897-1909</u>, Butterworth (1911) 391.II.27 and 29
- (6) Bolton Record Office ABCF/23/11/1.

- (7) See Dixon M V <u>Constabulary Duties: A History of Policing in Picture Postcards</u> S.B. Publications (1990) 38.
- (8) Home Office 15/4/1909 163.219/10
- (9) Hunt, E.H. <u>British Labour History</u> 1815 1914. Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London (1985) 303, 319
- (10) O.Morgan, The Merthyr of Keir Hardy , in G.Williams (ed)

 Merthyr Politics: The Making of a Working Class Tradition University
 of Wales Press (1966) 74; Geary, R Policing Industrial Disputes:

 1893 1985 Cambridge University Press (1985) 29
- (11) HO 45 10648/210615.
- (12) Chief Constable of Nottingham to Home Office, 21st August 1911 H045 10656/212470
- (13) Mayor of Chesterfield to Home Office, 22nd August 1911 H045 10656/212470. It should be noted that these special constables were probably permanent employees of the railways, rather than recruits appointed specifically to supplement the regular police during this disturbance. In which case they would have been sworn in under the 1838 Special Constables Act, which effectively enabled the creation of a separate force of railway police (see Brooke, D The Railway Navvy David and Charles, Newton Abbot (1983); Miller, J.P and Luke, D.E Law enforcement by public officials and special police forces Home Office(1977), Leon op cit).
- (14) Hansard 7th May 1923, col 1990. See also col 1981 et seq
- (15) Home Office circular 214312, 15th September 1911
- (16) Draft rules for First Police Reserves followed in circular 217670, 22nd December 1911; half the cost of the force was to be charged to the exchequer contribution account, which would be met when the special circumstances outlined in circular 2'4312 arose. First Police Reservists could be paid yearly retainers, and a minimum 5/- per day of actual duty. Appointment and payment of retainers could be made conditional on the reservist residing within a specified place or area. When called out, the FPR could be supplied with ordinary police uniform, but nothing in the rules was to prevent a constable appointed to the FPR from engaging in any employment for hire or gain except when called out for active duty.
- (17) op cit.
- (18) Seth, R. <u>The Specials: The Story of the Special Constabulary in England, Wales and Scotland.</u> Victor Gollancz, London (1961) 73
- (19) By sl., special constables could only be appointed where a riot, tumult or felony had taken place or was reasonably apprehended. Similarly, special constables appointed under s196 of the Municipal Corporations Act 1882 could only act when required to do so by Justices' warrant, which could only be issued when the Justices were of the opinion that the ordinary borough police force was insufficient to maintain the peace.

- (20) Report of the Commissioner of the City of London Police: Special Constables. 17th November 1911. Held at City of London Police Museum, Wood Street Police Station, London EC1
- (21) City of London Police Reserve A Record. 1914 1920 Anon. Published at Headquarters, Guildhall, London, E.C., March 1921 26 -27. The City had had a long tradition of organising police reserves; during the Chartist riots in 1848, 22,653 persons were enrolled and sworn as special constables in the City under the 1831 Special Constables Act. Of these, the numbers allocated from each Ward were formed into Parties or Divisions paraded at three main stations, and the remainder were retained to act under the Aldermen in their several Wards.
- (22) Report of the Commissioner of the City of London Police op cit
- (23) ibid. This argument \underline{is} \underline{still} used by opponents of bounty-schemes for specials
- (24) ibid.
- (25) Circular: Clerk of the Peace of Northumberland to Justices, 19th February 1912. Draft Quarter Sessions Rules, 5th February 1912. Both at Northumberland Record Office, QAP.
- (26) The ASE had contacted him after one of their members, Samuel Braithwaite, complained that the Chief Constable of Lancaster had told him that he would be fined £10 if he did not enrol, even though Braithwaite claimed that to do so would be against his principles (HO $45\ 10694/231071$)
- (27) Home Office to George Barnes, M.P., 21st November 1912 HO 45 10694/231071. The question of compulsion was again raised during the second reading of the Special Constables Bill 1914, when Mr. Ronald McNeill raised the matter in relation to one of his constituents who, although willing to be enrolled, had stated that he was not qualified for the duties imposed on him. In this case, the Secretary of State, Mr McKenna expressed surprise that magistrates had felt it was necessary to compel men to serve, given the numbers of volunteers who were coming forward. Hansard, 26th August 1914, cols 84-86.
- (28) Special Constables Act 1914 sl(1)(a).
- (29) ibid sl(1)c and s2.
- (30) Seth op cit 71
- (31) Ward, Col Sir EWD; Report to the Secretary of State for the Home Department on the Service of the Metropolitan Special Constabulary 1914. Cmd. 536, HMSO 1920, p2 5
- (32) Seth op cit 84-5
- (33) ibid 84-5
- (34) CLPR A Record op cit 27

- (35) These "Special" reserves consisted of employees from the Post Office, the Royal Exchange, and HM Printers. The fourth "Special" reserve was originally intended to be a training company, re-routing reservists once proficient to companies with a personnel shortage. This latter became a company in its own right. Each company had an average of 100 members. CLPR A Record op cit 44-106
- (36) ibid 27.
- (37) ibid 29.
- (38) ibid 30.
- (39) ibid
- (40) ibid 31.
- (41) ibid 33.
- (42) ibid 36-7
- (43) ibid 27
- (44) D.J. Hadaway "London Specials Under Fire" In <u>Police Review</u> 9 January 1987 71-2
- (45) Two postcards illustrating this phenomenon were published during the war. See Dixon op cit $64\,$ 5
- (46) Hadaway op cit
- (47) For a detailed description of the role of the Metropolitan Special Constabulary during the First World War see Reay, Col WT. The Specials. How They Served London. Wm Heinemann (1920).
- (48) J.E. Chatfield "The Reflections of a Special Constable" In <u>Odds and Ends</u> Vol LXIII 1917, 109-132. (unpublished). Held at Manchester Record Office).
- (49) ibid 122-3
- (50) ibid 126-8: Whether the drunk was also liberated, or transferred his affections to the horse instead, is left open to conjecture.
- (51) ibid 128-131
- (52) Cheshire Record Office CJP/20/2/4
- (53) eg: Metropolitan Special Constabulary, Essex, Bolton
- (54) A random sample of 142 volunteers who enrolled in the Bolton reserve in October December 1914 contains no blue-collar or unskilled recruits Bolton Record Office ABJ/14. See also the Report of the Commissioner of the City of London Police, 1911, supra
- (55) Bolton Record Office ABCF/23/17

- (56) op cit 129
- (57) H045 11200/375227/28
- (58) Seth op cit108
- (59) The Globe 8/10/15. Article by 'A Barrister' Legal Aspects of the Special Constabulary Question of Pay, cited in Seth op cit 110
- (60) ibid 111
- (61) ibid 88
- (62) ibid 103
- (63) ibid 111
- (64) ibid 88
- (65) supra p8
- (66) Cambridge Record Office Watch Committee Minutes (Cambs) Vol IV 19 28
- (67) ibid 166
- (68) Seth op cit 111
- (69) Letter in the referee 14/5/16, cited Seth op citll1
- (70) Ward, Col E.W: Report on the Service of the Metropolitan Special Constabulary 1914 HMSO cmnd 536 1920 para 42. A similar classification, "personal reasons", is still used today, and is recognised as indicating dissatisfaction with conditions of service (see eg Gould, Police Sergeant 6584: An Analysis of the Recruitment and Retention of Special Constables in the West Midlands Police Unpublished BA dissertation, Birmingham Polytechnic, 1990)
- (71) Ward op cit paras 21-3, 42.
- (72) Essex Record Office (Chelmsford) J/P 12/8. These were only awarded where the special had performed over 150 hours of duty without pay, and had been a special for more than three years. Alternatively a special could qualify if he or she had given more than nine years' service in peacetime
- (73) Chatfield op cit 123-5
- (74) ibid 125-6
- (75) Hertfordshire Record Office D/ECh B(o)1
- (76) Reay op cit 158
- (77) ibid 164
- (78) ibid 159

- (79) Chatfield op cit 109- 111
- (80) Dixon op cit 59.
- (81) CLPR A Record op cit 108
- (82) Cited in Seth op cit 84
- (83) ibid 85-6
- (84) Bolton Record Office AB/24/1/19
- (85) Reay Col W.T "The Metropolitan Special Constabulary: The War Force The Reserve", Police Journal 1928 317-334 at page 324.
- (86) Reay op cit 1920 156 166, op cit 1928 321
- (87) Surrey Record Office cc98/23/2
- (88) Reay op cit1920 166
- (89) "Flat 'at" The HAC MSC 1919 1969. Anon pamphlet held at Artille House pp 5-6.
- (90) ibid
- (91) Judge, A. <u>The First Fifty Years: The Story of the Police Federation</u> Police Federation 1968
- (92) "Flat 'at" op cit 5-6.
- (93) Hadaway op cit
- (94) Reay op cit 1920 223
- (95) Special Constables Act 1914 sl(1)
- (96) KuT cc98/23/2
- (97) Hertford Record Office D/Ech B(o)1
- (98) CLPR A Record op cit 108 9
- (99) Secretary of State to Chief Constables, 24th January 1919, circular 375227 at HO 45 11200/375227.
- (100) Chief Constable of Sunderland to Home Office undated 1913 HO 45 11200/375227/40
- (101) Chief Constable of Essex to Home Office 27th January 1919 HO $45\ 11200/375227/3$.
- (102) This demand anticipates the Desborough Committee's recommendation of a starting salary for regular officers of £3.10/per week, and may have been in excess of existing wages for regular officers; for example, Dorset was only paying £1.13/- weekly, while regulars in Manchester received as little as £2.10/- per week. (Judge, op cit 6-9.)

- (103) HO 45 11200/375227/3
- (104) undated internal memorandum HO 45 11200/375227/40.
- (105) Memoranda dated 12.3.20 and 15.3.20 at HO 45 11200/375227/69
- (106) Chief Constable of Birmingham to Home Office, 19th April 1919 HO 45 11200/375227/28
- (107) Birmingham Mail, 10th and 11th April 1919, Birmingham Post 12th April 1919, Birmingham Gazette 14th April 1919 at HO 45 11200/375227/28
- (108) HO 45 11200/375227/28
- (109) ibid
- (110) Home Office to Birmingham Watch Committee 3rd May 1919 HO 451200/375227/28
- (111) Minutes of meeting between the Mayor of Birmingham and the Home Office, 5th June 1919, HO 45 11200/375227/28
- (112) Geary, R. <u>Policing Industrial Disputes:</u> 1893-1985 Cambridge University Press 1985 p54.
- (113) ibid pp50-55.
- (114) ibid.
- (115) 2nd December 1919, Home Office circular 390739/18. This recommendation was in marked contrast to its January 1919 circular, where the Home Office stressed that special constables were not to be used on active duty in peacetime supra p --.
- (116) ibid
- (117) Chief Constable of Birmingham to Home Office, 16th October 1919 HO 45 11200/375227/39; Home Office to Chief Constable of Birmingham 22nd October 1919 ibid
- (118) Chief Constable of Birmingham to Home Office 8th December 1919 HO 45 11200/375227/51
- (119) Minutes, 18th December 1919 HO 45 11200/375227/51
- (120) Home Office to Chief Constable of Birmingham, 10th January 1920 HO 45 11200/375227/51.
- (121) In Bunyan, T. <u>The History and Practice of the Political Police in Britain</u>, Quartet Books, London (1977) p259
- (122) Home Office to Chief Constables 3rd March 1920 HO 45 11200/375227/64
- (123) Conference of Chief Constables from Industrial and Mining Areas held at the Home Office on 24th August 1920. Circular 375,227/92 of 20.10.20 HO 45 11200/375227/92

- (124) Chief Constable of St. Helens to Home Office, 2.3.21 HO 45 11200/375227/106
- (125) Fox to Town Clerk, St Helens, 3.3.21. Town Clerk to Fox, 4.3.21 HO 45 11200/375227/106
- (126) Chief Constable of St Helens to Home Office 8.3.21 HO 45 11200/375227/106
- (127) Undated memoranda HO 45 11200/375227/106
- (128) an extraordinary piece of advice, given the historical precedents under the 1820 and 1831 Special Constables Acts. See Leon, C op cit 1987 and Leon, C "The Mythical History of the Specials" in The Liverpool Law Review Vol XI(2) 1989 187-197
- (129) Home Office to Chief Constable of St Helens, 29.3.21 HO 451200/375227/106
- (130) Geary op cit
- (131) Chief Constable of Surrey to Home Office, 15th October 1921 HO 45 11200/375227J110
- (132) supra p --
- (133) Extract from Minutes of a Central Conference of Chief Constables held at the Home Office 26. 10. 21, HO 45 11200/375227/116
- (134) HO 45/11200/41038
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- (208) ibid 65-67. Judge comments that 10, 000 of the 13, 000 auxiliaries had left by the end 1945. This seems to contradict Hart's assertion that for two to three years after the war, "temporary constables" constituted as much as a third of the total strength of the police ibid 56. These "temporary constables" may, however, include paid and part-time special constables.
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CONSTABULARY IN THE CRIMEA By Colonel T.B. Wright

In April 1813 Wellington had raised a Staff Corps of Cavalry for courier and disciplinary duties. It was formed from cavalrymen of good character and disbanded after the defeat of Napoleon.

On the outbreak of the Crimean War it was decided to raise a similar body for "special duties". On 17th July 1854 one W C Grant was offered a commission and the command of a 50 man irregular police force to be composed of ex-policemen or others who understood horses and could ride. Its ultimate role was to be determined by the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Raglan, who was to decide whether the corps would be composed of horsemen, a foot patrol or both.

The Mounted Staff Corps came into being on 21st August 1854. A contemporary newspaper reported:-

"On Saturday evening, nearly 100 men, the greater part of a new cavalry corps, destined for special service in the East, embarked at Hungerford Pier, on their way to Woolwich, from whence they sailed on Monday for Gibraltar, in a vessel called the Joseph Shepherd. They are designated the Mountain (sic) Staff Corps, and consist of men selected for their intelligence and good conduct from the Irish police and constabulary force principally, and also from the metropolitan police. They all appeared to be men in the very prime of life, above the average height, and to be possessed of great muscular energy. They are accompanied by Major Grant, their commanding officer, Captain Baynes, and two subalterns, namely Cornets Budgen and Hunton. novel and picturesque, an appearance was embarkation attracted a considerable crowd of spectators in the vicinity of the market and pier at Hungerford. They were dressed in the new regimental tunic, which is a short red frock coats, without epaulettes, tastefully ornamented back and front with black braid, and in which the ease and comfort have been as much consulted as the elegance of the wearer. head-dress consisted of a strong black felt hat, resembling an ordinary helmet in shape, and encased or set in an open work of brass, in which both taste and durability were combined. wore black or dark blue pantaloons, partially lined with leather. They were each armed with a sword, and what gave additional novelty to their ensemble, a Colt's revolver, which they carried in a neat black leather case on the left side. The costume of the officers was remarkable for its great elegance, differing chiefly from the privates substitution of gold lace for braid. They describe themselves as proceeding on special service to the Crimea, the exact nature of which they have yet to learn on reaching their destination. They will join their horses at Gibraltar.

Unfortunately the date of this newspaper report is unknown. However the Small Arms Returns show that on 25th September 1854 57 Colt's revolvers, together with a large number of spares were purchased for the use of the new corps. The Mounted Staff Corps was therefore the first unit in the British Army to be issued with revolvers, the

regular cavalry being then still armed with single shot pistols of the 1842 pattern. The helmet which was, in fact of black leather, was also a novel feature in the British Army of the day. It was worn with a white horse hair plume in Review Order and a large flame shaped spike on ordinary occasions. The rest of the Army was still dressed in the short coated although the new tunic or "short frock" had been approved for issue to commence in 1855. So again the Mounted Staff Corps were leaders in military fashion. Their hussar style frogged tunics had Royal blue collars and cuffs. The blue overalls had double scarlet stripes down the outside seams.

On arrival in the theatre of operations the men were employed on guard and provost duties in and around Raglan's headquarters. In "Rough Notes by an Old Soldier" published in 1867, General G. Bell, an infantry battalion commander in the Crimea, wrote scathingly of the new corps:-

"In the midst of the mud, Clamour and confusion, scattered here and there, are the newly arrived mounted staff corps (Irish policemen) in fanciful helmet, red tunic braided with black cord, and mounted on a piebald Spanish horse, looking very much as if they had escaped from Astley's or were the advance guard of some equestrian troop coming to open a circus in the village. These 'nice young men' prance about in the mire, or stand sentry with drawn sword at a ruined house near the centre of the town, in the vain hope of preserving some order among the multitude of travellers".

Raglan was also concerned over the apparent inefficiency of the corps which found his personal bodyguard. Early in 1855 he recommended that the men be offered their discharge with some exceptions. A suggestion to reform the corps in two troops of 50 men with volunteers from the regular cavalry regiments was made and approved. Back in London Lord Newcastle wrote to H. Waddington for the attention of Lord Palmerston, complaining of the "utter inefficiency" of the men of the Mounted Staff Corps selected from the Metropolitan Police. The Commissioner of Police was requested to offer a full explanation.

On 12th September 1855 the new commander in the Crimea, General Sir James Simpson, wrote to Lord Panmure, Secretary for War:-

"I have had the honour to receive your despatch, No. 47 of the 23rd July, authorising me to discharge, and send home those men of the Mounted Staff Corps, who are not desirous of being attached to other branches of the Army.

I communicated your instructions to Major Grant, the Officer Commanding the Corps, who has informed me that 29 men wish to take their discharge on the 20th November next, the date on which their three months warning expires.

Six have been discharged here for the purpose of taking engagements in the Commissariat Dept.

One has been promoted in the Land Transport Corps.

Three will be immediately discharged to be attached to the Army as deputy Provost Marshals.

I do not consider that an establishment organised like the Staff Crops is a necessary appendage to the Army, but I have decided to form a police Corps, the details of which I will send to your Lordship, on a future occasion.

Major Grant has applied to be placed on the staff of this Army, as a D.A.A.G. or D.A.Q.MG. As this officer holds no rank in the Army, I am unable to accede to his wishes, and I regret that I can find no appointment suitable to his tastes and abilities.

Captain Baynes is willing to be employed as the head of the Police Corps, which I proposed to cause....."

Accordingly, the Mounted Staff Corps was disbanded on 6th October 1855. The writer has always believed that any good policeman will make a good soldier although by no means every good soldier will make a good police officer. It is therefore both puzzling and disappointing to read that the original police personnel did not make a success of the Mounted Staff Corps. Of course in those days of a long service army in which men enlisted for life only to be discharged when no longer required or no longer fit for service, the Metropolitan Police and the Irish Constabulary can have contained few ex-soldiers. There appear to have been many disciplinary problems among the early police forces in England and a good proportion of constables did not remain in the force long. Moreover the chief police officers of 1854 were probably no keener on nominating their best men for detached service than would their counterparts today.

On the credit side of General Simpson's letter shows that at least ten per cent of the original personnel of the Mounted Staff Corps were considered fit for advancement in other branches of service in the Army. The letter only accounts for two officers and 39 men out of an embarkation strength for four officers and nearly one hundred men. The Mounted Staff Corps presumably suffered less from battle casualties and the Crimean winter than the troops in the line. Nevertheless an appreciable number must have failed to survive nearly a year on active service. It may therefore be that the success rate was nearer 25%.

These were not the first policemen to be offered responsible posts in the Commissariat and Transport. Lieutenant Colonel F. G. Ainslie, commanding the 21st Regiment, had embarked his regiment on the Golden Fleece on 15th August 1854. On the 18th he wrote to his brother, - "Besides our own people there are three officers of the Constabulary and 31 constables all transformed into deputy Commissary Generals and sub-conductors, the former on 19/6 a day and the latter on 7/- a day all selected from the Irish Constabulary and very respectable men they seem to be and the officers seem inclined to make themselves agreeable." This ship reached the Black Sea port of Varna on 3rd September 1854.

The Royal Waggon Train had remained in existence for more than fifteen years after Waterloo but was disbanded in 1833. The British

Army went to the Crimea without a proper transport service. Because of this the troops at the front suffered and died for want of food, warm clothing and shelter which could not be brought up from the base at Balaclava harbour only nine miles away. On 5th February 1855 the Observer reported that 2,000 police officers were to be recruited for a new transport corps. The Secretary of State was said to have summoned Sir Richard Mayne, the Chief Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, to report to him and recommend "any inspectors, sergeants, and private constables who may feel inclined to volunteer and form a transport corps in the Crimea." went on to state that the corps was to consist of a quartermaster, sergeants or superintendents, drivers and corporals. The total number of men was to be 2,000 of which 1,000 would be drivers, "at a pay each of 3s. per day, and 2s.6d. each for the lower class, clothing and rations to be given in addition. The officer is to receive £100 for an outfit, but the candidate must be in every respect efficient, capable of holding her Majesty's commission, and qualified to associate with the officers in the British Army. The sum of 2s. per day is to be added for field allowance beyond the regular pay. The principal officer is to be allowed a horse of his own selection, at cost price to the Government. His standing salary is to be 8s. 6d. per day. Pensions are to be allowed to the men who may be engaged in the event of their receiving wounds whilst on duty in the East. It is proposed to raise 800 second class drivers, who are to be officered by about 10 men of the different grades of non-commissioned officers."

On 17th March 1855 it was reported in the United Service Gazette that the Land Transport Corps, under the command of a lieutenant General's attached to the Quartermaster would be Department. it would be organised in ten troops each of 100 drivers there was also to be a with a captain and two lieutenants. commissariat Corps of Waggoners under the orders of the Commissary General with the local rank of lieutenant colonel. A squadron of two troops was to be attached to each division of the Army. Each driver in each corps was to be armed with a cavalry carbine, a sabre, and a revolver, and to have charge of two horses or mules. The report concluded; - "A large portion of the Force has already proceeded to the seat of war; and as a sufficiency of men cannot be obtained from the police, Recruiting Parties have been sent into the agricultural districts to enlist them. A Depot for instructing Recruits is to be formed at Croydon, which was formerly the Headquarters of the Wagon Train."

It seems that before it was found necessary to scour the agricultural districts, recruiting was carried out at the Wellington Arms, 162 Waterloo Road, London. The depot was at Horfield Barracks, Bristol. The uniform of the Land Transport Corps was a blue double breasted tunic with two rows of eight white metal buttons down the front and blue trousers with a red side stripe. The troops supporting the 1st Division had light blue collars, cuffs and shoulder straps, 2nd red, 3rd yellow, 4th White, 5th grey and 6th green. The headdress was a blue broad-brimmed slouch hat turned up at the side with a rosette in the troop colour or a blue peaked cap with a band of the appropriate colour. A bayonet, and a hatchet were carried on a waist belt and a pouch belt was worn over the left shoulder. All leatherwear, including thigh length riding boots, was light tan. The Land Transport Corps under Colonel McMurdo did good

service carrying supplies and ammunition from the new railhead to the lines before Sebastapol.

It is ironic that the Land Transport Corps, containing numbers of metropolitan policemen, was nicknamed "The London Thieving Corps". After the Crimean Campaign the Corps was disbanded but was almost immediately replaced, at home, by the Military Train raised and commanded by McMurdo in 1857. After many changes of name over the years, the Military Train became the Royal Corps of Transport of today. Few realise that the Metropolitan Police played a significant part in the foundation of this Corps.

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THE LAST PARISH CONSTABLE TO BE MURDERED? By Len Woodley

Prior to the formation the County Constabularies, virtually the only method of Policing in rural areas was the appointment, by magistrates, of Constables for each Parish. This duty was in addition to the normal work carried out by the person selected. The upheaval in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; the effects of the Industrial Revolution and the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, rendered this system unacceptable and hastened the formation of paid professional Police Forces in the country. Nevertheless, until comparatively recent times Parish Constables continued to be appointed, despite the protestations of the County Chief Constables. The usual reply to the question, of what use were they with a County Police Force in existence, was the response that, with their local knowledge, the parish constables could be of value. Gradually, however, they died out and were no longer appointed. That some Parish Constables could and did perform sterling work is unquestionable. It was the system that fell down, not necessarily the men.

In the 1870s in Lincolnshire, the old method of Policing still ran alongside that of the new. Appointed for the tiny village of Hemingby was Thomas Bett GELL, who was also a wheelwright. As the nearest Constable of the recently formed Lincolnshire Constabulary lived at Baumber, approximately $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles distant, it was to Gell that the villagers turned to, in the first instant, if trouble occurred.



Thus it was on the night of Saturday 15th October 1876, when William Drant a blacksmith of the same village, returned home the worse for drink. He was known for his drunken rages and his wife had left him because of them. Drant now lived with his mother and as he came home he began abusing and then assaulting her. A friend of the family who had been visiting, also came in for a share of the insults and when Drant struck her, she ran from the house screaming, "Murder!", at the top of her voice. Several men of the village, on hearing the scream came to Mrs. Drant's assistance. As they burst into the house, they found the son astride his mother with a clasp knife in his hand intending either to kill her or at least to do some serious bodily harm. A struggle ensued during the course of which one man, lunged at by Drant was lucky to escape injury as the knife went through his trousers. The weapon was taken from him and he stood back. Thinking the fight was over the men turned to help Mrs. Drant to her feet. Immediately her son picked up a piece of stout wood and threatening his fellow villagers made his escape, out of the front door and up the path towards the gate.



It was here that he met Gell hurrying on his way to the scene of the commotion, no doubt in his official capacity as Parish Constable. Nothing was going to interfere with Drant's flight and he struck Gell a tremendous blow across his head, scattering the poor man's brains across the path. A general hue and cry now took place and the 'New Police' in the guise of P.c. Lawson of Baumber was called upon. He it was who arrested Drant and took him to Superintendent Truelove at Horncastle. A doctor attended Gell, who was still alive, but in the early hours of Sunday morning he died. Drant was charged with the murder and broke down, saying that he was sorry. At the inquest, at the Coach and Horses public house at Hemingby, the jury had no hesitation in bringing in a verdict of Wilful Murder and Drant was committed to stand his trial at the Assizes.

One month later, he stood in the dock and despite an eloquent plea on his behalf by his counsel, that no-one had actually seen the blow struck and the fact that he suffered from epilepsy, Drant was found guilty of murder and sentenced by the trial judge, Baron Huddlestone to death. Drant was removed to the condemned cell to await his dreadful fate.

However, a petition on his behalf, raised by the villagers of Hemingby and sent to the Home Office resulted in a reprieve and he was ordered to be detained during Her Majesty's pleasure.

In the interim period Thomas Bett Gell, was interred at the church at Hemingby, where he now lies alongside his wife and family, surely the last Parish Constable to have been murdered.

MR. SUPERINTENDENT JAMES BENT A Police Officer in the Manchester Division by Sergeant R. Dobson

Take your mind back to 1848, just one hundred and thirty-two years ago. The Lancashire County Constabulary was nine years old. The Force policed the whole of Lancashire from Eccles to the Lake District, except the cities of Manchester, Salford and Liverpool, and those cities were much smaller in acreage than they are today. The Force was headed by Chief Constable John Woodford, and he had twenty superintendents and three hundred and sixty constables to police the eighteen divisions. All policing was done on foot. There were no telephones but there was an excellent Royal Mail service. Transport was in the form of the horse, and each superintendent had one. The magistrate was the local legal power, and was much respected. Woodford had received plenty of help when he had gone to the magistrates for advice on setting up police in their areas. Lancashire was thriving industrially; towns and populations were exploding, which was why, just nine years earlier, the County Police had been formed along the lines of Peel's Metropolitan Police under the authority of an Act of Parliament.

It was in 1848 that young Jimmy Bent joined the County Force. He was twenty two years old, married with two children and lived at Patricroft. He worked as a labourer in Booth's Silk Mill.

His initial training amounted to two days at Preston, during which time he would receive a uniform and learn basic foot drill. This uniform was white trousers, swallow-tail coat and leather top hat, though within a short time he would be issued with a more recognisable dark blue tunic with a high collar on which was embroidered his number (known to this day as his collar-number). In this training period there was little time for law lessons, but as recruits had to be able to read and write, he would read a law book, which would accompany him to his station. Pc. 405 Bent was posted to Manchester Division, which then included Old Trafford, Eccles and Swinton. He was to serve in this Division all his service - fifty three years - which was a most unusual situation, especially as he was promoted during this time. However, the Division was a large one and he served throughout it, which would mean moving house a few times.

Bent's enthusiasm for his job was tremendous, and he clearly impressed his superiors. A policeman's duties in those times did not have the pressures of time and speed we experience today but he worked long hours with no days off, under Army-style discipline and for little pay. Consider too that those men teaching young Pc. Bent had no more than nine years police experience themselves. Jimmy learned fast and well, and he tells us about his early career in a book he wrote at the end of his career, "Criminal Life" (1891). He comes over as a great egotist, but clearly he was a very capable young policeman. He was awarded a Merit badge, a style of recognition of "promotion" we no longer have, when he had but 4 years service and, when he had almost ten years service, he was promoted sergeant and posted to Longsight, later taking charge of Newton Heath.

During this time he had worked in uniform and in plain clothes. He

considered himself "the principal detective in the Divisions". He clearly took great pleasure in making arrests and he didn't report a single motorist in the whole of his career!

As a constable and later as a supervisor, Bent loved getting stuck in at the sharp end leading from the front; no desk job for him, though he would need ability with reports and statements. Among the many jobs he tells us about is one when as a sergeant in plain clothes investigating a murder, he went with another officer to a steel works in Miles Platting. Other constables and a bailiff had been assaulted at the works and soon Bent was struck with a steel-shafted hammer by a man who called for help. This came in the form of about 30 workmen. At the same time, a constable was being pushed backwards by men holding red hot bars to his stomach and the seat of his trousers was on fire. The iron bars the men were carrying were so pliable with heat that they entangled with each other. Bent was struck on the head, causing a wound to the bone, and he fell to the ground, where he was kicked and hit with red-hot iron bars, which burned his clothing. He heard a man call out "Fetch another heated bar and shove it down his throat". brought a bar and "placing a foot at either side of my head, and grinning like a fiend he put the bar to my mouth. On the instant I grasped the bar with my left hand, which it burned fearfully, I swooned and for a time was unconscious". When Bent awoke, he was alone but later met more men who handled him roughly. The outcome of the incident was that three men were tried at the Assizes, two of them receiving twenty-five years penal servitude. Others reputedly fled to America. Bent was off duty for some time afterwards, and for a long time suffered headaches.

In 1881, colliers held a strike at Ellesmere Pit, Walkden. Bent took six men, carrying cutlasses in a bag, to deal with the incident. There was a dispute with the colliers (never the gentlest of men) and in this they dragged him as if to throw him down the pit shaft. He undoubtedly saved his life by some quick thinking. Turning to his men, he said, "Everyone of you turn to the crowd and see how many you can swear to tomorrow for murder". The effect was electrical and resulted in his quick release.

Another aspect of policing which interested Bent was the licensing legislation and the need to keep a tight grip on licensees. Visiting pubs would be an everyday matter and he dealt with some unlicensed drinking dens. In his book he wrote:-

"It sometimes happened to be my duty to endeavour to detect beerhouse keepers who were suspected of selling liquor during illegal hours. I remember on one occasion, at Newton Heath, one of the fraternity who, I think had made up his mind to defy the law in every possible and imaginable way, by selling during prohibited hours, gambling with all sorts of instruments, permitting drunkenness and disorderly conduct, and so forth. He had been fined the full penalty of £5 several times, but this did not appear to have any deterrent effect upon him. One day I caught him offending and he was summoned for a breach of his licence and again fined £5 and costs, and although he seemed sharp enough to evade the Police on a great many occasions, I think that in the case I have mentioned he was rather outwitted. He was allowed a month in which to pay his

fine and costs, and at the expiration of that time he came to the Police Station just as I was going to bed, bringing £5 11s 0d., in penny pieces. Naturally, I felt very angry at this, but as he insisted upon a receipt, there was nothing left for me to do but to sit down and count the copper. Being annoyed by the man's evident desire to cause me as much trouble as possible, I determined, if I could possibly manage it, to pay him back in his own coin. I therefore commenced to count the coins, and as soon as I got up to 10/- I told him I was afraid I had made a mistake, and that I must go over it again which accordingly I did.

All the while he kept repeating that he was in a hurry to get home, and that he had other business to attend to. I replied that unless he waited until I had finished counting the money I could give him no receipt, and would not do so.

Having taken about an hour to count the money, I then picked out about twenty pennies, which I showed him were bright with pitching on the table, and about fifty which were not legible and which I could not accept, he had consequently to be at the trouble of going home for the value of these fifty pennies in silver. And then I gave him clearly to understand that he would be watched in the future; and that if he allowed any pitching on the table for money or money's worthy he would be punished for it, as it was distinctly illegal. He informed me then that he had been to a lawyer, who had told him that the law was in such a state that if he were to pay the amount of his fine in pennies he could never be called upon to pay any further penalty, and that afterwards, so far as his house was concerned, the licensing laws would be null and void. He found that the lawyer's advice was not sound, however, for within a short time from that day he was caught again and fined a similar sum."

Clearly, Jimmy Bent was not liked by everyone, including his colleagues. I did not mention that this early promotion would be affected not only by by his own ability but by the poor standard of the men he worked with. Drinking on duty was rife and there were sackings for this and for other disciplinary offences almost every week. When he was a uniform sergeant, two men accused him of taking a bribe from a John Booth of Newton Heath. The charge was enquired into and, as a result, the pair dismissed for conspiring and making a false charge.

Sadly, Bent's career was blemished by his son. Edwin joined the County Force when twenty one years old and was posted to Bacup, resigning after three years for what reasons is not known. He later re-joined the force but was called upon to resign. Again, we know not why but one can imagine the position that his father was in. He immediately joined the Manchester City Police but six months later was dismissed. Whatever it was for, it must have been a great disappointment to his father.

Policing and forensic evidence have come a long way since Bent's days. When investigating the murder of a maid at Harpurhey, Bent felt he knew the murderer but had no evidence, and so he had a photo taken of the dead girl's eyes in the hope that they would contain

her last view of the murderer. An anonymous letter had been received by the dead girl's master just before the murder. Bent lost this letter for a while and was castigated in the Press for this.

Throughout his service, Bent seems to have been highly thought of by the public. On leaving Croft's Bank, Barton, the locals gave him a watch, a testimonial and a purse of money. So did the people of Newton Heath when he left here, and when he had completed twenty five years service, the County magistrates gave him £75 and a silver tea and coffee set.

In 1875, Pc. Nicholas Cock, a twenty year old known by Stretfordians as "the little bobby" through his lack of inches, told Superintendent Bent that one of some men he had arrested for drunkenness had threatened to shoot him if he was summoned. The man was John Hebron. Later that day, Pc. Cock was found dead on his beat in Chorlton-cum-Hardy, killed by a bullet.

Bent was called to see him but the officer died before he could say who had shot him. Naturally Bent suspected Hebron. He went with another officer to a farm where the man lived with his two brothers, william and Frank. John had said he would shoot Cock before midnight that night, and he was shot before that time. Rushing into a dark outbuilding Bent saw by the light of his lamp the three men in bed naked. He told them to dress in the clothes they had worn before they went to bed, and when up handcuffed them, saying by way of a caution "Now mind what I am about to say to you. You three men are charged with the wilful murder of Constable Cock". A pause, then John said, "I was in bed at the time". No time had been mentioned. They were taken to Old Trafford Police Station — with their boots. Those boots were to play an important part in the case which Bent skilfully prepared against the brothers. Forensic science was not then used as it is today, indeed very little study of it had been made, but Bent compared the boots (which had unusual nail pattern markings) with footmarks found at the scene of the crime and which he had covered with boxes to preserve them until daylight.

I have examined part of the prosecuting counsel's brief for the case. Bent's statement is a masterpiece of thinking and skilful practice, even though it contains evidence which by modern standards is hearsay, and would be liable to attack on scientific grounds. It reads....

"Williams's boots were wettest and slutchiest... I examined a candle, it was softer than was natural, as if recently burnt. There was no fire in the fireplace or gas in the room. It was cold... I found footprints at the scene, as if made by two or three persons. One was more unusual - it was pointing towards Firs Farm. I counted the nails in the impression and had it measured... compared it with the left boot of William Hebron and found it to correspond. The outside row of nails were very close together and I could not count them, but I measured them both lengthways and they corresponded exactly. Fourteen nail marks in one row and thirteen in the inside ... I counted the number of nails in the boots and they corresponded with the

nail marks. There is a plate on the heel of the boot and that plate was shown in the impression.

I examined the other impressions with those of John's boots and so far as I was able to make comparison, they corresponded.

- I made the first examination just after 4.00 a.m.
- A few days after the constable's death, I caused a lighted candle to be placed in the outhouse and on going into the road I could see the reflection on the privy wall which is in front of the window, and when I went to the gate I could see the light in the window. (The brothers stated they had been asleep for some time, but Bent said he had seen a light in the outbuilding when first he went there).
- I had noticed a bullet mark on that brick (at the scene) early in the morning, and I now produce it.
- It was dry right up to five o'clock, the weather was not such to cause their boots to be so slutchy. The highway was dry. It had not rained before".

Other officers corroborated Bent's evidence and a bootmaker with eighteen years experience said that it was a very peculiar nailing for a strong boot.

Of the three, William and John stood trial at the Assizes. John was acquitted, William sentenced to death, but with a jury recommendation for mercy, possibly because of his age. At the trial, the brothers had called some witnesses against counsel's advice. These witnesses had been shown to be lying. Perhaps it was this factor, or Bent's preparation of the case, which resulted in the verdict against William.

As a gesture of respect, a collection was taken in the Chorlton-cum-Hardy areas and an inscribed headstone placed over the grave of Constable Cock. The headstone can now be seen at the side of the road between the Headquarters main building and the Training School at Hutton Hall. The local vicar wrote the wording on the monument.

The story of Cock's murder does not end with the jury verdict. Hebron's sentence was alterd to "life imprisonment", but after two years an infamous criminal of those times, Charles Peace, admitted having committed the Cock murder whilst on a housebreaking enterprise. He was a prolific liar but whether he lied or not in this case, the Home Office released William with a bounty of £800 compensation. Peace had no reasons to confess to the murder, he was under sentence of death and said he had seen the Hebron trial from the public gallery.

What induced the Home Secretary to pardon Hebron and accept Peace's word? I have discovered letters which throw some light on this decision. So far as I am aware, they have not been published.

The first was written by the Chief Constable of Lancashire on 23rd February 1879. He had compared Peace's statement with a plan of the

area, visited the scene of the murder (The Seymour Hotel, Seymour Grove, Whalley Range) and re-interviewed Pc. Beanland, who was working with Pc. Cock, and who found the body. He tells the Home Secretary that he is very sceptical about the truth of Peace's statement. However, two days later he again wrote to the Home Secretary and told of seeing a gunsmith in London. He had shown the gunsmith the bullet taken from Pc. Cock's body, and the gunsmith had said at once that it was exactly the same as the bullets fired from a revolver known to have been used by Peace. That seems to have swung things in favour of Peace's story and Hebron was released. Wouldn't it be interesting if that bullet, now in the Lancashire Police Museum could be compared forensically with Peace's gun?

In 1907, a pistol was found by workmen in a clay-pit at Chorlton-cum Hardy whilst excavating for a municipal school. It was possible that this was the pistol thrown away by the murderer, not found by the police when they searched for it, and that Peace's story was just another of his acts of bravado. After all, he had nothing to lose by admitting the murder as he was going to hang anyway.

In short, there is still doubt about who murdered Pc. Cock.

On a bitterly cold day in the winter of 1878, Bent was walking from Belle Vue to Gorton when he saw a shoeless child, blue with cold. Bent's christian heart bled for the child. The incident played on his mind, and he determined to help twenty poor children each day. He bought the ingredients necessary to make soup and detailed a man to prepare it. Soup prepared, where were the children? With some men he went in search of them into the poorest quarter of Hulme. Seeing policemen, most children cried "You won't lock my daddy up will you?" To entice the children to the soup, he promised each a penny, and eventually collected eighteen children who duly feasted on bread and soup. The next day one hundred and eighty came; the third day it was five hundred and eighty. Mr. Bent's Soup Kitchen at Old Trafford Police Station (which became know as Chow Bent's for obvious reasons) was born. It became one of Manchester's most famous institutions, still remembered by the children who attended daily.

The local newspapers of the time make interesting reading, and I have spoken to some old people who remembered the Soup Kitchen....

"We sat on wooden forms at tables, scrubbed spotless white. No one, young or old, was refused... The floor was greasy and had the smell of stale food... It was in the large, square parade ground, in a corner of which was a large building, twenty two feet by sixty six feet, bare, apart from the long trestle tables laid the length of the building, and a large copper boiler used for boiling up the soup... The soup was served by a policeman, his braces dangling, with a long handled ladle, filling each large, blue striped basin with the soup, which contained meat, peas and carrots, served with a slice of bread an inch thick (two slices for the men)... The policemen laid aside their truncheons and handcuffs for the big rough apron and bread knife. (Actually, not all the officers' work was voluntary. A Pc Neil did no police duty in the winter months except looking after the kitchen)... The soup was so good that the day room men (officers living at the station) used to go

for it... There are many people over sixty living in Manchester today who did not like to admit going to Bent's... My mother gave me a wallop for showing her up... Changing coats to go back in, the sergeant caught us... From Christ Church School, Hulme, we used to dash there are four o'clock, there would be at least a hundred boys and we would have put Salford Harriers to shame".

Before the first winter was over, Bent was £50 out of pocket, and the kitchen was closed (having supplied forty-one thousand six hundred and forty-eight meals) until the next winter, when it was reopened with the Chief Constable's permission. Operations started on a larger scale at the kitchen and the benevolent work was extended. The ill-clad children, barefooted and freezing, were found shoes, clogs and clothing. Each item was stamped "POLICE", and it was pity the pawnbroker found in possession of any such article. Women fought bitterly over these garments, which meant warmth and comfort to their children. Summer trips to the country on canal barges were organised. Sports meetings provided some income for the funds. An advertisement for such a meeting is on show at the Lancashire Constabulary Training School, Hutton.

In 1886 for some now unknown reason, probably associated with Bent's connections in the locality, a move was started to close the Soup Kitchen, where upon hundreds of people, at the instigation of local Justices of the Peace, Doctors and Clergy, signed a petition addressed to the Chief Constable, asking that he allow Bent to continue the good work. This petition is now in the County archives. Continue it did, each year supplying between one hundred thousand and one hundred and fifty thousand meals. On each New Year's Day every child was given an orange, an apple, some toffee and a new penny. These were hard times... "And they wasn't good old days". A newspaper reporter exclaimed after seeing the starving children, "And we send missionaries abroad". He appealed, through his newspaper, "The Manchester Courier", for funds for the continuance of the good work, reminding his readers that the child was was first cradled in a manger, when He became a man, took the little children in His arms and blessed them. The thanksgiving prayer said at the Soup Kitchen is well worth some thought:-

"Be present at our table, Lord. Be here and everywhere adored. Thy children bless, and grant that we May feast in Paradise with Thee".

The Soup Kitchen continued after Bent's death, and probably closed in the late years of the Great War.

To sum up on Bent as a man, I again quote from his police personal file and his beneficiaries:- Five feet eight inches, sandy hair, freckled, mole on chin, fair complexion, grey eyes ... a jovial Christian man always trying to do good. A bit corpulent and bandy legged, and about seventeen stone... must have been one of nature's gentlemen and many times over the years have I thought of that man... must have been a generous man at a time when indifference to the less fortunate was the order of the day, despite the booming Manchester cotton trade and the development of Trafford Park. One old age pensioner, reminded of Bent, said, "I thank you for

reminding me of my happy childhood memories", and sent a pound note for a police charity. As a copper, Bent was undoubtedly in the top class, truly professional and a model for successive generations.

Bent died whilst still serving on 8th July 1901 - fifty three years after receiving his two days of training. He is buried at St. Katherine's Churchyard, Davyhulme.

APPENDIX

Letters relating to the Murder of Pc. Cock

Preston,

5th March, 1879

Sir,

On receipt of your letter of 3rd instant I at once put myself in communication with Captain Palin, Chief Constable of Manchester and have had personal interviews with him both yesterday and today and he has rendered every assistance in his power - I have ascertained through an Inspector of the County Force that a woman living in Manchester has stated to him that her daughter lived with the Peaces at Dranall for some time up to about four years ago, and this girl told her mother that she had seen Peace in Manchester about the time Fish was tried at Liverpool for the murder of a little girl at Blackburn, which created great excitement in the County at the time and I find Fish was tried on 28th July 1876. Peace was in the be little doubt that There can I think neighbourhood of Manchester in the earlier part of that year, as a report of the robbery of a Concertina was made to the Salford Police on 26th April, which concertina was found among Hannah Peace's property and has since been returned to the owner - I think I ought also to inform you of the following circumstances:-

On 23rd January last a Detective Sergeant of the Manchester Force was apprehending a woman in Manchester when her husband began threatening him a good deal - went on to say "You've settled a good many in your time but you will be burning your fingers some day like that great man at Old Trafford has done. He got one innocent fellow nearby serving but Old Charley had done that and something will come out some day and (meaning Bent) will have finished his order." On being asked who that 'great man' was he said Superintendent Bent. In further conversation he told the Sergeant that by 'Old Charley' he meant Peace who it will be remembered had not at that time been tried for the (Banner Cross Murder). The Sergeants suggested that another man named Prince might have done it but the man stuck to it that it was Peace.

He has been seen by Captain Palin today and confirms in all material points the Sergeants' account of what took place. This man is one of the criminal class and says Peace was commonly talked of as the murderer of Cock among those with whom he associated.

I have the honour to be

Signed C.G. Legge

Rt. Hon. R.A. Cross

Preston

7th December 1876

Re. Conviction of N. Habron for murder of Police Constable Cock

Dear Mr. Iacson,

I enclose you the accompanying letter and account from Mrs. Halton and sister that you may have time to consider it before our next Constabulary meeting; it seems to me under all the circumstances that the charges are entirely reasonable and should be paid as police expenses.

I would also ask you to consider whether some acknowledgement from the County is not due to Mr. Supt. Bent for his exceedingly prompt, vigorous, and decided action in at once following and apprehending the brothers Habron, and for his untiring zeal in, from time to time, to the time of the trial, sparing no effort which might elicit evidence, and lead to the conviction of the murderer or murders, a course of action which has been fully justified by the result of the trial, I may also say that since the trial Mr. Justice Lindley having requested to see me with Supt. Bent and Constable Beanland did express to me, in their presence, his great satisfaction at the way in which the Police generally, and Mr. Bent and Constable Beanland in particular, gave their evidence in the case, and he particularly dwelt upon the fairness and impartiality with which the evidence was given, and informed me that he had specially reported his opinion of it to the Secretary of State, there are few officers in this or any other force who equal Mr. Bent in energy, and devotion to his work, and in this special case he has worked most anxiously and industriously, and in my opinion deserving of special acknowledgement.

I only received official notification of my appointment in Ireland yesterday afternoon, I immediately forwarded my resignation of my present appointment to the Clerks of the Peace, together with a letter with reference to the Assistant Chief Constable, both of which I understood they would at once forward to you.

Hoping to see you on Monday next when the new Police Headquarters Committee meeting.

I remain

Very truly yours

Signed Rob Bruce

Preston

23rd February, 1879

CONFIDENTIAL

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 21st instant forwarding the documents which I now return, received by Mr. Secretary Cross through the Governor of Leeds Prison from Charles Peace and to report that I yesterday visited the place where Police Constable Cock was murdered on 1st August 1876 and have endeavoured to sift the truth of Peace's statement. With regard to the plan of the locality drawn by him I have to inform you that it is substantially correct though several inaccuracies exist in it, and is such a plan as a burglar well acquainted with the district, as Peace has been for a long time having been twice convicted of burglaries committed in the neighbourhood in the years 1859 and 1866, might easily draw. As regards his account of what occurred on the night in question, I would observe that it corresponds in great measure with the evidence given at the trial of the brothers, Habron; but he is incorrect in saying there were two civilians standing with the two Constables at the "Ducking" (this should be Jutting) Stone when the man who crossed from Whalley Range over Seymour Grove into the garden of a house on the other side came up; the witness Simpson was the only one there at all that night, and he had left the Constables and gone in the direction of Brook's Bar before the man whom PC followed did so.

Peace is also wrong as to the gate through which the man went, which was the one belonging to Gratin's house, see plan Marked A and not that of Spences house as shown in his plan - I have pressed Constable Beanland very closely upon this point and can have no doubt he is correct, and this Constable also says he does not believe it possible for a man to have made his escape in the direction indicated by Peace without his seeing him as it took less time for him to reach the gate from Gratin's door steps where he was standing when the shots were fired than for a man to have got out of sight as Peace says he did.

This constable is sure too that he saw the flashes and heard the report of the pistol at on plan and not at 'me' on Peace's Plan and certainly the bullet mark on the wall near the 'jutting stone' would be more consistent with shots fired as Beanland says than as indicated by Peace - Peace's account of his escape is not a very consistent one as he omits a road between Spences and Mr. Worthington's house altogether in his plan and represents himself as passing it and going through a garden and over a wall where stables really stand before climbing the hoarding which bounds the fields at the back of these houses.

It is true however that men were working day and night at a sewer in the fields and had a fire burning at the time. It also appears that Peace and William Habron are about the same size, the former being described in our Books as five feet three and a half inches in 1859 and five feet four inches in 1866 and the latter as five feet three and a half inches.

Beyond this their descriptions do not agree but I think the evidence on that point at Habron's trial was not very conclusive.

I proposed taking the bullet found in Cock's body to Leeds tomorrow with a view to ascertaining if it could, or is likely to have been fired from Peace's pistol and will report the results. If it were admissible to put any questions to Peace I think there are one or two I might ask him with reference to the houses in Seymour Grove the answers to which might tend to prove the truth or falsehood of his statement, and if Mr. Cross would wish this done and you would telegraph instructions to the Governor of the Prison at Leeds tomorrow, I could act on them in the afternoon.

There was much that could not be made evidence that occurred at the time of the murder which seemed to fasten the guilt of it on one or more of the Habrons but it seems difficult to perceive what motive Peace can have in charging himself with it unless he was really the perpetrator of it.

I have the honour

(Signed) C.G. Legge,

Chief Constable of Lancashire

The Under Secretary of State, Home Office

5 Upper George Street,
Bryanston Square,
London YY

25th February 1879

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that I today had an interview with Mr. James Woodward, Gunmaker, No. 64 St. James Street, who was employed by the Treasury when getting up on the case against Peace for the murder of Mr. Dyson and showed him the bullet which caused Cock's death, and he at once said it was exactly the same as the bullets now known as the 'Robinson' and 'Dyson' bullets which were fired from Peace's revolver. It, as were the other two, is a cast bullet and must have been made for a cartridge of a pattern which has not been manufactured for more than five years, but previous to that time was extensively manufactured and sold by Messrs. Ely. The marks of the grooving on this bullet seem to compound accurately with some fired by Mr. Woodward out of Peace's pistol, the weights considering they are cast bullets also agree very closely, that of the 'Dyson' bullet being 85 grains.

The latter is what is known as a 444 bullet; the empty cartridge case taken out of Peace's Revolver in Robinson's case was a pin fire marked 'Ely 12 London' and the 'Cock' bullet would fit such a case and not one marked 'Ely 9'.

The Pistol has been handed to me by the Metropolitan Police and I will attend at the Home office with it and bring the bullet found in 'Cock's body with others for your inspection at twelve o'clock tomorrow.

I have the honour to be

Signed C.G. Legge

The under Secretary of State.

THE NORTHERN RHODESIA POLICE AND THE DEFENCE OF NORTHERN RHODESIA 1914-1916

by

COLONEL T.B. WRIGHT

In 1911 the population of Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) was estimated at 890,985 Africans and 1,500 Europeans. The Territory was bounded by the Caprivi Strip of German South West Africa (now Namibia), Portuguese West Africa (Angola), The Belgian Congo (Zaire), German East Africa (mainland Tanzania), Nyasaland (Malawi), Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique) and Southern Rhodesia. In August 1914 the 19 officers (three of whom were in Europe on leave), 2 warrant officers, 10 British sergeants and constables, and 786 African other ranks of the Northern Rhodesia Police were responsible for defence and immigration, as well as policing the territory of 290,600 square miles. Apart from a single track railway from the Victoria Falls to Ndola and the Congo Border, communication depended on tracks or rivers.

The threat to Northern Rhodesia in a war between the German and British empires was clear. To the south-west was German South West Africa (GSWA), with a European population of about 15,000 and a garrison of 2,000 German regular troops. These could be reinforced by 483 armed police and 1,723 reservists and other white males liable for callup.

To the north German East Africa had a European population of 5,336, of whom some 3,500 were male adults, and a garrison of fourteen field companies of Schutztruppe, a total of 216 German officers and NCOs and 2,472 native askari. Each field company was a self sufficient unit with two to four machine guns, and 250 carriers permanently attached. In addition there were 67 German police officers and 2,140 armed native police.

In Nyasaland were only 300 men of the 1st King's African Rifles (KAR) and a small civil police force. The remaining seventeen companies of the KAR, less than 2,000 officers and men, were scattered from Zanzibar, just off the German coast, through British East Africa (Kenya), to Uganda, with the greater part in the far north of those two territories where operations against dissidents and interlopers were in progress.

A German occupied Northern Rhodesia would have provided a valuable axis, including some three hundred miles of rail, to link the two German colonies. The threat seemed more theoretical than real for in South Africa there was still a British garrison of all arms as well as the mainly part-time Union Defence Force. German South-West Africa was hardly in a position to take the offensive and Britain's weakness in East Africa could soon be made up by reinforcements from India. The war might well, for all practical purposes, have passed Northern Rhodesia by.

However all the British regulars, except coast artillery and engineers, sailed for Europe at the end of August 1914. A few weeks

Colonel Wright is a serving officer in the Army Legal Services.

GERMAN EAST AFRICA BISMARKSBURG LAK# TANSANYKA ZOABE KITUTA I ITAKA Abercorn 58151 m8021 NEU LANSENBURS NORTHERN RHODESIA FIFE THE NORTHERN BORDER NYASALAND LAKE niles 80 NYASA KARONSA SERMAN ERSY BELGIAN AFRICA ABERCORM. CONSO .KASANA MYASALAM ANSOLA AIN PARTE LATOON NORTHERN RHOBESIA BELSHAR 9 PWA SE KHAN EAST ARRICA conço SERTIAN SOUTH WEST TRHODESIA SATIESA CONTHERN AMODESIA NORTHERN BECHUANALAND BROKEN HILL MATURUESE ERST ם אוכניו, 57 CATUSUESE NEST LUS AXA PORTUGUESE THE PON O USANDA SKITISH EAST AFRICA EAST AFRICA MASALAND sesheke ANSOLA LIVINGSTONE SOUTHERN SALISBURY
THE FALLS

RHODESIA

LYNGER BULAWAYO CAPRIVI TSUMEB SERMAN SOUTH BECHUANALAND WEST AFRICA PROTECTORATE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA MAFERINS 64

after the outbreak of war Lieutenant Colonel S G Maritz, commanding a South African force in the Northern Cape, led his men willy nilly into German hands. On 25 September a rebellion broke out among disaffected Boers on the Vaal, delaying the planned invasion of South-West Africa indefinitely. On 20 September the German cruiser Konigsberg sank HMS Pegasus in Zanzibar harbour. In early November two brigades from India made an unsuccessful seaborne landing at Tanga on the coast of German East Africa. These events ensured that the Northern Rhodesia Police were to be no mere spectators in the Great War.

On 9 August 1914 the Mobile Column of the Northern Rhodesia Police left Livingstone for Kasama under Major H M Stennett, the Second in Command of the Force(1).

On 10 August the guards on the Victoria Falls Bridge were joined by Major A E Capell DSO British South Africa Police with No.1 Troop BSAP, from Salisbury, under Lieutenant F T Stephens, No.4 Troop from Bulawayo under Lieutenant G Parson, a machine gun section from the BSAP Depot at Salisbury, under Lieutenant A L Tribe and forty native members of the Southern Rhodesia Force(2). No.4 Troop was recalled within a few days.

On 11 August, by proclamation in the Government Gazette, the Northern Rhodesia Police Force was declared to be "On Active Service". Guards were placed on all other bridges in the Territory. The District Police were withdrawn from outlying rural stations to swell the ranks of the Military Branch of the Force. The district police system was not revived after the was and their duties were assumed by district messengers employed by the Provincial Administration.

The tiny Criminal Investigation Department had only come into being after Regimental Sergeant-Major Kenneth Ferguson returned on 23 January 1914 from a fingerprint course at New Scotland Yard. Appointed Sub-Inspector and Justice of the Peace on 15 June, Ferguson was responsible for European immigration, his five African detectives, and the uniformed Town Police in the capital, Livingstone. Ferguson had received a welcome reinforcement when Sergeant R H Kirk arrived from England on first appointment on 3 July 1914(3).

62 suspected enemy aliens were investigated. Nine Germans and two Austrians were sent to South Africa for internment. Four other Germans, five Austrians and eight German and Austrian Poles were also arrested, but released after interrogation on giving money security for their good behaviour. The first months of the war saw a large increase in applications for naturalisation.

On 26 August No.1 Troop BSAP was ordered some 40 miles up the Zambezi to Kazungula. Here a fort was erected on the South Bank and manned by Sergeant Duncombe with two other NCOs and eight troopers. About forty miles further upstream at Sesheke, on the North Bank were lieutenants Hornsby and Castle with a detachment of 25 Northern Rhodesia Police, only about three miles across the river from the German fort of Schuckmannsberg in South-West Africa(4).

On 13 September 1914 the High Commissioner in South Africa gave permission for the entry into German territory. At 9 am on the 15th, four officers, 41 European and 37 native other ranks of the British South Africa Police left camp at Victoria Falls with three maxims and marched to Livingstone where they collected wagons and supplies. They bivouaced for the night seven miles upstream on the Zambezi.

On 21 September they reached Sesheke, having been joined en route by the garrison of Kazungula. At 9 am Lieut Stephens was sent across the river as parlementaire, with Corporal J H L Vaughan BSAP(5) as flag bearer, and Native Corporal-Bugler Kapambue BSANP. The party was met on the South Bank by a German native sentry and escorted to the fort of Schuckmannsberg. Here, after an hours discussion, the German Resident, Herr von Frankenberg, agreed to surrender. By 2 pm Stephens and his companions were back at Sesheke.

At 3 pm the "Fall in" was sounded. A section was left to guard the camp while the rest of the British force marched to Susmann's Drift where boats had been assembled by the NRP. Lieut Hornsby led the way across the Zambezi. On landing he had to forcibly disarm a native sentry who refused to hand over his rifle. By 3 pm the whole force was ashore and began a two mile march to Schuckmannsberg.

The troops were drawn up on the square to receive the German surrender. Sergeant Onyett BSAP(6) arrested Unteroffizier Fischer. This NCO and von Frankenberg were released on giving their parole. 28 native police, nearly all Subia by tribe, were placed under guard. Some mules, arms, ammunition and warlike stores and supplies were seized.

At 8 am on 22 September the detachments of BSAP and NRP paraded facing the flagstaff in the presence of Mr Venning, District Commissioner, Sesheke. Lieut Castle broke the Union Flag at the staff while Maj Capell called for three cheers for His Majesty King George V. A few days later von Frankenberg and Fischer were sent via Livingstone to Bulawayo escorted by Corporal Gardiner and Trooper Davey BSAP(7). The native prisoners were allowed to return to their homes.

In October 1914 Captain E H L Salmon and Second Lieutenant G P Burton NRP reached Schuckmannsberg with the main body of B Company from Mongu. They were followed by Captain J J O'Sullevan with another detachment of Northern Rhodesia Police(8). In view of these reinforcements it was considered safe to withdraw the BSAP, and wise to do so before the rains set in. They left Sesheke on 3 November, and, leaving Sgt Duncombe and six men at Kazungula, reached Livingstone on the eighth. On 10 November the BSAP Detachment entrained for Bulawayo.

Scouts had been sent forward towards the Okavango River. They reported no cause to fear an enemy advance. The telegraph had now been extended to Sesheke. It was decided that there was no need to continue to occupy Schuckmannsberg. It was deemed sufficient to man Sesheke as an observation post and intelligence base, together with the police post at Sioma Falls, a hundred miles north-west. O'Sullevan described the Caprivi as, "Not of much use to anyone. It breeds the largest and most vindictive, venemous mosquitoes I have seen in a long experience of tropical Africa. In the wet season it

is a swamp and unhealthy; in the dry weather the heat is terrific, whilst the sand is deep and uncomfortable to walk in."

At Noon on 5 December O'Sullevan received telegraphic instructions from the Chief Commandant of Rhodesian Forces, Col Edwards(9), to report as quickly as possible to Livingstone, from where he was to lead his force, now known as the 2nd Mobile Column, to the border with German East Africa: "The same day at 3 p.m. I left in a dug out paddled by natives. We did sixty miles on the Zambezi in a blinding thunderstorm for the rains were on. We walked (two native soldiers and I) most of the other thirty miles through heavy mud and reported to Livingstone at 3 p.m. on the 6th. The column arrived ten days later, having had difficulty with the wagon transport." At Livingstone the 2nd Mobile Column received reinforcements of officers and men, before entraining with the captured German mules for Sakania in the Belgian Congo. From there they were to march to Abercorn.

At the outbreak of war the garrison of Abercorn had been a mere 21 district police under the District Commissioner, C P Chesnaye(10). On hearing of the war Mr Chesnaye promptly arranged for the evacuation of European women and children, and sent out patrols of settler volunteers and natives to watch the movements of the enemy.

At Bismarksburg (Kasanga) on Lake Tanganyka, the Germans had astrong fort which could easily be reinforced by steamer from Ujiji, the terminus of their Central Railway from Dar es Salaam, and Usumbara at the head of the Lake. Usumbara, four hundred miles from Bismarksburg was the peace station of the 9th Field Kompany, and Ujiji, one hundred miles closer, the headquarters of the 6th. The Germans mounted guns on their steamers, giving them complete superiority on Lake Tanganyka.

There was no enemy action on the northern border until late August when native auxiliaries commenced sporadic raids. They cut the telegraph line between Abercorn and the other border post at Fife, one hundred miles to the east. The peace garrison of Fife was seven district police.

Lieutenant J J McCarthy(11) had only returned to Northern Rhodesia from leave on 7 August. He was now in command at Abercorn where the garrison had been brought up to forty African police by reinforcements from D Company at Kasama. The gaol, the only suitable building, was put in a state of defence.

On 5 September a force from Bismarksburg, of four Germans, 52 askari and 60 armed carriers, with a light gun, made the first attack on Abercorn and was repulsed. The enemy had been accompanied by some 250 irregulars who ravaged the countryside, looting, raping and again cutting the telegraph.

An urgent request for reinforcements had been sent to Kasama. Few, if any of D Coy remained there after reinforcing Abercorn and Fife, but Maj Stennett had just marched in with his Mobile Column. Though they were tired after a four week trek from the railhead at Broken Hill, Stennett at once pushed on with his 100 men, covering the ninety-nine miles in sixty-six hours to reach Abercorn at 3 am on 9 September. At six the enemy began to shell the town. They attacked

later in the day and were driven off for the loss of two African police killed.

On the 10th the enemy withdrew to the Lumi River. Lieutenant McCarthy attacked their camp the following dawn and drove them back across the border.

While Abercorn was under siege natives from neighbouring villages had carried water into the garrison by night. The prisoners evicted from the gaol volunteered to carry machine guns into action. One convict pardoned for his services had been sentenced to life imprisonment for rape in 1906.

On 9 September the German 5th Field Company from Neu Langenburg (Tukuyu) had attacked the KAR at Karonga on Lake Nyasa. They were reinforced by the 2nd from Iringa, Oberleutnant Falkenstein with a detachment of the 2nd Field Coy based himself at Itaka from where he operated against Fife which was already harrassed by Wahehe irregulars. Lieutenant A C de C Cussans NRP(12) was now in command at Fife.

Patrolling by both sides continued. The telegraph line from Lake Tanganyka to Lake Nyasa was constantly cut. It took ten days for messages, carried by runner and bicycle to the line of rail, to reach Livingstone, until a new telegraph line was completed from Broken Hill to Abercorn via Kasama.

Between 22 and 26 September 500 Belgian native troops reached Abercorn. On hearing of their approach the Northern Rhodesia natives on their route had taken to the Bush, leaving their villages bare of supplies. Accordingly the 1st Battalion, Force Publique, had suffered from a shortage of water on the march. Whether the villagers were motivated by a particular fear of the Belgian askari or the general uncertainties of war, is not recorded, but a belief that the Congo was largely peopled by cannibals persisted in Northern Rhodesia well into the 1960s.

On 23 September Stennett assumed command of the combined Anglo-Belgian force on the Northern Rhodesia border with the local rank of Lieutenant Colonel.

The attack on Abercorn had demonstrated the disadvantage of the NRP's lack of artillery. The Belgians had brought two guns with them, but steps had already been taken to make good the deficiency. An old seven pounder mountain gun had been found in Southern Rhodesia. It was sent up by train to Broken Hill with Corporal Horton and Troopers Farrar, Hennessey and Hadath BSAP(13), all trained gunners, and 600 rounds of black powder ammunition. Lieutenant Percy Sillitoe NRP(14) was taken from his civil police duties at Lusaka to meet the gun at Broken Hill and bring the party north. With the help of the District Commissioner he assembled 600 carriers and supplies for the 520 mile march to Abercorn. They set out as soon as the train arrived and marched for thirty days without a break. The gun barrel, its heaviest component, weighed 2001bs and required four porters with frequent reliefs.

Sergeant Howe(15) was also sent from Lusaka to the front in charge of some 30 Africans who carried boxes of rifle ammunition on their

heads. After a time in the field Howe returned to police duty at Broken Hill.

Due to a misunderstanding the Belgians were recalled to the Congo. Their advanced party had left, when, on 17 November 1914 enemy troops landed from two steamers at Kituta Bay on Lake Tanganyka, fourteen miles west of Abercorn. They destroyed a small steamer laid up there and burnt the stores of the African Lakes Corporation. By this time Sillitoe had arrived at Abercorn. He was sent with 50 NRP accompanying 150 Belgian troops to intercept the German force. They missed them at Kituta but caught up with the enemy at Kasakalawe, a further fourteen miles down the lake. On 20 November the allies drove the raiders off. The Germans re-embarked under cover of the guns of their steamers. Cpl Horton and his crew did not manage to come up in time to bring their gun into action.

On 26 November the Belgians completed their departure from Abercorn. Until their return on 26 January 1915, Stennett was too weak to undertake more than the passive defence of Abercorn and Fife. The Germans were able to raid freely, carrying off or destroying large quantities of telegraph wire and completely isolating Abercorn.

On 6 December 1914 Fife was attacked by a force of two or three hundred with a field gun and three machine guns. One African policeman was killed by shellfire.

On 13 December Lieutenant Colonel F A Hodson(16), Commandant of the Worthern Rhodesia Police arrived to take over command on the Worthern Border which was now defended by 6 officers, 14 white wolunteers and 208 African police. Lt Col Stennett returned to Livingstone.

On 27 December the enemy again attacked Fife. They retired in disorder after a bayonet charge led by lieutenants Cussans and R M Smith. Smith(17) and one African policeman were wounded.

On 3rd February 1915 Major O'Sullevan marched into Abercorn with Captain Fair(18) and the 2nd Mobile Column. They had marched 430 miles from Sakania in twenty days despite heavy rain and swollen rivers. O'Sullevan was to establish a new post at Saisi, about thirty miles east of Abercorn on the old Stevenson Road to Fife. The post was to be sited on a rocky knoll in the angle between the Saisi River and its tributary, the Mambala, overlooking the bridge across the Saisi.

O'Sullevan related: "Here we occupied and fortified the farm buildings. We made a fort and trenches, and removed the long grass, trees and other cover useful to the enemy. Then we proceeded to patrol, and were practically in touch with the Germans daily. The fact cannot be disguised that the enemy were considerably stronger than we were along the border line, and the same applies to the Myasaland frontier."

On 12 February nearly 150 men of the Northern Rhodesia Rifles, a newly raised white volunteer force, reached Abercorn. They had cut the first wagon road from Kashitu, on the railway fifty miles north of Broken Hill, to Kasama. The Rifles were distributed between the various posts.

The British were now in a position to act more offensively. On 26 February a patrol under Captain McCarthy captured eleven Ruga Ruga or irregulars, having killed one. On 17 March he was in command of a joint patrol of NRP and Belgian askari at Zombe, on the Sanfu River, when they were attacked by an enemy company. The Germans were beaten off, each side losing one European and three Africans killed. Two Belgian natives were wounded and a German officer captured.

The British South Africa Company's report for the year ending 31 March 1915 gave the strength of the Northern Rhodesia Police as 24 officers (including 4 temporary), 2 warrant officers, 6 British NCOs, 16 European volunteers, 4 British constables, 813 native NCOs and men, and 93 special native police. The recent reorganisation into two divisions, Military and Civil, was said to have undergone a severe test. In the report the Town and District Police was referred to as the "district police". The necessity for an adequate reserve for the Military Branch was said to be much felt.

"On the outbreak of war, an experienced officer was specially detailed and despatched to Abercorn to endeavour to obtain the services of ex-police and get them to rejoin the corps for the period of the war. The result was that the services of some 125 ex-native police were obtained. The Awemba provided thirty-two, the remainder were from the districts around and the north-west of Kasama. Endeavours to obtain ex-police from the Angoni tribe failed entirely . To keep up the military portion to the strength required owing to the war, it has been necessary to denude the districts of civil police to an undesirable extent and to a degree almost incompatible with safety."

"The training of the district police, as a civil police force, is only just commencing, and has no doubt had a serious setback owing to the war. There is no reason why this branch of the force should not with time and careful and patient training be as efficient as civil police, as their brothers have proved themselves to be useful and reliable soldiers."

"The branch of the Criminal Investigation Department, which was inaugurated early in the year, has clearly proved its value and, now that initial misunderstandings and misapprehensions connected with the scope of the duties of its officers and members have been removed, should increase in efficiency and importance year by year."

In March 1915 there were further fears of an attack from German South-West Africa. The South African invasion of that territory was now well under way and it was thought that some of the enemy would try to break out and make for German East Africa. The detachments of NRP at Livingstone and Mongu were each strengthened by fifty men. Supply depots were established between Livingstone and the Sioma Falls to expedite the despatch of any mobile column to prevent the enemy entering the Barotse Valley.

On the Northern Front the Germans were reinforced by three field companies brought from the interior in April. The garrison of Bismarksburg had itself been expanded to field company strength being numbered as the 29th in June. At Mbozi thirty miles from Fife a detachment under Oberleutnant Aumann had also been raised to company strength.

On 17 April, after a five and a half hour march from Fife, a detachment of NRP and Rifles stormed a position at Mwanengombe, thirty miles to the east. Lieutenant Irvine of the Rifles was first into the stockade and fell mortally wounded. Forty enemy askari and irregulars were killed or captured.

On 24 April, 130 men under Lieutenant G P Burton NRP penetrated thirty four miles into German territory. They attacked a transport column near Mwazye, dispersing the escort and capturing many carriers and loads.

On 25 May the German 24th Field Company and half the 10th Schutzen Company, white settlers, arrived at Bismarksburg. The enemy commenced an offensive designed to assist any force which might attempt to push north from South-West Africa.

Major O'Sullevan in a lecture to the African Society related:"I remember, one night in June, information came in that the enemy were entrenched in force on Mosi Hill, in German East Africa. I wired to Colonel Hodson, who came out with a force to attack. He marched all the next night, and arrived near the German position at dawn. I also marched with a small column through the night."

"We found after dawn that the enemy were out looking for us, and that the position was not strongly held, so we took it with my force of Belgian and British troops, and captured large quantities of supplies, and also, later in the day, a convoy of supplies, some excellent wine, officers' kits, plans and maps, and some native levies known locally as Ruga Ruga. We slep that night in this fort."

"Before daybreak we burnt and destroyed the camp. The enemy had laid an ambush on the road we came by, and also on two other roads; but we marched north into their territory, and away from the roads they suspected we should take, and by a circuitous route through the bush got home to Saisi, our rearguard only being attacked. We found Colonel Hodson had had no luck, and had returned the day before to Saisi Fort."

O'Sullevan's garrison at Saisi was now three officers, five white volunteers and 160 Africans of the Northern Rhodesia Police with two machine guns, the BSAP gun and crew, and eight Belgians and 280 natives of the Force Publique, with a 4.7 cm Nordenfelt gun and one machine gun.

Early on 28 June about 500 enemy troops, surrounded Saisi in the early morning mist and opened fire with a field gun. During most of the morning and part of the afternoon there was confused fighting over open ground south and west of the fort. The allies' two small guns were put to good use. Trooper Farrar BSAP is said to have signalled inners and outers to the Germans in contempt for their shooting! At 11 am next day the enemy withdrew. One British volunteer and two African police were killed and six Belgian askari wounded, against two Germans and four of their askari killed and two Germans and 22 askari wounded. Maj O'Sullevan spoke highly of the work of Lieutenants Dickinson and Allport(19) in this action.

The allies spent the next three weeks improving their defences with the help of some 300 carriers. At 7 am on 24 July the Germans

returned to the attack with, according to German sources, 89 whites and 680 askari, two field guns and six machine guns together with irregulars and armed carriers. Firing continued night and day for four days. All the livestock within the perimeter was killed by shrapnel.

On the fifth day the German commander called on O'Sullevan to surrender, stating that he had captured a convoy of suplies, had beaten back a relief force and knew the garrison had no water. O'Sullevan refused and described the ensuing events as follows: "That night they attacked in force by the light of a fairly bright moon, and came on bravely, but they could not get actually to our trenches. The attacking force was about 1,500, a large majority being Europeans, but though we heard them encouraging the Arabs and native troops to charge, they could not get them to do so."

The siege continued until 3 August, by which time the enemy had exhausted their supplies. One company withdrew to Neu Langenburg and the others to Bismarksburg from where most returned up the Lake to Ujiji. O'Sullevan reported enemy losses as five whites and 28 askari killed. Casualties among the garrison were nineteen, including five Belgian askari and four carriers killed, one native servant died of wounds and one African of the NRP wounded. The BSAP gunners had managed to knock out one of the enemy field guns.

A relief force from Abercorn of 50 NRP under Captain Fair and 270 Belgian troops had come into action on 28 July. On 29 July Fair and 33 men broke through to join the garrison but the remainder were held off, losing five killed, ten wounded and three missing. Fair was a crack shot. It was said he would lie on an anthill while a dozen or more askari would hand him up their Martini-Enfields to fire. Some of the former district police were still armed with .450 Martini-Henrys, but soon all at the front were to be rearmed with the Long Magazine Lee Enfield.

With the telegraph out of action communications were dependent on the heliograph, which only the postmaster at Abercorn, a BSAP trooper at Saisi, and Corporal Kituta and his NRP signallers, could operate.

Meanwhile on 8 July 1915 news had been received at Livingstone that the South African rebel, Maritz, and his men were moving along the Okavango River towards the capital. Major A J Tomlinson(20) was sent up from Southern Rhodesia with 5 officers and 100 men of the BSAP with two maxims and a field gun. The combined force was concentrated at Sesheke under Lt Col Stennett until 9 August when it was confirmed that Maritz had entered Angola and given himself up to the Portuguese.

The majority of the BSAP detachment returned to Bulawayo but a few remained at Livingstone as the cadre for "A" Special Reserve Company which was brought up to strength by ex-police and other volunteers from Southern Rhodesia. The company left for the north on 18 August.

Sub Insp Ferguson was still in charge of the CID and Chief Immigration Officer, assisted at Livingstone by D/Sgt Kirk, who was appointed a Justice of the Peace on 30 September. Sergeant-Major Arthur Coote took charge of town and district police at Lusaka on

his return from leave on 7 September, while Sgt Mjr John Taylor was responsible for the detachment at Broken Hill(21). The senior NCO or constable in charge at Ndola was also immigration officer there.

Sergeant Gwiranipakamwa was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal for an incident in 1915 when he and Sgt Harold NRRifles, a government medical officer, carried the wounded 21t Daffarn(22) out of action under close and heavy fire from both sides. Corporal Africa received the same award for handcuffing a German, tieing up several enemy askari with his blanket, and marching them all in as prisoners. Lt Dickinson, 2Lt Allport, Colour Sergeant Zidana, Sergeants Mwambera and Gaza, Corporal Chikusi and Private Piyo were all mentioned in despatches.

The successful defence of Saisi did much to enhance British prestige in the area and stimulated recruiting in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, especially among troops returning from South-West Africa for demobilisation. The border was now undoubtedly secure.

On 4 October 1915 "A" Company BSAP, 160 strong under Major J S Ingham, reached Abercorn, having marched from Broken Hill, bringing a 12 pounder field gun with them. On 18 October "B" Special Reserve Company with Major R E Murray DCM BSAP(23), marched into Fife from Karonga, having evaded an enemy ambush at Mwembe. Formed at Salisbury 131 strong, this company had travelled by rail and water via Beira on the Mozambique coast and Zomba, Nyasaland.

The Belgians required the return of their troops for operations elsewhere. Despite the arrival of the BSAP it was decided that Saisi could not be held without the Belgians. "A" Coy BSAP covered the withdrawal on 29 October. A detachment of NRP replaced the Belgian garrison at Sumbu on Lake Tanganyka.

On 6 December 200 enemy troops made an unsuccessful attack on Zombe, a post north-east of Abercorn. On 22 December sixty British made an equally unsuccessful attack on Leutnant Aumann at Sinyati, thirty miles from Fife. On the same day a German force took up position at Nakonde, four miles from Fife, to intercept a convoy. Captain Baxendale BSAP went out to engage them with 28 NRP and a machine gun. After two hours he was joined by Lieutenant Mills(24) with 21 Europeans and 16 African police from the convoy escort. On learning that the convoy was safely into Fife, the enemy withdrew. Seven pools of blood were found in their position. The British had two wounded.

On 28 January 1916 Captain Ingles NRP with a half company of the Force and thirty or fifty BSAP, drove off a patrol of two Germans and 20 askari and Ruga Ruga near Ikomba, 70 miles south-east of Abercorn. The next day Lieutenant Debenham NRP(25) with the advance party of 15 men, following the enemy spoor, caught up with them, crossing a swamp 1,000 yards wide and immediately engaged them, hitting seven and pinning the rest down. After Ingles and the main body came up five unwounded enemy surrendered with three badly wounded. Seven bodies were found. On the British side one sergeant was wounded.

This appears to have been the last engagement in Northern Rhodesia until the closing days of the War. A major British offensive was to start in May 1916, but that is another story.

Biographical Notes;

- (1) Lieutenant Colonel Harry March STENNETT DSO (LG 14.1.16) NRP, born 1877(79?), Lieut Imperial Yeomanry in South Africa 1901, Capt Barotse Native Police 1902, Maj & 2i/c NRP 18.12.1912, L/Lt Col OC Northern Border 23.9.14, Western Border 1915, leave 23.2.17, Supt L'stone Gaol, T/CO NRVol Force(& OC NRP Depot?) 20.8.17, A/Lt Col CO NRP Service Bn 21.2.18 Inv 5.18, Supt L'stone Prison (& OC Depot?), Lt Col Cdt NRP Oct 1919, Rtd 1925.
- (2) Colonel Algernon Essex CAPELL CBE(1924) DSO(1900) BSAP, b. Tenenhall nr Wolverhampton 1.11.1869, Tpr Cape Mtd Riflemen 1889, Lt Bethune's MI 1899, Capt SA Constabulary 1900, Maj 1902, ejected by Boer Govt 1908! A/Dist Commr Dagoretti Brit East Africa, Chief of Police Grenada 19?, BSAP 19? Lt Col CO 2 Rhodesia Regt 1915, served E Africa 15-18, Commr BSAP & Cdt SR Forces 192? Rtd 1926.

Major Francis Trant STEPHENS OBE(1919) MC(1917) BSAP, served with BSAP Svce Coys in E Africa & ltr Att'd KAR. Major George PARSON DSO & Bar(Apr & Dec 1917) BSAP, served with Svce Coys in East Africa. Captain Alden Lewis TRIBE BSAP, 2 Rhod Regt 1915, served E Africa,

att'd 3/2 KAR killed 17.11.1917.

(3) Lieutenant Kenneth FERGUSON NRP, RSM Fingerprint Cse New Scotland Yd Oct 1913-Jan 1914, Oi/c CID & FP Bureau NRP, Town Police L'stone & Immigration, Sub/Insp JP 15.6.14, T/Lt 1.4.16, died L'stone 19.10.18.

Chief Detective Inspector Robert Howard KIRK NRP, arr L'stone on first appt Sgt 3.7.14, D/Sgt JP 30.9.15, T/Sub/Insp & C/Immigration Offr 14.2.17, C/D/Insp (equiv Lt) 1.11.18.

- (4) No.667 Sergeant George Frederick DUNCOMBE BSAP. Captain Charles Cooper HORNSBY NRP, Sub/Insp (2Lt) 12.2.13, Lt 1914, T/Capt died Enteric fever Lupembe Hosp GEA 12.5.17. Captain Edgar Collins CASTLE NRP, 2Lt 6 Lancs Fusiliers (Militia) Jul 1904, Capt 4 LF(Sp Res) 14.8.08, Sub/Insp (2Lt) NRP 1911(12.2.13), Lt 1.1.14, Leave 16.6.14-10.9.14, T/Capt E Africa, Lt OC Town & Dist Police, Broken Hill, Ndola & Lusaka 1923, Capt OC all Town & Dist Police Dets 1924, Rtd 1931, died 19 5 9 .
- (5) Major James Henry Lionel VAUGHAN Croix de Guerre, Tpr BSAP No.1741 19?, Lt 1 Rhod Regt 12.11.14, served GSWA to 31.7.15, NRRifles 1915? T/Maj KAR killed PEA 5.5.18.
- (6) Captain Harry Thomas ONYETT MC(1917), Tpr No.1053 BSAP 19?
- (7) Captain Cecil Senior GARDINER NRP, Tpr No. 1494 BSAP 19?, T/2Lt NRP 15.4.17, Lt 1.1.1919. No.1669 Sergeant Albert Charles DAVEY BSAP, served with Svce Coys in East Africa, Mentioned in Despatches 1917.
- (8) Captain Ernest Harry Lindsell SALMON NRP, Sub/Insp (Lt) 12.2.13, Capt 13.2.14, leave 12.1.15. Major Granville Pierrepoint BURTON NRP, Sub/Insp (2Lt) 3.12.13, Lt 1.4.15, Maj Ag Cdt NRRegt Feb 1933, Rtd 31.5.33.

Lieutenant Colonel John Joseph O'SULLEVAN DSO(LG 14.1.16) FRGS, born Athlone Mar 1879, Tpr Cape Mtd Riflemen 1898, SA War Commissioned 2 Northants Regt 1900, OC French's Scouts, Int

- Offr Staff, twice wounded & mentioned in despatches, Capt Barotse Native Police 1903, L/Maj Cdt NE Rhod Constabulary 1908, Insp (Capt) NRP 12.2.13, OC No.2 Mobile Col 6.12.14, L/Maj 5.2.15, Maj 7.9.15, left NR 15.10.15, Hosp UK, CO 19 (Labour) Bn Cheshire Regt 26.4.16, A/Lt Col CO 11 (Svce) Bn Sherwood Foresters, France Jul 1916, wounded Aug 1916,Cdt Ballykinler Cmd Depot 1917, Res Magistrate Killarney Rtd Oct 1922, to Antigua, died 1936, Father of Peter O'Sullevan the Racing Commentator.
- (9) Major General Sir Alfred Hamilton Mackenzie EDWARDS KBE (1920) CB(1900) MV0(1904), b.India 1862, 2Lt 3 Seaforth Hldrs (Militia) 1880, 1KDG 1883, Maj 1896, 5DG 1897, CO Imp Lt Horse SA 1900, Lt Col CO "A" Div SA Constabulary 1901, Cdt Transvaal Vols 11903, Mil Sec to Viceroy of India, Col AAG Northern Cmd India 1905, Chief Const Met Police London 1906, Commr BSAP & Ch Cdt Police & Vols S & N Rhod 1912, T/Brig Gen Cdt Gen 1.2.16, Hon Maj Gen 1919, rtd 1922.
- (10) Major Christian Purefoy CHESNAYE CBE, b.1869, Bechuanaland Border Police Matabele War 1893, Capt Matabele Rebellion 1896, Native Commr NE Rhod 1900, served as Political Offr in occupied German E Africa 1917.
- (11) Lieutenant Colonel James Joseph McCARTHY CBE(1919) DSO(1917) MC(LG 14.1.16), Sub/Insp (Lt) NRP 12.2.13, from leave 7.8.14, L/Capt 23.9.14, Capt 1.4.15, OC Irregulars 1916, T/Maj 14.1.17, departed NR 5.3.18 A/Lt Col Dunsterforce Caucasas, returned 14.2.20, Hon Maj May 1920, Rtd 192? Planter, died 16.10.45.
- (12) Captain Arthur Charles de Cussance CUSSANS MC(LG 14.1.16) Sub/Insp (Lt) NRP 12.2.13.
- (13) No.1711 Company Sergeant-Major Jack HORTON MSM(1919) BSAP, Att'd Rhod Native Regt as CSM 1916. No.1866 Trooper John FARRAR BSAP. No.1710 Sergeant John Matthew HENNESSEY MSM(1919) BSAP No.1709 Trooper Edwin HADATH BSAP.
- (14) Captain Sir Percy Joseph SILLITOE KBE, b.London 1888, Tpr BSAP 1908, Cpl i/c Vic Falls Oct 1910, Lt Barotse Native Police Feb 1911, Sub/Insp (Lt) NRP 12.2.13, Oi/c Lusaka Jun 1913, T/Capt OC E Coy 2.4.16, sick 1916, Occupied Territory Adm GEA Bismarksburg 15.8.17, Political Offr Dodoma Nov 1918, Relinquished Commission NRP 26.5.20, left Tanganyka ill health 1922, CC Chesterfield Mar 1923, East Riding 1925, Sheffield 1926, Glasgow 1931, Kent Mar 1943, DG Sy Svce(MI5) 1946, Rtd 1953, Ch Investigator De Beers 1953.
- (15) Chief Inspector Robert Arthur HOWE MSM(1934) NRP, b.1886, PC Met 190?, Tpr BSAP 1911, Sgt NRP 1913, L'stone, Mumbwa, Lusaka, Northern Border, Broken Hill, Leave returned 13.3.17, Immigration Offr L'stone 15.12.17, C/Insp L'stone 1929, Rtd Aug 1934, Broadstairs d.9.3.84.
- (16) Colonel Frederic Arthur HODSON CBE(1919) NRP, b.Yorks 1866, Pte York & Lancs, 2 Y&L to Natal 1892, MI Coy 2 Y&L Rhod 1896, BSAP Nov 1896, Sub Insp 1902, Capt & Adjt Barotse NP 1903, Maj 2i/c 1906, L/Lt Col Cdt NRP 18.12.12, L/Col 10.12.14, Rtd Hon Col Oct 1919 Strensall d.21.1.25.

- (17) Captain Ronald Maskelyn SMITH OBE(1919), NR Govt Svce Att'd NRP as T/2Lt Oct 1914, T/Lt 1.3.15, sick leave 20.4.15, returned ? T/Capt.
- (18) Lieutenant Colonel Charles Henry FAIR DS0(1917) NRP, Sub Insp (Lt) 12.2.13, Capt 28.10.14, OC A Coy, T/Maj 14.1.17, A/Lt Col CO Svce Bn Leave 9.4.18. Maj Ag Cdt 1920, OC Kasama Det 1920, OC Barotse Cattle Cordon, gored by Buffalo 1922, inv?
- (19) Lieutenant Colonel Edward Griffin DICKINSON MC(1917) NRP, Natal Police 1901, Zulu Rebellion 1906, Lt Barotse NP 1911, Sub Insp (Lt) NRP 12.2.13, T/Capt 2.4.16, T/Lt Col CO Svce Bn 5.6.18, Lt Col Cdt & Ch Commr Police & Prisons Apr 1930, Cdt NRP(Mil) 11.4.32, Rtd 1933.

 Major Herbert ALLPORT NRP, Sub Insp (2Lt) 10.8.14, Lt 1.4.15, Leave 18.4-18.10.16, T/Capt, A/Maj 6.11.18. Hon Capt

1920.

- (20) Colonel A J TOMLINSON BSAP, Tpr 1894, Jameson Raid 1896, Lt Col CO Rhod Native Regt 1916, Commr BSAP 1926?
- (21) Sergeant-Major Arthur COOTE NRP, S-Mjr Barotse NP i/c Town Police L'stone & Prosecutor 1910, NRP 1911, i/c Immigration restrictions vice Ferguson 22.9.13-23.1.14, Leave 2.3.15-7.9.15 i/c Town & Dist Police Lusaka.

 Sereant-Major John TAYLOR NRP, S-Mjr by 5.5.14.
- (22) Second Lieutenant Maurice DAFFARN, 2Lt 16 Lancers resigned 19? Att'd NRP as T/2Lt 17.12.14 w1915.
- (23) Major John S INGHAM BSAP, bl870, BSAP Jameson Raid 1896. Lieutenant Colonel Ronald Ernest MURRAY DSO & Bar(1917) DCM(1900) Croix de Guerre BSAP, Cpl BSAP SA War, Maj Dist Supt Bulawayo 1915, Lt Col Chief Staff Offr N Border 1916, CO No.1 Column Nyasaland/Rhodesia Field Force Apr 1916, Inv 27.1.18, d.England 29.6.20.
- (24) Major Walter BAXENDALE, Mayor of Bulawayo 1912, SR Vols att'd BSAP OC B Svce Coy Sept 1915, Staff Offr No.1 Col 1916, OC NRP & BSAP Dets Bismarksburg 23.6.16, OC D Coy NRP to Iringa 29.9.16, killed nr Ngominji Oct 1916.

Lieutenant Charles E MILLS MBE(1919), Sgt NR Rifles, 2Lt NR Rifles Mobile Col 27.4.15, described as NRP att'd BSAP in NR Govt Gazette 1919.

(25) Captain Harry Clement INGLES NRP, Insp (Capt) 12.2.13, Leave 16.6-10.9.14, OC C Coy 1916.

Captain George Anthony DEBENHAM MC(12.9.17), NR Govt Svce Att'd NRP as T/2Lt 1.2.15, Capt by 12.9.17.

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BOOK REVIEWS

THE ENGLISH POLICE, A POLITICAL AND SOCIAL HISTORY, Clive Emsley; Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991, Hardback, pp253, £35,00.

This work will undoubtedly be the standard text on the history of Police in England and Wales for the 1990s. Professor Emsley taps a rich vein of varied sources in a very readable and lively history. This book highlights for me the vast range of material on police history which has been published in the last decade. This, together with a mass of hitherto unpublished items from numerous local police archives is skilfully woven into a text which is unbelievably rich in examples to back all the main arguments.

The general theme of the work is along a middle course between the traditional "whig" police historians, exemplified by Critchley and Reith, and the revisionists who see the police as an instrument of class control in an emerging industrial society. The parts played in the development of policing by the Treasury, the police themselves and police authorities are taken into account. Many conventional wisdoms on 18th and 19th Century policing are cast into doubt, leaving a number of interesting questions open for further research.

The first eight chapters relate to a chronological account of the development of policing right up to the 1990s. The next two chapters relate to life within the police service, drawing on police archive material, autobiographies and some oral history recordings. The final chapter makes some useful European comparisons.

Professor Emsley is to be congratulated on producing a book which will interest all of our members. Unfortunately however the price tag, at £35.00 may mean that sales will be somewhat limited. If you don't rush out and buy a copy then I suggest that you add it to your Christmas list or at least lay your hands on a copy through your local library.

Les Waters

"MY MANOR" Charlie Richardson with Bob Long. Sidgwick and Jackson £14.95.

Charlie Richardson's autobiography weaves the story of his life with the progress of the notorious torture trial in 1966 for which he was sentenced to 25 years imprisonment. As an account of his early life in a poor family in south east London the book paints an effective and sometimes amusing picture of working class life. provides an interesting incite into the culture of violence that led ultimately to Richardson's imprisonment. But the book is also used as a vehicle for Richardson to defame and abuse - often obscenely the courts, lawyers, police, social workers - in fact anyone not criminal shotgun totting, belonging to the macho, hard man, subculture of South East London. Like the blast from a shotgun the allegations, particularly about the Metropolitan Police, are spread indiscriminately. None of the 'corrupt coppers' who either 'framed' Richardson or allegedly accepted thousands of pounds in bribes from him are named.

Richardson emerges as a rather sad, weak and frustrated man who, although successful by his own standards, seems to have been unable to sustain anything worthwhile, whether in his shabby business ventures or in his relationships with the many women to whom he has apparently given such enormous pleasure. Richardson constantly blames the misfortunes and shortcomings of others for his ultimate inability to achieve his full potential as an international business man, lover and general all round reformed robber baron with a heart of gold.

At first is difficult to understand why a self confessed, habitual criminal, like Charlie Richardson, should decide to tell his tale. After all, it would seem to provide the perfect opportunity for the very inadequate boys for the Yard to catch up on an international criminal mastermind. After reading the book it becomes obvious that what Charlie Richardson really wanted is fame and notoriety. It is equally satisfying for him to be associated with the Krays or Lord King, being known is what matters, although I doubt the noble Lord shares that perception!

It is now 7 years since Charlie Richardson was released from Spring Hill prison. I suppose it was stretching optimism beyond the limits to expect that 'Charlie Boy' would save criminal intelligence officers the trouble of keeping tabs on him by actually telling what he is up to these days. His publishers say he has renewed his interests in mining and is '...extremely successful. He claims to have been offered £1.5 million for a business'... the banks and building societies would have nothing to do with.' Let us hope that is true, a literary career certainly doesn't look too promising.

Roy Ramm Detective Chief Superintendent Metropolitan Police New Scotland Yard

Mike Brogden, ON THE MERSEY BEAT: POLICING LIVERPOOL BETWEEN THE WARS, Oxford University Press 1991, pp 184, Price: £14.95

This lively account of policing in Liverpool between the Wars relies almost exclusively on oral history material gathered from 24 octogenarian and nonagenarian former rank and file police officers, supplemented by extracts from fellow officers' contributions to contemporary police publications (often, it has to be said, in excruciating doggerel). Brogden is concerned to offer an account of what it was like to be a policeman at the time and place chosen entirely from the viewpoint of the beat officer (with some additions from plain accounts or 'views from above'. What we get is a vivid description of the pains, boredom, deprivations and discipline involved in the daily round, with little light — or any other purpose guiding his research. His stated aim is to make a contribution to the sociology of occupations, where that of the police has been conspicuous by its absence, rather than to the social history of policing. His concern with the topic arises from what he sees as the inbuilt contradictions in the policeman's role. These contradictions derive from the fact that a largely working class body of men were recruited to take action on behalf of the State against other working class people; his purpose is to discover

how these were dealt with by the service and by the men themselves. He is more successful in demonstrating the ways in which the police authorities sought to control their working class controllers, through the strict time discipline of the beat and the restraints on their private lives, than he is in getting his respondents to discuss the existence or implications of conflicts within their class position on their work and lives. Unfortunately, the lack of a common understanding here makes for rather flat reading of the very lengthy verbatim material.

Barbara Weinberger

KEEPING THE PEACE? POLICING STRIKES IN BRITAIN 1906 - 1926: Dr. Barbera Weinberger. Berg Publishers Limited. Hardback. pp 229 £27.50

Dr. Weinberger has supported the Police History Society since its inception and has spoken on the subject of this book at one of our conferences.

A detailed and fascinating discussion of the police role and response to industrial disputes from the problems in Newport in 1910 to the General Strike of 1926.

Again an expensive book, of both academic and general interest concentrating on relationships between the police, government, unions and employers.

The period 1906 - 1926 is significant in the way that policing industrial disputes opened up the debate between local and central authorities over tactics and accountability in the field of public order, and stimulated development in the organisation of the police.

Robert Bartlett

A MISCELLANEY

POLICE CATERING By Richard Ford

I joined the Gloucestershire Constabulary in 1946 after war service in the Royal Navy and, as a single constable, lived in police stations as was the practice with unmarried men in those days. Catering, as such, was virtually non-existent, being entirely on a "do-it-yourself" basis. Most men went out for their main mid-day meals and then managed the rest of their sustenance themselves. Food for night duty men was, if in need of cooking, dished up by the station reserve man at about one or two o'clock in the morning in between his other duties of looking after prisoners and cleaning offices.

At my first station at Stonehouse I was the only single man there and my "catering facilities" consisted of a gas ring, a cold water tap and a bare board table in a stone floored kitchen which also accommodated two police pedal cycles and occasional stray dogs. Gas used was chargeable at one shilling (5p) per week. Thankfully, a nearby hotel provided good cooked lunches at reasonable prices.

Moving to Cheltenham in 1947 I was among more men but messing arrangements, which were carried out in basement rooms adjacent to the cells, were still pretty primitive. The place was infested with mice who would come tumbling out of four food lockers when opened. One little rodent cheerfully tunnelled his way through a loaf of mine. Removing such "perishables" from my locker, I left only canned goods there but, undeterred, "Mickey" chewed the label off a condensed milk tin.

At Gloucester in the following year I found that mousey companionship still was not lacking. The upstairs mess room had several holes in the floor and often, when sitting quietly with my midnight meal, I saw mice come out and play unconcernedly around.

Transferring to the Bournemouth Borough Police afterwards, I found a great improvement as proper canteen facilities with well cooked food existed in the Central Police Station, with minor facilities in Divisional Stations. Civilian cooks were employed in the canteen though sometimes police officers, particularly policewomen, were "roped in" in times of staff shortages. Night duty cooking was again the responsibility of the station reserve officer. Prisoners' meals had to be prepared as well as those of police officers. As regards official catering, it must be admitted that some police personnel were their own worst enemies, preferring to bring "sandwiches and a flask" rather than enjoy and pay for a canteen meal. Something of a catering crisis arose when men with "private" sandwiches endeavoured to flavour them with police sauce. The canteen manager insisted on payment of one penny (old money) for the privilege.

Sometimes, detachment duty away from stations called for temporary or emergency feeding arrangements. When performing duty at Ascot races in early post-war years, and housed in police barracks at the course, rabbit seemed to figure largely on the menu. (It was rumoured that a senior officer's favourite sport was shooting).

Duty at Ministry of Supply sales of surplus war stores in the bitter winter of 1946 - 47 was a distinctly unpleasant affair.

Accommodation was mainly in former prisoner of war camps and catering was in the hands of contractors. It seemed as though the latter hadn't realised the changed status of the former. One constable was removed to hospital with food poisoning and after that there was some improvement.

Recent year have seen great improvements in police catering and in some Forces they are almost up to hotel standards. Many former policemen, including myself would say, "Not before time".

LAST RESPECTS By Richard Ford

Old time Guildford firemen were obviously a kindly crowd (as no doubt are their present day successors) and seemingly had good relationships with the Borough Police Force. In 1901 Police Sergeant Chapman died and by a sad coincidence his mother had predeceased him by only twelve hours. At the double funeral at Stoughton Cemetery the coffin of Sergeant Chapman was carried by policemen and that of his mother by firemen, a touching gesture which the Force must surely have appreciated.

Mutual representation by police and firemen at Service funerals were quite common in earlier days. There can have been no more poignant and impressive of these occasions than that of the burial of Police Constable Walter Charles Choat of the City of London Police at St. Mary's Church, Byfleet on 23rd December, 1910. Choat was one of a group of City policeman mercilessly gunned down, three of them fatally and two of them crippled, by a gang of anarchists escaping from a night raid on a jeweller's shop in Houndsditch a week earlier. His coffin was followed by members of the City of London, Metropolitan and Surrey Police Forces and fully uniformed members of the Fire Brigades of Byfleet, Addlestone, Chertsey, Walton, Weybridge, Esher, Kingston and Surbiton, Woking, Cobham, Ripley, Hampton, Guildford, Godalming and Egham. After the service the police and firemen were provided with tea at the Village Hall, the cost of which was borne by local subscriptions. Truly public spirited actions all round.

But the Fire Service itself was soon to pay an indirect price to the anarchists responsible for the police murders. Days later some members of the gang were cornered in a house in Sidney Street in London where they were besieged by armed police and troops. (The latter included a detachment of the Royal Horse Artillery who arrived at the gallop from St. John's Wood with two field guns which were not, however, actually used). After a prolonged and furious exchange of shots, resulting in yet another police casualty, the building eventually caught fire and two anarchists perished in the flames. Firemen of the London Fire Brigade were injured, one of them fatally, when part of a wall collapsed on top of them. No doubt the police paid suitable tributes to the resulting funeral.

MEMORIES FROM ABROAD By Richard Ford

In August, 1960 Richard (then a Sergeant in the Bournemouth Borough Police Force) was one of a forty strong detachment of British Police Officers flown out to Malawi, known at that time as Nyasaland, to assist in the preservation of law and order in the somewhat disturbed period following Dr. Banda's release from prison and preceding the country's final progress to independence.

Posted to the Chiradzulu Mountain Police Station as an Inspector, he quickly found that to say "it was not like Bournemouth" was the understatement of the year.

Many of the African constables, such as buglers and drivers, could not read or write and much of the Force's time was spent in long "rural" patrols, lasting for a week at a time, among outlying isolated villages.

Reports of crime took anything up to 24 hours to reach the Police Station as they were usually brought by runners who would not travel through the night for fear of being attacked by wild animals or seized by "evil spirits". Telephone communication, such as existed, was unreliable due to various disorders caused by such things as trees falling or monkeys swinging on telephone wires.

Additional hazards were such things as snakes basking in the Police Station back yard or straying cattle or goats arriving in the front. A lunatic was brought in in hefty iron shackles, forged by the local blacksmith, but without any appropriate key.

A potentially serious riot over hut taxes at the village of Magomero was thankfully defused without bloodshed although several arrests were made and various prison sentences resulted.

Following their long established native custom, African policemen were allowed to have more than one wife and the practice of "buying" wives was still followed. Finding one of his young constables in difficulties over raising the necessary cash to purchase a "loved one", Richard lent him the necessary money until pay day and thus became the only Bournemouth police officer ever to be a "shareholder" in an African wife.

ROMFORD POLICE: THE ANNIVERSARY OF A CHANGE Bernard Brown of Bermondsey Removals Unit

The abolition of the Greater London Council has always been a 'controversial subject' yet it was the formation of that body in 1965 which not only created the new London Borough of Havering but also led tot he passing of the Romford Division from the Essex Constabulary to become part of the Metropolitan Police District. It had been with Essex for 125 years; Last April (1990) saw its twenty fifth anniversary of being in the Met.

When 'K' or Stepney Division was formed on 1st February, 1830 the Metropolitan Police District came no further East than Bow Bridge, where the River Lea divided the counties of Middlesex and Essex. The latter were not to get their county force until 1840.

Highwaymen had always been a problem in this area. Even after the Turnpike Trusts had improved many of the roads such men were not deterred altogether. The report in the Norwich Mercury of 9th December, 1775, illustrates this:

COACH PASSENGER KILLS FOOTPAD

On Monday morning, early, the Norwich coach was again stopped at the 6th milestone at Ilford by five footpads. An excise officer of this city, who was an outside passenger and had a brace of pistols, discharged them both and killed one of the villains on the spot. The guard being unwilling to fire, the excise man took his combine from him, fired it, and broke the legs of another, who is in custody.

Romford at that time was in the parish of Hornchurch, becoming a parish in its own right in 1786. When the Bow Street Horse Patrol was started in 1805, two patrols form the 4th Division were established on the Romford Road at Maryland Point, another two in Ilford and a single horse patrol station in the town of Romford. The buildings for the latter were rented for the princely sum of £15 per annum. When the horse patrols were incorporated into the Metropolitan Police in 1837 they continued to police Romford as part of 'K' Division, although the M.P.D. had not as yet penetrated the County of Essex.

However, negotiations were already in hand for the Metropolitan Police to be extended. In fact, on 16th September, 1839, Romford parish had sent a testimonial to the Commissioner of Police asking that they might be included in the M.P.D. in the original plans for the exterior districts, an inspector's station was actually proposed for either Barking or Romford; but when, in 1840, the Met area was extended, Romford was not included. The border was the Romford parish boundary.

This extension of the M.P.D. coincided with the formation of the Essex County's own Constabulary, 115 officers under their Chief Constable, Captain Mchardy. Romford was included in the Brentwood Division and a station was taken into use in the High Street with an inspector in charge. The six constables were posted in this manner:

three for Romford, two for the parish of Hornchurch, and one for the hamlet of Collier Row. The wages of inspectors were fixed at £1.5 shillings per week; a first class constable received twenty-one shillings per week and a P.C. (second class) nineteen shillings.

Of course, the horse patrols of the Metropolitan Police were no longer responsible for the Romford area since the county force was now in existence. It was as well that the situation had been regularised, for the coming of the Eastern Counties Railway in 1839, linking Romford with the Metropolis at Shoreditch, was the beginning of the real growth of the town. It was already an important market town and, before the coming of the railway, was also an important staging point for the Royal Mail coaches between London and Ipswich, Norwich and Yarmouth. Even twelve years after the railway had been opened, it was still possible to travel to the City from Romford by stagecoach for the sum of two shillings (or one shilling and sixpence, if you would travel outside and brave the elements).

By 1851 the county force had taken on more men. Four of these were used to augment the strength at Romford by creating new beats at Havering, Collier Row, Upminster and Rainham.



A precursor of the Instant Response Units was noted in 1859 by Superintendent Cartwright of the Inspectorate, who observed:

"In Essex I find the system of dropping night patrols, a practice which would appear worthy of imitation; that is to say, the supervising officer taking a patrol constable in his cart to a certain point and dropping his men and taking up others from time to time or place to place as they may be required during the night".

Over the years the size of the town continued to increase, as did other places round London served by the railways. There were various reorganisations of the Constabulary and boundary changes affecting Romford. The town had grown sufficiently by 1912 for the London General Omnibus Company to introduce a motor bus route between there and Bow Road underground station.

The Great War had a marked effect on the area. The buses were withdrawn - they were commandeered for the war. Romford Division, which had separated from Brentwood in an earlier shuffle, was combined with it again for the duration of the war, due to men being called up for the front. To the South, A Royal Flying Corps Aerodrome had been built on the site of Sutton's Farm, Hornchurch, to combat the German Zeppelin raids from the East Coast. Indeed, the first three Zeppelins to be shot down during 1916 were all drowned by Hornchurch pilots among them the famous Captain William Leefe Robinson.

Between the wars the population and consequent building up - of the area continued to increase. There were further parish and police reorganisations to meet the growing needs of the people.

Hornchurch Aerodrome was again in action during the Second World War; the Royal Air Force pilots again fought valiantly against the invaders. The aerodrome finally closed in 1962.

The year 1949 saw the first bus service to the developing Harold Hill estate (the present route 174 provides a through service to the Ford Works at Dagenham); and with the rapid expansion of the estate, a new police station was opened at Gooshays Drive. The Romford Division at this time was divided into two sub-divisions. The Romford one included the Plough Corner section and police officers at Collier Row and Rydal Mount, Havering. The Hornchurch Sub-Division was stationed in a small terrace house in the High Street and included the Emerson Park section and offices at Hornchurch and Harold Wood.

And so, on 1st April, 1965, the G.L.C. was formed and the former Essex boroughs of Romford, Rainham and Hornchurch became part of the new London Borough of Havering. Romford Police ceased to be under the control of the Constabulary and became part of 'K' division for the first time since the horse patrols left in 1840. A total of 138 men were transferred to the Metropolitan Police as part of the deal.

The Romford Police station in South Street was taken over, of course. (This had replaced the earlier High Street station in 1892). However a new county police station in Main Road had been under construction prior to the transfer, and this was opened in December, 1965. It became the District headquarters in lieu of East Ham.

Plough Corner was eventually closed and the same fate nearly overtook the station at Collier Row (a former public house!) but a petition signed by a thousand local residents saved Collier Row, and it is now a police office. There was a further major reorganisation of the sub-division in 1974.

A reminder of the time when the M.P.D. ended at Dagenham and Chadwell Heath can still be found today in the form of coal posts. These white posts bearing the crest of the City of London were originally erected in 1851 at a twenty mile radius round London, to exact a toll on coal coming into the city by road, rail or canal. In 1861 they were re-erected at the M.P.D. boundary and half a dozen still survive along the borders of the Romford Division, as it is today. For 125 years they marked the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Police.

SERGEANT ROBERT PATERSON OF THE GLASGOW CITY POLICE By Patrick W. Anderson

The History of the City of Glasgow Police (The Thin Blue Line by Douglas Grant, a retired Inspector) records in the Appendix a list of police officers who over the years had been awarded medals for gallantry. The following two are noted:

1955 Sergeant Robert Paterson) Rescuing two women trapped in Constable Alexander Innes) tenement severely damaged.

Both were awarded the Queen's Commendation for Brave Conduct and the Corporation Medal for Gallantry.

I have traced in the Glasgow Herald of 6 December 1954 the event. The newspaper reports a trail of damage done by a gale during the early hours of Saturday the 4th that swept Scotland. Chimney heads and pots were dislodged, trees uprooted, garden sheds smashed and shipping disorganised. The report goes on to say that in Glasgow where a storm reached gusts of 79 m.p.h., a chimney head fell through the roof of a tenement in Oxford Street, and buried a mother and her daughter in rubble. Police and firemen released the women who were both treated at the Royal Infirmary. Four other families were given temporary accommodation for the rest of the night at the Police Centre nearby. The newspaper does not mention the Sergeant or Constable involved in the drama, but the Report of the Chief Constable for the year 1955 describes the bravery of Sergeant Robert Paterson and Constable Alexander Innes, both of the Southern Division for their courageous conduct on 4 December 1954 in affecting the rescue of two women who had been trapped by fallen debris when a chimney head smashed into the tenement property in Oxford Street.

The Queen's Commendation for Brave Conduct of Sergeant R. Paterson (and Constable Innes) was published in the London Gazette of 17 May 1955. Paterson received the Commendation and the Corporation Medal for Bravery at a presentation in Glasgow; the latter is inscribed 'Presented by the Corporation of Glasgow to Sergeant Robert Paterson, Southern Division 1955'.



Sergeant Paterson was later promoted Inspector in the City of Glasgow Police. He was also the recipient of the Police Exemplary Service Medal (Queen Elizabeth), in addition to the 1939-45 Star, and the Defence and War Medals. (339 members of the Glasgow City Police served in the 1939-45 War, and of that total 30 lost their lives).

I acknowledge assistance given by the Staff of the Mitchell Library in Glasgow.

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THE FORT STIKINE DISASTER by R. Howard

From an article by Noel Morris, in 'Coin and Medal News' February 1985.

As William Green emerged from the main entrance of the Colaba Barracks in Bombay and turned towards his apartment and a late lunch, he mentally toasted the change in career he had just negotiated and reflected that this would be the last occasion that he would wear his City of Bombay police uniform. His happy frame of mind might have been adversely affected if, as a student of the occult with an allied interest in superstition, he had stopped to consider how closely to the date Friday April 14, 1944 - came to being a 'black Friday'. In the same vein, any expert on maritime disasters and a belief in coincidence might well have felt uneasy that it was also the 33rd anniversary of the Titanic disaster.

Green, at that time a dapper 50 year old with the unmistakable gait of a military man, was born in Great Yarmouth, a grandson of the town's lifeboat coxswain. He worked for a time, but his thirst for adventure, together with a fascination for uniforms and all things military, led him to enlisting in 7th Queen's Own Hussars when he was 17 and he was sent to India with his regiment. During the First World War he saw active service in Mesopotania and afterwards sought to follow his mother's family into the Constabulary. Unfortunately a lack of inches led to his application being rejected, so he returned to India where the regulations were not so strict and found a place in the Mounted Branch of the Bombay City Force.

In the years between the wars, he had a hectic time, being injured on no less than eight occasions in sectarian and nationalist riots. His outspokenness and unwavering determination to treat the indigenous population and his native colleagues with due respect, did not endear him to some of his senior officers and he found himself unsatisfied with his role. He decided upon positive action and, on the morning of that fateful day, he obtained a doctor's certificate stating that he was medically unfit for further police duties and followed that with a visit to the barracks from which he had just emerged, incredible as it may seem, with the promise of a commission in the Military Police. Up to the moment that afternoon when the first of two major explosions rocked the city, all of Green's plans were coming to fruition, but the lives of many people changed in that instance.

The source of the explosion was pinpointed to the docks' area by the pall of smoke that began reaching skywards almost immediately and this served to guide the driver of the truck that Green commandeered picking up helpers on the way. The drive to the docks was along broken roads, littered with all sorts of debris - overturned vehicles, collapsed walls, broken glass and small fires - there was panic everywhere.

Dazed people were running away to escape further danger. The cause of the explosion and the likelihood of others were at that time unknown and uncontemplated factors, but William Green aided no doubt by the authority of his now redundant uniform, was able to co-ordinate the efforts of random groups of men who were frantically

clearing away the debris of a collapsed wall and several people were soon freed. The second and much more violent explosion occurred just after this task had been completed and such was its intensity that William was lifted completely off his feet and thrown many yards distant, where he lay dazed, blinded in the left eye, deafened in the left ear and with the fingers of his left hand shattered.



George Medal Hero - William Green in Uniform of Captain Canadian Division, Legion of Frontiersmen.

The S.S. Fort Stikine had arrived in Bombay two days earlier having sailed in convoy from Birkenhead via Karachi. American built of 7,142 tons, she was a new ship under a new captain and was on loan to Britain from the United States under the terms of the Lend-Lease Agreement. During passage she had occupied a position on the extreme edge of the convoy which demonstrated a respectful recognition of the lethal nature of her cargo. With fourteen hundred tons of various explosives in her hold and other flammable commodities such as bales of cotton, drums of lubricating oil and resin, she was indeed a floating bomb. She was also a floating gold-mine, for amongst her cargo of scrap iron, sulphur and rice was

a consignment of gold bullion valued at one million pounds. sharp contrast to her convoy station, the position allocated to her in dock, demonstrated a greater lack of appreciation of her potential danger. She carried no 'B' flag to indicate the explosive nature of her cargo probably for fear of sabotage, and no priority was given to her unloading. The cause of the ensuing fire (thought to be a carelessly discarded cigarette) was never positively identified, but it was later ascertained that several witnesses had seen smoke rising from her holds earlier in the day, but none had seen fit to report he fact. By the time that the alarm was eventually raised, time was too short to locate the exact position of the blaze or to summon the necessary equipment to deal with it and, just after four o'clock, the Fort Stikine was ripped apart by the first explosion, despatching into oblivion her master and members of the crew, as well as firemen who had been called to the quayside. The second explosion - the one that blew William of his feet - occurred about half an hour later.

Nobody, least of all William Green, knows how long he lay stunned by his ordeal, but he eventually recovered sufficiently to begin organising further rescue parties. Later when the pain from his injuries finally got through to him, he had his crushed fingers bandaged and then set off, accompanied by a young sailor, Able Seaman Waugh, to find further rescue work. Together they swam though the murky water in the dock dodging the numerous bales of burning cotton to guide to safety a small group of petrified Indian dock workers who had been cast adrift. The crude oil on the water played havoc with William's already damaged eyes, but not until he had collapsed from sheer exhaustion did he agree to go off to hospital for treatment. Then, after a brief rest, some nourishment and a change of clothes, he was back to assist in the search for survivors over the next two days.

The Fort Stikine Disaster reeked terrible devastation. A square mile of the city of Bombay around the dock area was completely flattened and all the ships sharing Bombay dock with her at the time were seriously damaged. The stern of the ship lying next to her was lifted clean out of the water and deposited on the roof of one of the dockside buildings.

In human terms the official figure of 500 killed is probably more than a conservative estimate and untold thousands must have been injured. On the lighter side, several gold bars were handed in as having fallen from the sky, while others, no doubt fell at the feet honest mortals. Happening as it did in wartime. contemporary reports were heavily censored. The initial report of the court of enquiry set up to investigate the matter was quite damming in the picture it pained of some of those in authority, but by the time the final report was approved, the tone was much more conciliatory.

As for William after further crown services he returned to the United Kingdom following the civil disturbances of 1948. It was not in his nature to lead an inactive life and he complemented a steady civilian job with wholehearted spare time involvement in the Special Constabulary, the St. John Ambulance Bridgade, the Civil Defence and the Legion of Frontiersmen, which he had first joined in India in the 1930s and in which, even today, he plays an active part. His

injuries are still apparent and his movements are slower but his thoughts are crystal clear and his brain sharp. In recognition of the part he played following Bombay's worst disaster, the authorities post-dated his medical discharge by two days necessary for him to complete 25 years service in the city's police force. For this example of policemanship, courage and devotion to duty he was awarded the George Medal.

Postscript

Born on 2nd April, 1894, William Green will be 97 years of age come April. For many years he was the training officer for the Canadian Division of the Legion of Frontiersmen and was this year promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel and No. 2 I/C the Command. He justifiably and proudly displays medals from the two world wars and other military and police actions headed by the coveted George Medal.

Spl-B C P 218

BOMBAY POLICE OFFICE:

16th afril 1917.

Mo : W. Green

has been appointed

by the Commissioner of Police for the City of Bombay to the Police of the City of Bombay, and is vested with the Powers, Functions, and Privileges of a Police Officer under the City of Bombay Police Act, 1902.

2 Commissioner of Police.

DESPERATE RIOT IN SEVEN DIALS Many Injured (1873 - 1852)

Pc. Scott



A quarrel, which quickly assumed the proportions of a riot, occurred on Saturday night in Seven Dials, and resulted in the arrest of several persons, while upwards of twenty others had to be treated for injuries at the Middlesex, Charing Cross, and King's College Hospitals. The trouble started by a fight between two men who were taken into custody by two police constables. Their companions tried to effect their rescue and the constables were suddenly surrounded by a crowd of excited men and women. The mob fell on the police and the two prisoners were torn out of their grasp. The constables endeavoured to follow the men, and were hurled to the ground, kicked, and struck at with sticks. One of the policemen managed to blow his whistle, and the other constables arrived on the scene. A number of men got one of the constables into a doorway, and brutally ill-treated him, the man's cries for help in "the King's name", being responded to by only one young man by whose help the constable was enabled to rejoin his comrades. The stranger was then

From "The Illustrated Police News" March 30, 1901, and involves my great grandfather, P.C. Scott, 79E. Article by Mrs. C.F. Clark, Gairdner River, Western Australia.

surrounded and kicked. Seven men were arrested and conveyed to Bow Street. On Sunday the police arrested the other men for the part they took in the riot, and all will be brought before the magistrate at Bow Street Police Court.

At Bow Street Police Court on Monday, Alexander Staircase, of no occupation, of Seaton Street, Hampstead Road; William Rogers, porter, of a common lodging house in Queen Street; William Bayliss, labourer, of Great St. Andrew Street; Margaret Hearn, better known as "Mog the Fireman"; and William Hassett, a carman, were charged before Mr. Marsham, with being disorderly. Staircase, Rogers and Hassett were further charged with assaulting the police.

Police Constable 79 E stated that at 5.40 on Saturday evening he saw Rogers and Staircase standing in Great Queen Street, Seven Dials. They were using obscene language. He told them to go away, and they walked a short distance. Staircase then said "If you come down here we will flatten you". The witness then took him into custody. Rogers immediately struck him a violent blow on the back of the head, knocking him down. While lying on the ground, Staircase kicked him on the arm. In fact, they both kicked him while he was down, Rogers making a suggestion as to what part of the body the other man should kick. Eventually, the witness go up, closed with Staircase, and threw him onto the ground. Police Constable 73 then arrived, and took Rogers into custody. Rogers was very violent, and the witness saw him struggling on the ground with the other constable. then some roughs pulled the witness of Staircase, who at once kicked Police Constable 73 on the jaw. By this time there were hundreds of people present, and the witness struck Staircase five or six times on the arm with his truncheon. Some respectable man in the crowd blew the witness's whistle. He was at once assaulted by five or six roughs and was afraid to come to court that morning. Bayliss, Hearn, and Hassett incited the crowd and made several attempts to rescue Staircase and Rogers.

Hearn: I saw a man in gores of blood, and wiped his face with a pocket handkerchief. I was not drunk. I have been a teetotaller for ten days.

Police Constable 73 E gave corroborative evidence, and he added, that he had to use his truncheon on Rogers.

Police Constable 465 E said he was thrown to the ground violently and kicked about the legs and body. He drew his truncheon, but someone in the crowd took it from him, and struck him on the shoulder with it.

Police Constable 102 E said that Hassett rushed at him as he was rising from the ground, and kicked him on the groin.

All the prisoners said they were innocent.

Bayliss was discharged, the magistrate saying there was not sufficient evidence against him.

Inspector Cutbush said the street was blocked for some time, and about thirty constables were sent to the scene. The young fellow who blew the constables whistle was treated at Charing Cross Hospital.

Mr. Marsham said it was a serious assault, and sentenced Hassett to three months and Rogers and Staircase to six months hard labour. Hearn was fined 20s.

Hassett: I am going to do that for nothing. When I come out I shall not have three months; I shall be stretched.

Arthur John Scott, born 19 May 1873 at Wye, Kent, married Ellen Louisa Browning 21.4.1897 at Wye. A. J. Scott joined the Police Force 16 March 1896 at "E" Division (or Holborn Division). He resigned from the Force 20 March 1922 after 26 years and 4 days service, at 48 years of age. He died in 1952. He was given a barometer dated 1922 when he resigned. It was also said that P.C. Scott shook the hand of the murderer, Crippin.

Pc. Scott's Police Manual is still in family possession in Western Australia, as are his police medals:

VR Jubilee 1897 COR Edward VII 1902 COR George V 1911 and medal FOR FAITHFUL SERVICE SPECIAL CONSTABULARY