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Editorial

The PHS Journal, for the first time in its history, has a new editor. Bob Bartlett has been editor since the first issue back in 1986 and has now given up the task to move on to other things. My first duty, then, is to thank him for all his hard work and dedication in the past, and to wish him well for the future.

Members of the PHS come from a wide range of backgrounds and interests. Serving and retired officers, academics, students, family historians and collectors of memorabilia spring readily to mind. Papers for the Journal need to reflect this diversity so that there is something of interest for every member.

This year we have a good mixed selection of material starting with a very timely piece by regular contributor Len Woodley on PC John Bailey, the police photographer on the Great Train Robbery investigation thirty years ago come summer. Did we talk of anything else in August 1963?

Articles are welcomed from small snippets of interest to a maximum of 5000 words with numbered references. Please send the material double-spaced and typed on A4 paper with details of any discs you can send to save time retyping. It helps if contributors can give me a line on how they want to be described in a footnote.

Jenny Ward



John Bailey by the De-Havilland



Leatherslade Farm from the air

A PHOTOGRAPHER RECALLS THE GREAT TRAIN ROBBERY


Len Woodley

A chance remark made to a senior officer one day in 1959 was to take PC John Bailey away from the everyday work performed at a largely rural station and into the fascinating world of police photography and crime detection. John was on duty at Linslade, where he had served since 1956, dealing with the usual run of the mill offences of careless driving, cyclists without lights and all the mundane things that were considered part of a semi-rural constable's lot in the late 1950s. He had transferred from the Metropolitan Police as he felt that he was stagnating as a mere number on the 'Royal A' Division to find himself and his family in 'King Country', as the Linslade sub-division was known then - Albert King being the Inspector in charge and holding great sway as Inspectors in that era could.

There came a visit by the Assistant Chief Constable of the Buckinghamshire Constabulary who asked, amongst other things, if John had a hobby. 'Photography, Sir,' was the earnest reply, and he thought little more of it as the great man departed. Some months later, John received a telephone call from Headquarters informing him that he was to attend an interview with the head of the Buckinghamshire CID, Detective Superintendent Malcolm Fewtrell. When he asked why he had been chosen he was told that he had expressed an interest in photography to the ACC who had in turn mentioned it to Superintendent Fewtrell, who had borne it in mind for when a vacancy occurred in the Photographic Department. There was now a vacancy and that was why he had been summoned.

A few days later John appeared before the 'Fewt', who, after asking him the usual questions suddenly demanded, 'Do you drive?' When he explained that he could not, John was told to go for ten days instruction and if he successfully passed his test he would be taken onto the strength of the Photographic Department. (It was to be some years before the name was changed to the Scenes of Crime Department.) At the end of ten intensive days John was handed his 'ticket' and, divesting himself of his uniform, he presented himself at Police Headquarters at Aylesbury. He joined the small but enthusiastic team of Detective Sergeant George Gaunt, Detective Constable (later Superintendent) Vivien Jenkins and Sam Clarke, civilian (ex-Metropolitan and Bermuda Police), now alas all dead.

The Photographic Department covered the whole of the Buckinghamshire Constabulary (now part of Thames Valley) from Lavendon, on the borders of Bedfordshire and Northamptonshire, to Datchet, adjoining the Metropolitan Police District. There were no divisional photographers so that all articles for examination were packaged and sent to Aylesbury. If they were so cumbersome



Bridego Bridge, the scene of the robbery



John Bailey photographs the mail-train
copyright: Bucks Herald


that they could not be dispatched, or the scene of the incident had to be photographed, then one of the team had to travel out from Headquarters. Thus it was that after a six-week course at New Scotland Yard on the techniques of fingerprint searching and classification (he never attended a photography course), John not only photographed the unusual and commonplace articles sent to him for examination but attended the scenes of larcenies, house-breakings and burglaries. He was also called out in the middle of the night to serious and fatal accidents and murders, although eventually these night-time callouts were restricted to murders only.

John gained expertise quickly in dealing with such matters and the sight of the grey Austin van turning up at the scene of an incident and the tall, lean figure of John emerging with a black shawl draped over his shoulders reassured many a uniform and detective officer that if nothing else turned out correct, the photographs taken by DC Bailey would.

But it was not the gory murder scenes, the innumerable fatal accidents, the back-street abortionists that would be the high point in John's service.

On Thursday 8 August 1963 he was aroused from a deep sleep and told that he had to get down to Headquarters immediately and take the Photographic Department van out to Bridego Bridge near Sears Crossing and Cheddington where the mail-train had been robbed. John knew exactly where to go from his years spent at Linslade. Other police officers and members of the public were to come to know the names of these locations well over the days, weeks, months and years of the investigation into what would become known as 'The Great Train Robbery'. To his question of 'Has much been taken?' came the laconic reply, 'About a million pounds.' This estimate was to rise considerably in the next few days.

On John's arrival at the scene he saw the train standing forlornly where it had been stopped in the early hours of that day. It had been conveying the mail from Glasgow to London plus a number of mail sacks containing a large quantity of money en route to the Bank of England. On its journey southwards it had been attacked at Sears Crossing by a gang of well-informed robbers who, in a precise but not unbloody operation - for the driver, Jack Mills, had been assaulted - had relieved the train of its precious cargo. John set up his camera along the embankment and commenced work. The 'Up-Special' had been violated and was now being inspected by the usual hordes of police officers who attend the scene of every major crime. For not only were the rank and file of the uniform and CID of the Buckinghamshire Constabulary present but also, at the request of Brigadier Cheney, the Chief Constable, senior detectives of the Metropolitan Police who were to lead the investigation into the so-called 'crime of the century'.



The gloved green light

John took the usual photographs of the scene, of the mail-train in situ, the carriages, the signal gantry where the green light had been covered up with a glove and a false red light substituted and, after the train had been slowly moved the few yards to a quieter track by Cheddington Railway Station, John had the somewhat novel experience of going aloft in a De-Havilland Beaver, loaned by the Army Air Corps, to take some aerial photographs to give an overall picture of the locality.

A more detailed examination of the train could now take place and under the direction of Detective Superintendent Ray of the Metropolitan Police all officers spent long hours meticulously searching for clues that would assist their colleagues.

Detective Superintendent McArthur had expressed the belief that the train robbers were not too far from the scene and accordingly organised a vast search of farms and buildings, occupied or derelict, that may have been taken into use by the thieves. A few days later, acting on a tip-off from a member of the public, the hideout was found at Leatherslade Farm near Brill and again the police descended en masse. Unfortunately the birds had flown, but in their haste they had left enough articles behind to engage the attention of the fingerprint searchers and photographers for several days. Two Land-Rovers and a truck were minutely examined and a concealed storage place was found in the back of the truck where groceries and other food had been hidden at some time.

Police dug holes in the surrounding garden, cupboards were taken apart and even the proverbial outhouse was searched. Then, in the cellar, were found a number of mailbags. Carefully they were opened and banknote wrappings and a few banknotes were discovered. A discarded Monopoly set was also found which gave rise to the story that the train robbers had played the game with real money. Day after day the team worked on at the farm searching for clues as to who had stayed there for such a short time. Some yellow paint which had been spilt in one of the outbuildings during an attempt to change the colour of the vehicles provided vital evidence. It matched speckles later found on the heel of suspect Gordon Goody's shoes, proving that he had been at the farm.


The relentless pursuit began to net the criminals. Two were caught in the Bournemouth area, flourishing a large amount of money; another was chased across the roof of a London mews before being captured. A hoard of cash was found hidden in a caravan in a Surrey wood and any vehicle or article thought to have been handled by the robbers was painstakingly examined and photographed. Incidentally, the caravan was removed to Aylesbury Headquarters where it was stored. Later, a remark by one of the captured robbers, Jimmy White, that there should have been more money found in it, led to a more thorough search by Sam Clarke and John, and indeed another cache was discovered.



Suspicious confirmed - mailbags in the cellar



Incident room at Aylesbury; DC Frank Wright and the late DC Peter Jones in the foreground left to right



The truck with the secret cache

Eventually the train robbers stood trial at Buckinghamshire Assizes, although the actual venue was the newly built Rural District Council Offices because of the number of defendants. Those who had been found guilty were brought up, one by one, for sentencing at the Old Court House in Market Square, Aylesbury, and given exemplary sentences. John, along with others, spent many hours in the witness box giving evidence.

At the conclusion of the trial a letter was sent from Detective Superintendent Ray to the Chief Constable of the Buckinghamshire Constabulary. Part of this reads:

The assistance, co-operation and courtesy that I received on all occasions from your officers undoubtedly smoothed my task considerably and materially helped me in bringing the fingerprint side of it to a successful conclusion. Although everyone, from yourself down gave me this co-operation, I feel I must particularly mention DC Bailey who was attached to the fingerprint team and whose enthusiasm, help and skill played a considerable part in our investigation.

When he first joined the photographic team at Aylesbury in 1959 the main camera being used was the Kodak Technical half-plate camera. All fingerprints were photographed actual size with the use of the extension. At the studio fingerprints found on removable articles were photographed direct into bromide paper without using a negative by using a prism. Also at this time the department was catching criminals in the act by setting a camera trap by using infra-red film - long before video was invented. The main camera was eventually replaced by the MPP Micro Precision press 5 x 4 and Rolleiflex, then by various Mamyia and Bronica 2.5 sq. cameras for general photography. After that fingerprints were lifted by tape by using aluminium powder as they are today.

During his stay in the department its name changed to Scenes of Crime Department and the beginnings of forensic science were introduced. This meant another course with the Metropolitan Police and in addition to photography at a scene and searching for fingerprints he now had to examine the scene for hairs, fibres, blood and other things which involved many hours of painstaking work and many visits to the Home Office Forensic Science Laboratory at Aldermaston to have the evidence checked by scientists.

In the early days many fatal accidents at night in the country areas were photographed with the use of flash powder - lighting up the road for 500 yards or more. Later it was thought to be dangerous to carry the powder in a police vehicle and the method changed to PF100 and PF60 flash bulbs, sometimes two or three at a time. With the increase in film speeds less light power was required.

Since retiring from the police in 1980 John started the John BAILEY STUDIO in Aylesbury which he is still running today.

The Great Train Robbers

Charlie Wilson	30 years	Gordon Goody	30 years
Roy James	30 years	Jimmy Hussey	30 years
Tommy Wisbey	30 years	Bob Welch	30 years
Ronnie Biggs	30 years	Bruce Reynolds	30 years
Roger Cordrey	20 years	Jimmy White	18 years
	Buster Edwards	15 years	

Further reading:

Malcolm Fewtrell, The Train Robbers, 1964

Piers Paul Read, The Train Robbers: Their Story, 1978

THE NORTHERN RHODESIA POLICE AND THE CONQUEST OF GERMAN EAST
AFRICA 1916-1918

Colonel T.B. Wright

A previous article dealt with the defence of Northern Rhodesia during the first half of the First World War. In the latter part of 1915 it was decided in London that the German forces in German East Africa (now Tanzania) should be eliminated so that the British and Indian troops involved could be used elsewhere. On 19 February 1916 Lieutenant General J.C. Smuts landed at Mombasa to take over as Commander-in-Chief of all British Forces in East Africa. By 31 March 18,700 South Africans had joined his British, Indian and African troops based in Kenya and Uganda.

On the Southern Front Brigadier General Edward Northey ADC was in command of the unified Nyasaland-Rhodesia Field Force. With him were a South African mountain battery and the 1st and 2nd South African Rifles, about 800 men.

The German commander, Colonel von Lettow Vorbeck, had one war aim, to hold down the maximum number of allied troops as long as possible. By 1 January 1916 he had managed, despite casualties, to more than quadruple his pre-war force to 2,712 whites, 11,367 askari and 2531 irregulars and armed porters, with 50 guns and 95 machine guns.

Although it was appreciated that the most suitable troops for bush warfare were Africans with strong cadres of white officers and specialists, on the British side expansion of the King's African Rifles had hardly begun. It was calculated that victory would be obtained before the climate and the mosquito destroyed the European and Indian troops and in far less time than it would take to train sufficient African recruits.

Northey set out on a tour of inspection, reaching Fife in Northern Rhodesia on 4 March 1916 where he found 'B' Company, British South Africa Police (BSAP) and two companies of the Northern Rhodesia Police (NRP). At Abercorn were 'A' Company BSAP and another two companies of the NRP. The fifth company of the NRP, 'E', garrisoned Zombe, nine miles away. Northey reorganised the defences on modern lines and took note of requirements for new equipment and supplies and on 23 March left for his headquarters in Nyasaland to plan his advance.

For the Nyasaland-Rhodesia Field Force he had about 1000 whites and 1500 Africans. It was to advance in three columns. No. 1, under Lieutenant Colonel Ronald Ernest Murray DCM BSAP, was known as Murray's Rhodesians or the 'Southern Rhodesia Column'. This column, two companies BSAP and four NRP, based on Abercorn, was to take Namena, 11 miles to the north-east. The total of 260

whites and 540 Africans was reduced by the necessity of leaving garrisons of half a company each at Abercorn and Fife.

No. 2 Column under Lieutenant Colonel E. Rodger, 2nd South African Rifles, consisted of 300 men of his regiment and 'E' Company NRP, 138 men under Captain Sillitoe, based on Fife. It was to take Luwiwa, 13 miles north-east.

No. 3 Column, under the Commandant of 1st King's African Rifles, Lieutenant Colonel G.M.P. Hawthorn, consisted of 1 KAR, the 1st South African Rifles and Nyasaland Volunteers. It was to advance from Karonga on Lake Nyasa and Fort Hill to take nearby Igamba and Ipiana.

Owing to ill health Colonel Hodson, the NRP commandant, had to give up command in the field and take charge of the Lines of Communication in Northern Rhodesia. The Great North Road from the railway at Broken Hill through to Abercorn was soon to be opened to motor transport operated by BSAP drivers under Major Charles Duly DSO.

Murray divided his Rhodesians into four sub-units:

- 'A' Force under Captain C.H. Fair NRP, comprising 'A' Company NRP and half 'A' Company BSAP, with two machine guns;

- 'B' Force under Captain G. Parson BSAP, which was 'D' Company NRP and half 'A' Company BSAP, with two machine guns.

- 'C' Force under Captain H.C. Ingles NRP, which was 'C' Company NRP and half 'B' Company BSAP, with two machine guns.

- 'Reserve' under Captain F.S. James NRP, comprising 'B' Company NRP and half 'B' Company BSAP, with two machine guns, a 12-pounder field gun and the old 7-pounder mountain gun.

On 23 May 1916 Murray marched out of Abercorn and into German East Africa. By the morning of 26 May 'A' and 'B' forces were in position but 'C' had lost direction in the bush and only arrived next day. Namena was a strong position on high ground. There was no question of carrying it by assault. The guns were placed on a height to the north-west and the lines were closed up to about 400 yards from the fort. On 28 May the garrison made a sortie. They were driven back with the loss of their commander captured, mortally wounded. With one man for every 20 yards of thick bush it was impossible to maintain an escape-proof cordon. On the night of 1/2 June the enemy, 30 Germans and 200 askari slipped away leaving six dead. Murray had lost four killed and three wounded.

In the morning the Rhodesians set off in pursuit 75 miles to Bismarckburg on Lake Tanganyika, forcing a crossing of the Kalambo River against opposition. Bismarckburg was a strongly designed fort on a promontory. Arriving on 7 June Murray called on the German commandant to surrender or, 'as soon as my guns arrive I will blow you into the lake.' In fact he had sent his guns back to Abercorn to speed his advance. The invitation to surrender was refused.

The map illustrates the geographical layout of German East Africa (Tanzania) and its neighboring territories. Key features include:

- German East Africa (Tanzania):** The central region, bounded by the Indian Ocean to the east and the Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique) to the south.
- Coastal and Inland Cities:** Zanzibar, Dar es Salaam, Dodoma, Kilosa, Ngomini, Muhanga, Mahenge, Mpapo, Kitanda, L. Kuyu, L. Liwale, Tunduru, Mbanza Bay, Wiedhafen, Karanga, Fort Hill, Salisi, Namerna, Bismarckburg, Kala, Kirando, and Karema.
- Rivers and Lakes:** R. Ruvu, R. Pangani, R. Rukwa, R. Kagera, R. Nyasa, R. Limpopo, L. Tanganyika, and L. Nyasa.
- Geographical Features:** Porets Hills, Njombe, Malangali, Utenge, Runge, New Langenburg, Luwina, Mbosi, and the Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique) border.
- Scale:** A scale bar indicates distances in miles (0, 50, 100).

NORTHERN
RHODESIA

PORTUGUESE
EAST AFRICA
(MOZAMBIQUE)

NYASALAND
(MALAWI)

A vertical scale bar labeled "MILES" with markings at 0, 50, and 100.

From a hill Surgeon Captain J.M. Harold and Lieutenant E.L. Ingpen NRP³ watched the white flag party enter and leave the fort. They asked a passing African policeman if the Germans had surrendered. 'Yes', he replied, not having understood but anxious to please. The doctor led Ingpen and a few BSAP troopers through the narrow gap in the abatis (a rampart of felled trees) to the gate of the fort. The red cross on Harold's helmet had enabled them to get so far without being fired on. The Commandant, Leutnant Hasslacher, opened the door and according to Captain Langham, then a BSAP trooper, asked in English what they wanted; 'Oh, just coming in', said Harold. 'How do you mean just coming in?' said the German and claimed them as his prisoners. Harold shouted, 'Like Hell we are! You're ours! Grab him!' and pulled Hasslacher out of the doorway where the German was seized by two troopers. Under fire from three sides both were wounded as they hustled him back through the gap in the abatis. Ingpen, mortally wounded in the groin, cleared the abatis in one desperate leap. Harold and Hasslacher were unscathed but the party was pinned down in dead ground in noman's land until they agreed on a truce. Hasslacher blew his whistle and waved his handkerchief and both sides ceased firing. The Germans brought out lemonade and bandages. The wounded were carried back to the British lines while Hasslacher returned to his command. During the night the enemy stole away north in a fleet of canoes and dhows which had been concealed from view on the lake side of the fort. Captain Fair set off up the shoreline next morning but could not find them.

Meanwhile Rodger's No. 2 Column had left Fife on 24 May. By the 26th they had established a ring of widely separated posts round Luwiwa. Here the enemy, 'L' Company of 20 Germans and 180 Africans, mainly former policemen, held two strongly built redoubts about 1200 yards apart. During the 26th and 27th Rodger closed in to within 200 yards of the enemy positions, reducing the cordon from 8000 to 4000 yards, but it was still far too long to be held by only 500 men. During the night of 27/28 May the enemy, having exhausted his rations and water, slipped away between the posts to the south where they were most spread out. Leaving half of Sillitoe's company to garrison Luwiwa, Rodger set out after the Germans. He pursued them over the Isole Pass, through Neu Langenburg, north-eastward through Pakalele and across the Rungwe River without firing a shot. On 6 June he came up against the enemy rearguard in the Poroto Hills, 16 miles north of the Rungwe. Four Germans were captured together with a gun, ammunition and equipment. The enemy, who were also being driven north by Hawthorn's No. 3 column, retired to reorganise on the line Madabira to Malangali.

By 9 June the Nyasaland-Rhodesia Field Force had occupied 20,000 square miles of German territory. The enemy dislodged in the Bismarckburg-Namena area were estimated at 600 and those who had retired before Rodger 300, not including Ruga Ruga, the Germans' native auxiliaries. General Northey moved his headquarters east

to Neu Langenburg. His next objective was Iringa to intercept the enemy retreating before Smuts' advance from the North. On 11 June Northey sent for Murray to bring his Rhodesians 200 miles east to Rungwe.

'B' and 'D' companies NRP and some BSAP details were left at Bismarckburg under Major Baxendale to round up enemy stragglers and assist in establishing British administration. With 'A' and 'C' companies NRP and the rest of the BSAP Murray marched via Fife and reached Rungwe on 29 June. From Rungwe he marched another 50 miles north-east to join Rodger at Buhora on 9 July. The whole of 'E' Company NRP was now behind on the Lines of Communication.

Rodger was to move on Malangali, while Murray, on the left, was to work towards Madabira. On 11 July a Rhodesian patrol drove a party of the enemy out of Kawere, 15 miles north-east of Buhora. On 25 July Murray was at Madabira. On 28 July he drove the Germans out of Lutege, halfway from Madabira to Wuasa. He sent Captain Fair's 'A' Force NRP a further 30 miles north to the crossing of the Great Ruaha River at Kiganga. Here it remained for a week, intercepting the enemy's mail between Iringa and Tabora and gaining much valuable information.

The advance was now held to await developments in the North, until, on 29 August Murray entered Wuasa unopposed. On 26 August at Weu, 23 miles from Wuasa and 15 miles short of Iringa, his forward troops located the retiring Germans, the Koenigsburg detachment of sailors, 2, 5, 10 and 'L' companies, all under Hauptmann Braunschweig. At 11 a.m on 29 August 1916 'C' Company NRP, under Captain Dickenson, entered Iringa, liberating 16 Indian prisoners of war and 42 civilian internees.

The Rhodesians were now only about 100 miles from Smuts' 2nd Division, which had crossed the Central Railway at Kilossa, but it was clear that von Lettow was not to be trapped between the two forces. His troops were heading off east for Mahenge. It was now planned to trap them between Lake Nyasa to the west, the sea to the east and the Rovuma River, the Portuguese border, to the south.

Murray, leaving a garrison at Iringa, marched south-east on Muhanga and then made for Mahenge. His route was across ranges of steep hills with narrow valleys and bush so thick that men had to cut their way through it. Reconnaissance showed that the enemy was strongly entrenched at Boma Himbu on the Little Ruaha. As Murray and Rodger closed in on his position, Braunschweig vacated it. This was to be the pattern of the advance. The enemy occupied a strong position, forcing their opponents to deploy, and then slipped away without a fight. The rains set in, cold and depressing. On 11 September Muhanga Mission was occupied. 13 Germans and 36 askari were captured, sick and wounded left behind by the enemy who had also destroyed 200

rifles and a quantity of ammunition to lighten their load. On 14 September Murray reached Hange, with his advanced guard 7 miles further east at Boma Dwangwire. His ox-drawn guns were a day's march or more behind, escorted by 'A' Company NRP, who spent most of their time helping to haul the guns uphill and holding them back on the downward slope, laughing and singing as they did it.

Murray's column was now ordered to march south to link up with Hawthorn. On 24 September Rhodesian patrols ambushed two parties of the enemy, killing two officers and several askari. On 29 September Murray reached Makapira. The men had been on short rations for many days as they marched further and further from their supply base at Iringa. Hawthorn had little to spare, being 60 miles from his own base at Lupembe. The two columns took up a strong position on high ground between the Mnyera and Ruhuje rivers, while posts were established on the lines of communication and supplies built up. Debilitated by sickness, Smuts' troops had been unable to reach Iringa. The German concentration to the east was such that for Northey's troops alone to press on to Mahenge would be to court disaster.

Meanwhile Lieutenant Colonel H.M. Stennett NRP had been placed in charge of the border area from Bismarckburg to Fife. Between 26 and 31 July 'B' and 'D' companies NRP, working north from Bismarckburg occupied Kirando Island and Kala, and were gradually securing the Ufipa country. Assisted for a time by half 'E' Company from Luwiwa, they cleared the enemy from the area between Lake Tanganyika and Lake Rukwa to about 80 miles north of Bismarckburg. Some 40 Germans and 300 askari remained around Mpimbwe and Kalema until on 20 August elements of the NRP gained touch with Belgian forces north-east of Mpimbwe. The Belgian advance on Tabora from the north and across Lake Tanganyika compelled the remaining enemy to withdraw.

British troops from Lake Victoria were also advancing on Tabora. Major General Wahle, in command at Tabora, was forced to fall back with his 1800 men, to join the main German concentration around Mahenge. He thus posed a serious threat to General Northey's thin line from Fife to Iringa. On 9 September Northey signalled to Baxendale to bring one of his companies to Rungwe. Arriving with 'D' Company NRP on 29 September he was sent on to Iringa escorting the South African mountain battery. Iringa was under siege. On the arrival of Baxendale on 9 October the enemy moved off to the south-west. Leaving the guns at Iringa, Baxendale and 'D' Company, 180 strong, were sent to garrison Ngomini.

On 30 September 1916 the five companies of the Northern Rhodesia Police in the field totalled 23 officers and 24 white and 872 African other ranks. 'A' and 'C' companies were with Murray. 'B' was performing police duty in the Bismarckburg District. 'D' was with Baxendale and 'E' arrived that day at Malangali.

Having left 50 men at Ngomini, Baxendale was patrolling with the rest of 'D' Company when he fell into an ambush and was killed with five of his men. Six others and a machine gun were captured and 22 wounded or missing but rejoined. Ngomini was then attacked. Having held out for several days the garrison surrendered on 29 October following the death of Lieutenant Clarke.

Mkapira was held by Murray and Hawthorn with 'C' Company NRP, 'A' Company BSAP and five single companies of 1 KAR. By 22 October they were surrounded by Major Kraut and five field companies. On the night of 29/30 October the Rhodesians and Nyasalanders broke out, killing 5 Germans and 37 askari and capturing 6 Germans and 76 native troops, a gun and 3 machine guns. Kraut's offensive power was crippled.

Reaching Lupembe on 4 November Murray was ordered to relieve Malangali, 60 miles north-west. Here Wahle's 26th Field Company had for five days been besieging the supply depot, which was defended by 100 recruits of the Rhodesia Native Regiment (RNR). The Rhodesia Native Regiment (RNR) had been raised at Salisbury in April 1916. Its 16 officers and 29 European NCOs were drawn from the BSAP and the Southern Rhodesia Native Affairs Department. To a cadre of 50 native policemen were added 406 African recruits. On 12 November 100 BSAP and 80 NRP arrived in 40 motor vehicles and dispersed the besiegers before driving back south to Njombe where Murray was now to concentrate.

On 16 November Murray's column had to move rapidly back to Lupembe where Hauptmann Wintgens had invested another supply depot defended by recruits for 1 KAR. Having engaged the enemy 20 miles from Njombe, the Rhodesians reached Lupembe on 19 November with 1 KAR from Mkapira. Wintgens decamped to join Kraut.

By the morning of 25 November both companies BSAP, Major Carbutt's company of the Rhodesia Native Regiment, and Captain Fair with 'A' and 'C' companies NRP, had closed in on Ilembule, 20 miles north-west of Njombe, where Oberstleutnant Huebner had established himself. That night 'A' Company NRP pushed right into the enemy position and gained control of his water supply in the bed of the Halali River. Huebner was thus compelled to surrender with 54 Germans, 250 askari, 3 maxims and a howitzer. For once the fish had been netted.

Back in the Bismarckburg District 'B' Company NRP had tracked down and captured 7 German officers, 47 other whites and 249 askari. Enemy morale was beginning to crumble.

After their success at Ilembule 'A' and 'C' companies NRP were joined at rest at Njombe by 'D' and 'E'. Here the companies were reorganised on a tribal basis. The Ngoni were separated into a new company, 'F'. On 10 December one company was sent to

Mbejera, thirty miles south-east, to watch the right flank and cover the collection of food supplies.

On 23 December 1916 the five companies NRP and the BSAP, some 900 rifles, marched out from Lupembe, under Murray who had been awarded the DSO. They were to co-operate with Hawthorn to destroy Major von Langenn-Steinkeller's force on the Kilombero River. Struggling through the wet bush the Rhodesians were foiled in three successive attempts to outflank and surround their opponents. At Sylvester Falls on 2 January 1917, under cover of machine-gun fire from ridge to ridge, the NRP, supported by the BSAP, crept down the gullies and up a spur held by the enemy. At 5 p.m. the charge was sounded and they went in cheering. The enemy fled. On 7 January touch was lost.

On 11 January Murray's column was diverted to Ifinga with instructions to drive Major Kraut out of the Upper Ruhuje Valley which he was using as a foraging ground. The Rhodesians reached the river on the 14th. By repeated actions they drove the enemy down the valley. By 29 January Kraut had retired to Mpepo and Murray's troops returned to Lupembe to rest.

The main army in the north was crippled by fever among the white troops and unable to resume offensive operations until the rains ended. The King's African Rifles were in the process of expansion and reorganisation; the first four regiments each forming second, and later third and fourth battalions. The Nyasaland-Rhodesia Field force therefore had to bear the burden of keeping the enemy on the run and gradually wearing him down. While Murray was at Lupembe, Major Kraut returned to the upper Ruhuje and marched on Kitanda.

At Likuyu a German force under Major von Grawert had been pinned down. At Kitanda part of the Rhodesia Native Regiment was battling to hold off Hauptman Wintgens and prevent the relief of von Grawert. On 29 January Major J.J. McCarthy MC NRP arrived from Likuyu in command of a detachment of the 5th South African Infantry and his own band of irregulars. He drove off Wintgens and Kraut, and von Grawert's 38 Germans and 202 askari surrendered. Max Wintgens had 500-700 combatant troops, 13 machine guns and three small guns. He had found little food. His askari were all from Tabora. They were becoming demoralised and mutinous. While Kraut moved south and east along the Rovuma to find sanctuary at Tunduru, Wintgens set off north-west to break through Northey's sparse cordon and make for Tabora, the only direction in which his askari would go.

'B' Company NRP had just rejoined from Bismarckburg, when orders for the pursuit reached Lupembe. 'E' and 'F' companies were left to garrison Lupembe while the other four marched out with the rest of Murray's column. The chase began on 14 February at Milow's Mission and ended 350 miles away only three days march

from Tabora on 28 May. On 15 March Wintgens was found to be making for St Moritz Mission, Galula.

Under Lieutenant Colonel A.J. Tomlinson BSAP, The Rhodesia Native Regiment had been at Mbosi, covering Fife. It was now to advance from the south with 'B' Company NRP under command. Murray made for Itaka and then pushed north to prevent an escape to the west. 1/1 KAR under Major G.L. Baxter was to bar him from returning east, and also block Wintgens' only route north, the bridge at St Moritz over the flooded Songwe.

Things did not go according to plan. Murray sent Lieutenant Percy Wardroper NRP⁵ to warn Tomlinson not to commit his force to a premature attack. He was too late. While Lieutenant Baker RNR and Sergeant Bainbridge NRP⁶ were reconnoitring towards St Moritz, Wintgens was stalking Tomlinson. They met on 20 March. Instead of withdrawing to the hills, Tomlinson dug in on the plain. Here he was quickly surrounded. Murray hurried to his assistance calling up Baxter to join him. Murray relieved Tomlinson on 27 March. Baxter came up the next day. Meanwhile Wintgens made good his escape over the unguarded bridge. Tomlinson's force had suffered heavy casualties. Of 'B' Company NRP, Captain James and Gunner Holloway were wounded and 20 African police killed, wounded or missing.

The pursuit was resumed but Murray was never again able to close with Wintgens. Difficulties of supply increased at every step until the Rhodesians were recalled south and a force from the Central Railway took up the chase. Wintgens, racked with fever, gave himself up on 21 May. His successor held out until 2 October.

On the return march Murray's column covered the 150 miles to Rungwe at an average of 17 miles a day. The rains had ended. The plan now was to drive the enemy main force across the Mahenge Plateau into the arms of a British force working inland from the coast at Lindi.

Three NRP companies under Captain Dickenson⁷ were ordered from Lupembe to drive Hauptmann Aumann's detachment east across the Ruhuje. This was accomplished by 25 July but on 29 July Aumann recrossed the river and occupied Mkapira.⁸ Captain Russell's company drove him out at the point of the bayonet.

The other three companies were in reserve at Songea until Lieutenant Colonel Fair and 'A' Company joined the 1st Rhodesia Native Regiment to attack Aumann from the south. On 9 August an unsuccessful attack was made on an advanced enemy post at Tuturu. Lieutenant H.W. Tarbutt and two African police were killed within five yards of the German trenches. The enemy later withdrew.

On 10 August Dickenson got across the Ruhuje. On 13 August the two forces joined west of Mpepo under Fair. Aumann was strongly entrenched on a ridge a mile northwest of Mpepo. On 17 August the attack commenced. The enemy resisted successfully until, on 26 August 'E' and 'F' companies NRP, under Captains Withers and Russell, rushed an outlying post, Single Hill. They took it and consolidated in time to beat off a vigorous counterattack by 'L' Field Company. It was police against police again as the enemy charged up to and, at one point, actually penetrated the NRP's trenches. A German was heard shouting 'Retire! Retire!' in English in the hope of confusing the NRP. Three of the enemy were killed and six askari captured together with their Company Commander, Oberleutnant Bauer, who died of his wounds. The enemy were seen to carry off ten wounded. The NRP lost one African policeman killed and one wounded.

Aumann obviously considered Single Hill the key to his position. After subjecting Withers' troops to heavy machine gun fire all through the following day he slipped away that night to Likassa. On 29 August Dickenson found him entrenched on a wooded height near the Litete River. There was heavy fighting at close quarters. Night fell with both sides dug in. Next morning Aumann had gone. The fight had been one of the fiercest yet experienced by the NRP who lost Lieutenant L.E. Leslie and 7 Africans killed and 4 Europeans and 11 Africans wounded. Aumann lost 2 Germans and between 10 and 24 askari killed and 55 captured, together with a gun. Some reports give his total loss as 94 men. It was for this action that Dickenson was awarded the Military Cross.

Aumann retreated rapidly north-east towards Mahenge. Fair pursued him as far as supplies would allow and on 1 October was 25 miles from Mahenge. A few days later Belgian troops occupied Mahenge and Aumann turned south. On 18 October the NRP joined their old allies in an attack on two enemy companies holding a hill on the Ruaha River. By the middle of November there were no enemy within reach. Fair was ordered to withdraw and took over Mahenge on 25 November.

On 26 November Murray, with 'B' and 'D' companies NRP and 1/4 and 2/4 KAR, was around Tunduru with patrols on the Rovuma. Fair left 'A' Company to garrison Mahenge and set off south to rejoin Murray. Murray's task was to prevent Major Tafel and his 1500 troops from joining von Lettow who was now right in the angle formed by the Rovuma and the Indian Ocean. Murray never managed to close with Tafel but his patrols captured every runner sent by one German to the other. Consequently neither knew the other's position or intentions. Tafel continued south-east through waterless and foodless country into the arms of Lieutenant General Louis Van Deventer, now Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces in East Africa. Unbeknown to Tafel, von Lettow had crossed his path making for Ngomano on the Rovuma which he forded on 25/26 November with 2000 troops and 3000 porters, scattering

the Portuguese garrison. In Mozambique von Lettow was joined by three companies under Hauptmann Gaering who had crossed further downstream.

Murray with the NRP, Rhodesia Native Regiment and 1/4 and 2/4 KAR was now to hold the Songea and Tunduru districts to prevent the enemy doubling back into German East Africa. The greater part of the NRP concentrated at Lipumbi. Few of the original officers were still at duty with the battalion which was now over 1000 strong including headquarters staff and the base organisation. 15 of the 20 officers at the front were from Southern Rhodesia as were almost all the 40 European other ranks. The companies in the field were now reorganised into a conventional British Army Service Battalion of four double companies, with its own machine gun platoon, lewis gun sections, signallers, scouts, medical, supply and transport sections. The men of 'E' and 'F' companies were split up among the other companies.

Murray had developed serious heart trouble and was invalided on 27 January 1918 to the regret of all. Northey deplored his loss and reported him suitable to command a brigade in Europe. This was not to be and he died in England on 29 June 1920.

Back in Northern Rhodesia law and order were being maintained by the few remaining police including convalescents, the native commissioners and their messengers. During 1917 at Fort Jameson there were 5416 convictions, of which 5204 were for non-payment of native tax. On 8 March 1918 Northern Rhodesia agreed to provide a platoon of NRP, at the expense of the UK Government, to police the Bismarckburg District of the occupied territory.

Lieutenant Colonel Stennett DSO assumed command of the Service Battalion by 21 February 1918 but in May was invalided with dysentery, taking charge at Livingstone on 24 June. Major Dickenson succeeded to the command of the Battalion. On 1 June the Battalion sailed from Mbamba Bay, where they had been resting, for Fort Johnston to join Colonel Hawthorn's column in preventing von Lettow coming west into Nyasaland. On 17 June they were rushed to Limbe and marched past Mount Majanje into Portuguese territory to Alto Mulocque, where they joined the pursuit of von Lettow to the coast near Quelimane and back. In three months the NRP marched 900 miles, without supply columns, living as best they could, and for much of the time in the sweltering coastal lowlands.

On 23 September the Battalion was shipped back to Mbamba Bay. Von Lettow was heading north for his home territory. On 4 October the NRP met his advance guard at Fusi on the Songea Wiedhafen road. The enemy main force soon came up and attacked all day long but he was unable to break through or outflank the NRP. After dark the Battalion withdrew to a stronger position on high ground but von Lettow was not going to continue the action or await the arrival of British reinforcements. He marched round

to the west¹² by night and made for Peramiho Mission. Lieutenant L.J. Champion¹² died of wounds received in this action.

2/4 KAR had now closed up and set out in pursuit with Major Graham's company of the NRP under command.¹³ The remainder marched back to the lakeshore to be shipped north. Northern Rhodesia was defenceless. On 24 October Captain Allport's company landed at Mwaya and reached Fife on the 31st. Major Graham had left the KAR at Neu Langenburg and marched into Fife on the morning of 1 November. In the late afternoon von Lettow attacked in the hope of seizing the supply depot there. Realising that an assault would be too costly he spent the following day bombarding the garrison before leaving that night for Kasama in Northern Rhodesia.

1/4 KAR with 'B' Company NRP were sent in pursuit and caught up with the German rearguard on 6 November at Kayambi Mission, capturing two machine guns. The rest of the NRP Service Battalion marched to Abercorn to bar any attempt to double back north. CO 1/4 KAR was lucky to have some NRP with him as his only map of the area was in a school atlas.¹⁴

At Kasama were only a supply officer and transport details and some African convalescents and soldiers under sentence. Captain James NRP, also recovering from wounds, had left for Abercorn on 31 October with all those fit for service. The Civil Commissioner, Hector Croad¹⁵, organised the evacuation of the white civilians and supplies. On 2 November Lieutenant Sibold came in with some KAR recruits. On 8 November a patrol under Driver Weitz BSAP engaged the enemy 20 miles north of Kasama. On 10 November Croad and Sergeant Rumsey BSAP MT¹⁶ found the enemy in possession of the township. On 13 November the German advance guard exchanged fire with the NRP and KAR details across the Chambezi River. At about noon Croad received a telegram instructing him to inform von Lettow of the Armistice.

At 10.30¹⁷ hours 25 November 1918 Brigadier General W.F.S. Edwards CMG DSO¹⁷ inspected a guard of honour found by both British battalions. At 11.00 Major General von Lettow Vorbeck appeared at the head of his troops. He read out the terms of surrender in German and repeated them in English. The German commander then offered his sword to General Edwards who refused it, saying he had much pleasure in allowing the German officers to retain their personal weapons in view of the very gallant fight they had made. The enemy troops then grounded their arms and equipment and stacked their machine guns and ammunition before being marched off to their camp. So ended the First World War.

1839 Africans served with the Northern Rhodesia Police during the war, of whom about 100 had been killed. In all 52 decorations or mentions in despatches were made to African police and 47 to whites serving with the Force.

Biographical notes:

1. Maj Charles DULY DSO(1900), b. Hastings 1.1.70, Matabele Rebellion 1896, OC Cyclists Rhodesian Contingent SA War, OC BSAP MT 1915, founder of a chain of garages in the Rhodesias.
2. Maj Francis Stafford JAMES, Lt Barotse Native Police 1907, Insp & Capt NRP 12.2.13, from leave 10.9.14, OC B Company 1916 w. Mar 17, leave 5.6.17-6.3.18, Hon Maj 1920.
3. Lt Ernest Lucien INGPEN, Sp Svce Offr 21t NRP 6.10.14, Sub-Insp & Lt 6.8.15, w. 7.6.16, d. 11.6.16.
4. Capt Robert William Marsh LANGHAM MC(5.6.19), 1459 Tpr BSAP 1911, SR Column 1915 Cpl, T/2Lt NRP 4.1.17, Lt 1.1.19.
5. Capt Percy Redesdale WARDROPER OBE(Civ 1934), T/2Lt NRP 18.8.15, Lt 12.1.17, T/Capt Adj't 1.2.18, MBE Mil 1919, Capt & Adj't 1920-1.12.26, OC Town & Dist Police 1927, & C/Insp Prisons 1928, Commr of Police KPM 1929, Rtd 6.4.36.
6. Sgt Frederick BAINBRIDGE, Tpr 1804 BSAP 1912, SR Col 1915, Sgt B Coy NRP Mar 1917.
7. Lt Col E.G. DICKENSON MC, misspelt Dickinson in earlier article.
8. Capt Lawrence Arnold RUSSELL, Asst Native Commr NR Att'd NRP T/2Lt 17.6.15 T/Capt OC F Cy 1917 B Company 1918 Leave 31.1.19, ltr Commr Eastern Province NR.
9. Lt Henry William TARBUTT, 1521 Tpr BSAP 1911 SR Col 1915 Sgt T/2Lt NRP 5.4.17 k. 9.8.17.
10. Capt George Montague WITHERS SubInsp & 2Lt NRP 12.2.13, Lt ex-leave 27.3.14, T/Capt OC E Coy 1917 leave 26.4.19 Capt 1920.
11. Lt Leslie Ellington LESLIE, SR Col T/2Lt NRP? k. 20.8.17.
12. Lt Leonard John CHAMPION, 1412 Tpr BSAP 1911 SR Col 1915, Sgt T/2Lt NRP 5.4.17 MID 25.9.17, 5.6.19, French MM (LG31.8.17) d.o.w. Songea 4.10.18.
13. Maj Bernard James GRAHAM, Sub-Insp & 2Lt NRP 3.1.2.13, Lt 1.4.15, fm leave 17.4.18, T/Maj 5.6.18, Hon Capt 1920, OC Town & Dist Police L'stone, Kalomo, Mazabuka, & Ft Jameson 1923-24, Capt Anglo-Belgian Bdy Comm 1927-32, A/Maj Cdg Northern Rhodesia Regt 1.6.33 Rtd 1937.
14. In the History of the KAR, p. 411, CO 1/4 KAR is said to have been guided by a local settler, Lionel SMITH. Smith was att NRP T/Lt Oct 1915 (GN84/14) & perhaps was sv'g with B Coy.
15. Hector CROAD OBE, b. London 1865, ed Charterhouse, to Canada worked CPR and NWCMP, Trader Nyasal'd 1890, Asst Collector Luapula Mweru & Choma Dists NE Rhodesia, Civ & Native Commr Serenje 1898, Kasama rtd 1924 Estate Mngr d. Abercorn 1919.
16. Sgt F. RUMSEY DCM BSAP MT, settled in Kasama Dist.
17. Brig Gen William Frederick Savery EDWARDS CB (1919) CMG (1917) DSO (1901) DL FRGS FRAI, b. 27.7.72, comm 3 Devon (Militia), Sierra Leone Frontier Police 1899-1901, SA Constabulary 1901-06, IG Police & Prisons Uganda 1906, IG Police British East Africa (Kenya) & Uganda 1908, KPM 1911, Br Gen IG Lines of Communication EA 1915.

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
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Northern Rhodesia Government Gazettes



Captain P.B. Bicknell, circa 1887

CAPTAIN P.B. BICKNELL: 45 YEARS A CHIEF CONSTABLE

S.C. Pearson

In December 1856, when Captain P.B. Bicknell was appointed to be the first Chief Constable of Lincolnshire, no one could have foreseen that he would remain in office for forty-five years. This must surely be a record. A study of his career shows that he was a remarkable man whose excellent ideas and leadership were good not only for the Lincolnshire Constabulary but also for the Police Service in general.

Before the County Police Act 1839, the large geographical county of Lincoln was divided administratively into three Parts known as the Parts of Lindsey, Parts of Kesteven and Parts of Holland, each with its own Court of Quarter Sessions. Following the passing of the Act, the Magistrates of the three Parts held a joint meeting to discuss the establishment of a paid police force, but they decided to take no action for the time being. Between 1843 and 1854, however, eighteen paid superintending constables were appointed, and police stations and lock-ups were built at various places in the county, but there was no organised police force with a senior officer in charge. Each of the superintending constables was in charge of an area and was responsible for all the parish constables under him.

Formation and consolidation of the Lincolnshire Constabulary

Following the passing of the County and Borough Police Act 1856, the Lord Lieutenant of the county called a meeting of the Magistrates of the Parts of Lindsey, Kesteven and Holland at Lincoln Castle on 9 October 1856 when it was decided that one Chief Constable should be appointed for the whole county at a salary of £500 a year, and that £200 should be allowed to him to cover all expenses, except those incurred by the use of the electric telegraph. A joint committee of Magistrates from the three divisions of the county was set up to examine testimonials and to nominate the Chief Constable.

The post was widely advertised and the response was excellent, for no less than 102 applications were received from persons whose ages ranged from 23 to 45 years, and whose occupations varied from officers of the Army and Royal Navy and police officers, to a lithographer's clerk, superintendent of the RSPCA, an engineer, a surgeon, a revenue officer, a private tutor and an auditor.

The three candidates who subsequently appeared before the committee were Major John Chester, the son of a Major-General, Major McKinstry, at one time a Chief Constable in Ireland, and Captain P.B. Bicknell. From surviving correspondence it is apparent that the Clerks of the Peace for Lindsey and Kesteven

favoured the appointment of Major Chester. The committee, however, decided to appoint Captain Bicknell, who took up his post in January 1857.

Although there was only one Chief Constable for the three Parts of Lincolnshire, there was no intention that there should be only one police force. Each of the three Parts was to have its own. In effect, therefore, Captain Bicknell had to establish three Forces, although they were known from the start as the Lincolnshire Constabulary. However, he set up only one Force Headquarters and ran the three Forces as one, whilst reporting separately to the Magistrates at the three Quarter Sessions each quarter.

He soon encountered the difficulty that he could not transfer a man from one Force to either of the others without his losing his pension rights. Because of this it was sometimes impossible to promote the best man as the promotion would have amounted to a transfer to another Force. An effort was made in the 1859 Police Act to overcome this difficulty, but although the Act provided for only one superannuation fund for the whole county, it still did not safeguard the pension rights of a man transferred from one Part of the county to another. It was not until 1865 that this defect was remedied under the Police Act of that year. A Joint Superannuation Committee of Magistrates of the three Parts was set up, and Captain Bicknell was appointed Secretary, a post which he held for many years. The Act of 1865 had the effect of consolidating the three Forces, although there were still three separate Police Authorities.

The Force Under Captain P.B. Bicknell: 1857-1902

Philip Blundell Bicknell was born on 10 December 1818. He was educated at Harrow and Cambridge and entered the Army in 1839. He served at Gibraltar, in the West Indies, and in the Kaffir War of 1846-47 with the 73rd Regiment, in which he was Deputy Assistant Adjutant at the time of his appointment as Chief Constable of Lincolnshire. He had had charge of the military police at Aldershot for 18 months, and had drawn up a scheme for the formation of a police corps for the Army generally.

Captain Bicknell's Headquarters were a single office which he rented in the Castle Square at Lincoln for £35 a year. A number of the former superintending constables were given appointments as superintendents in the new Force, but others were discharged, including William White, the first paid police officer appointed in Kesteven. White had by this time more than twelve years service, and submitted a testimonial signed by a number of magistrates. Captain Bicknell, however, considered that he was fit only to be a beadle, and White was discharged, although he continued to cause trouble for some time by his refusal to hand over the lock-up at Spitalgate to his successor.

A number of police officers from other forces, including several from the Hampshire Constabulary, were appointed to various ranks in the Lincolnshire Constabulary. One constable from the Norwich City Police was appointed as a sergeant on 25 March 1857 and was dismissed on the same day for impropriety to the Chief Constable.

There was apparently no lack of applicants for appointment to the Force, and by April the Chief Constable was able to report to the Magistrates the following positions:

	Lindsey	Kesteven	Holland	Total
Authorised strength	111	55	41	207
Number appointed	71	32	26	129
Number posted to duty	60	21	21	102

By the end of the year the Force was almost complete in numbers, but there were, nevertheless, recruiting and training difficulties. Several of the former superintending constables who had been given appointments as superintendents had proved very inefficient, and the Chief Constable stated that he 'feared to entrust the young constables to them, so much depends on the first training'. A number of these superintendents resigned, and resignations from constables were as numerous as the applications for appointment, whilst dismissals were frequent. During the year ending 30 September 1858, 39 constables were dismissed and 57 resigned.

Recruits

Many of the early recruits were farm labourers, and it is evident that Captain Bicknell preferred such men, for on 25 February 1864, he issued the following General Order:

It is in the power of Superintendents and of all classes of officers to assist the Chief Constable very much in keeping up the Force in numbers and quality. It often happens that men totally unfit are sent to Headquarters, too short, ugly looking, ill-made men that no Superintendent would like to have sent to his own Division. Agricultural labourers are the best class for the service, but they must be clean, active and intelligent, of a good height and well made.

On 28 March 1868 another General Order, brief and to the point, was issued. It read:

Men wanted for the Force - the better class of farm labourers preferred - broken down tradesmen of no value.

Throughout his many years of service, Captain Bicknell retained his preference for farm labourers. In 1894, he wrote to a gentleman in Middlesbrough and said:

I could not recommend your son to join this force. He is town bred, and I take nothing but country men and am more particular and strict even than in former days. He had better look nearer home.

In 1895, he wrote to Mr Cary Elwes at Brigg regarding an ex-soldier who wished to join the Force, and said:

Men who have been soldiers do much better for a Borough than for a County and especially such a county as this where the night patrols are so long (10 to 12 miles) and so very lonely. I find that the only man who can stand it is a Lincolnshire labourer fresh from the plough, all soldiers and men having a trade fail, and it is against their interests to try it.

Various inducements were offered to obtain recruits. In 1872, when asking all ranks to assist in finding new men for the Force, the Chief Constable emphasised that there were few forces in England where men could attain promotion more quickly or where they were better treated. In 1875 he offered to pay to any constable finding a recruit who was accepted for service the sum of 10 shillings, a scheme which continued until 1887.

Training

The training given to recruits before they were posted to their divisions consisted, for many years, mainly of drill. The first recruits for the Parts of Holland were trained at Boston, whilst those for Lindsey and Kesteven were drilled at Lincoln by sergeants of the North Lincoln Militia. Later all recruits were trained at Lincoln by the Drill Sergeant who was appointed to the Force.

In 1859 Captain Bicknell instituted a system whereby all members of the force attended at various centres in the county for one week's training in drill each year. These Annual Drills, as they were known, continued until 1932 when they were suspended as an economy measure and were never resumed.

In early years of the Force, training in sword drill was given, and in his report for 1867, Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary, remarking on the necessity for all forces to be so trained, commented on the good specimen of sword drill which he had witnessed in the Lincolnshire Constabulary.

Training in police duties was given in Divisions, and, no doubt, consisted mainly of learning by experience. The quality of the training given by the different superintendents varied considerably, and in 1876 the Chief Constable complained to his senior officers that the treatment given to recruits in some divisions was causing them to resign. He reminded them that one of the first duties of all officers was to encourage and train the young constables.

Leave and hours of duty

Although the Force was founded in 1857, there is no record of leave of any kind being granted until 13 April 1861, when superintendents were informed that they were at liberty to recommend for eight days leave of absence such men as deserved that indulgence. Five days later, a further order stated that well behaved and active constables would be allowed their leave

without any deduction from pay. In 1872 the Chief Constable announced:

As an encouragement to well conducted men, every Superintendent will be allowed in future to grant to each Sergeant and Constable under his orders (who has not recently misconducted himself) one day's holiday in each month without stoppage of pay, on which day the officer can if he thinks fit leave his beat and go where he pleases.

On the 30 September 1886 the following order was issued:

It has come to the Chief Constable's knowledge that some men who obtain the week's leave granted once a year do not leave home, but merely pass that time in idleness remaining at their Stations. The leave of absence is granted in order to afford to the men the opportunity of obtaining change and relaxation, and on no account whatever will it be granted unless the constable goes away.

Even when a constable went away on leave he was subject to restrictions, for if he was staying overnight in a place where a divisional headquarters was situated he had to report at the police station.

In 1893 Captain Bicknell stated that the men did not avail themselves very often of the one day's leave a month, but that they valued the privilege. He said that to give a holiday for a man to idle at home gave rise to inconvenience and even abuse, as he was apt to think it was not necessary to take action in a matter coming to his knowledge during the holiday.

Superintendents and Inspectors were at this time allowed fourteen days leave a year and other ranks eight days, but the majority did not take advantage of it. There were severe restrictions too on what a police officer could do when he was not on duty. Force orders provided that:

Every Constable, when his usual hours of patrol are over, will return to his home and remain therein, taking necessary rest, and unless called out to perform some service (the nature of which must be reported by him), it is expected that he will be found at his lodgings until the hour of again going on duty.

The order that a constable should not leave his beat between tours of duty continued in force until 1938.

The hours of duty are not recorded in the early orders of the Force, but there can be no doubt that they were lengthy, and included a considerable amount of night duty. In 1861, the Chief Constable instructed that a constable who had to travel on the following day to Court a distance greater than 7 miles would not be required to remain on night duty after 2 a.m., nor after his return from Court to perform on that night more than 3 hours duty. If the distance from the constable's station to the Court were 10 miles or more, then his duty on the night previous to the

Court was ended at 12 o'clock, and after returning from Court no further duty was required beyond looking round the village in which he was stationed. Constables stationed within 7 miles of the Court were allowed to omit any night duty after 4 a.m., and were excused from 1 to 3 hours night duty after their return, according to the distance they had to travel. These journeys had to be made on foot.

Promotion

In March 1861 Captain Bicknell introduced an examination which had to be passed by constables and sergeants before they were eligible for promotion. Constables had to be able to write neatly and correctly from dictation, and to understand the multiplication table and the first four rules in arithmetic, an amount of education which, according to the Chief Constable, could be attained by any man of common intelligence in six months. Sergeants had to pass an examination in the higher rules of arithmetic, making up pay sheets, charge sheets, summons sheets and other returns, and in classifying the different descriptions of crime under their proper heads.

Lincolnshire was probably the first force in the country to introduce such a system, as in his report for 1861 Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary recommended the adoption of the scheme in other counties, and published in full a copy of Captain Bicknell's General Order on the subject.

For many years constables were graded into three or more classes, with different rates of pay for each class. Advancement into a higher class was considered a form of promotion, and was commonly offered as a reward for good work. On 1 November 1870, for example, the Chief Constable called attention to the fact that the season for fowl stealing was approaching, and said that he would notice favourably any officer who made detections. In the following month three constables were promoted to a higher class for arresting persons in the act of stealing fowls. In 1864 a form of promotion for First Class Constables to a status known as 'Qualified Officer' was introduced, and was the subject of favourable comment from Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary in his report for the following year. These officers were allowed to perform their duties at their own discretion and without a route, and were supplied with the routes of men they were required to meet. It was not clear how long this system continued in force, but it was still in operation in 1884 when officers appointed to this position wore two buttons on the cuffs of their tunics as a distinguishing mark.

Vagrancy

The suppression of vagrancy was one of the principal reasons for the formation of police forces, and Captain Bicknell's method of carrying out this duty was by making full use of the provisions of the Vagrancy Act. Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary's Report for 1867 shows that in Lincolnshire 522 persons were

proceeded against for begging, a figure almost twice the number of the next highest county, Staffordshire, and these two counties were said to be by far the most active in the suppression of vagrancy. At a census of the daily number of vagrants taken on 7 April 1868 there were 555 in Lincolnshire. During the year ended 29 September 1868 766 vagrants were arrested in the county and 654 of them were committed to prison.

Captain Bicknell's view was that despite the vigorous action of the police there would be no reduction in the number of vagrants until the public ceased to help them, and until the prisons were made less comfortable. His approach to the problem was carefully thought out; he issued instructions that tramps were to be arrested during the summer months when they liked to have their freedom, and that they were to be left at large during the severe winter weather when they did not mind spending their time in prison.

A system whereby police officers issued lodging tickets to vagrants was tried out in 1860 but was considered a failure. It did not reduce the number of tramps, and, as the constables could not remain at home merely for the purpose of issuing the tickets, the tramps were kept waiting often until late at night when the constables returned from duty.

In his quarterly reports to the Magistrates, Captain Bicknell did not hesitate to make known his views on vagrancy. If an unusually large number of vagrants had been discharged, he would point out that they were persons undeserving of sympathy and that the district would be overrun with tramps unless they were dealt with more severely. He also commented when only short sentences of imprisonment had been imposed, informing the magistrates that most tramps did not object to such detention for the sake of the cleansing of the clothes and person, and the comfort obtained thereby.

Vagrancy, however, continued to increase, and attendance to prisoners and escorting them to prison must have made heavy demands upon police time. This is shown by the fact that in 1880 the Chief Constable had to apply for an additional constable to be stationed at Epworth. The authorised strength there at that time consisted of a superintendent and one constable. During the previous year there had been 250 prisoners at Epworth and about half of them had been committed to prison, with the result that the constable was fully occupied with prisoners, and there was no one left to patrol the town. In 1894, Captain Bicknell wrote regarding vagrants: 'We have no fancy methods of dealing with them, but stick to the statute.'

His efforts to overcome the problem were continued throughout his many years of service, but did not meet with the success they deserved. In 1893 about 1800 vagrants were arrested. Despite

the measures taken by the Chief Constable, vagrancy had increased.

Poachers

The Stamford Mercury of 21 November 1856 contained the following news item:

Vast quantities of game are brought into Lincoln every morning by the poachers, particularly from the south, so that the well-stocked preserves of Mr Chaplin and others must be repeatedly laid under contribution. The poachers by half a dozen together walk into the City between seven and eight with their bags and pockets well stuffed out, and seem to care not who sees them.

In 1861, the Chief Constable stated that discharged convicts frequently allied themselves with gangs of poachers, of whom they formed the most desperate members, and in the following year he reported to the Kesteven Quarter Sessions that it was undeniable that in several places night poaching was carried on to a considerable extent.

In the circumstances, it was not surprising that there were some violent clashes between the police and poachers. In 1860 a constable in the Lincolnshire Constabulary was murdered by a poacher, and the Chief Constable was concerned personally in the investigation of the crime. Shortly after 1 a.m. on 25 October 1860, Constable Alexander McBrian was on patrol in the vicinity of the churchyard at Wyberton near Boston when he met a man who went off the footpath into a field. The Constable spoke to him and followed him. The man pulled his hat down over his face and, turning partly round, fired a shot at the Constable from close range causing a severe wound in the right upper arm. Constable McBrian went to Wyberton Rectory from where the vicar sent him in his cart to the lock-up at Skirbeck Quarter near Boston, where Superintendent Manton was informed at 2 a.m.

Constable McBrian did not know his assailant, but it was no doubt from information which he supplied that on the following morning Thomas Richardson, a farm labourer, who was known to go out at night with a gun and who on two occasions had threatened the lives of police officers, was arrested. He was identified by Constable McBrian when he made a deposition on 31 October 1860. The following day he died, but about two hours before this he made a Dying Declaration in which he repeated his identification of Richardson as the man who had shot him.

This Dying Declaration was admitted in evidence at Richardson's trial at the Lincolnshire Assizes on 8 December 1860. Evidence was given of the finding at the scene of the crime of a piece of the Times newspaper which, from its smell, appeared to have been used as wadding in a gun, and of the finding in Richardson's house of a double-barrelled shotgun with one barrel loaded. As the gun could not be unloaded it was fired off, and another piece

of Times newspaper which had been used as wadding was recovered. Captain Bicknell gave evidence of fitting the two pieces of newspaper together, and the publisher of the Times said that the two pieces when placed together made up a part of a copy of the issue for 27 March 1854. There was further evidence regarding a billycock hat similar to the one worn by Constable McBrian's assailant being found at Richardson's house, together with a quantity of mixed shot of sizes 3, 4 and 6. Shot of similar sizes and in similar proportions was recovered from Constable McBrian's clothing and his wound, and a gunsmith from Boston gave evidence that shot 3 and 4 were commonly mixed together, but that it was most unusual to mix shot 6 with it.

The jury took only ten minutes to find Richardson guilty, and he later admitted his guilt. He was sentenced to death, but this was commuted to penal servitude for life after petitions to the Home Secretary had been submitted from inhabitants of Boston and Lincoln who described Richardson as industrious and inoffensive. The Chief Constable did not agree with this assessment of his character and was perturbed over the possible effect which the reprieve might have on other members of the Force. He told the Holland Quarter Sessions on 10 January 1861:

This case must have an evil effect on the Police of the every portion of this county, and not of this county only but of every other county. A Peace Officer is shot wilfully and determinedly while on patrol duty in the middle of the night, not having given any provocation whatever - not one circumstance is brought forward in extenuation of the crime - the culprit is of a known savage and desperate character, had threatened the lives of Police Constables and others previously and undoubtedly fired the shot with a full determination to commit a Murder - nevertheless petitions in favour of the Murderer having been transmitted to Her Majesty's Government the life of the Murderer is spared.

It is my duty to represent and report to the Quarter Sessions such matters as appear important with relation to the County Police, and I may say therefore that I fear the leniency shown in this instance must mischievously affect the morale of the Force. The officers patrol habitually throughout the County for 7 hours in the dead of night, and their duty calls on them to challenge persons they meet prowling about at such hours unlawfully armed. They have no firearms themselves and are at the mercy of characters like Thomas Richardson who I apprehend can only be deterred by fear of consequences from acting as he did. It cannot be concealed that a feeling of insecurity and alarm now exists amongst the Police, and I

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1. Editor's note: Henry Goddard claims this story in his own memoirs, but Mr Pearson's account is taken direct from the Lincolnshire Rutland and Stamford Mercury.

have reason to believe a sentiment of exultation on the part of evil doers has been promoted by what with every respect for the constituted authority I cannot but regard as the unfortunate decision come to in this case. Fortunately, Captain Bicknell's fears for the morale of the Force were not well-founded, though violent struggles with poachers continued.

Riots

During Captain Bicknell's period of office as Chief Constable, there were several riots in the county, but they were mainly of a minor character. In 1862, however, members of the Lincolnshire Constabulary were concerned in suppressing a large scale riot in the City of Lincoln.

On 12 February a Parliamentary Election took place in Lincoln and the result was declared shortly before 5 p.m. A crowd of men and boys then gathered near the Saracen's Head, the headquarters of the newly elected Member of Parliament, and began breaking the windows. This went on for some time, and the City Police were, apparently, unable to take any effective action. The Mayor exhorted the crowd to disperse, but they took no notice, and the County Police, who had been asked to assist if necessary, were called in. They made their appearance at about 8 p.m., a force of five superintendents, eight sergeants and eighty-seven constables, under the command of the Chief Constable. They were received by the mob with shouts of defiance and hooting. Captain Bicknell marched fifty of his men into the crowd and endeavoured to persuade them to disperse, but they attacked him and his men with large stones. The other fifty men were called into action, but it was not until about 10 p.m. that the streets were reasonably clear.

Newspaper reports of the riot allege that the police laid about them indiscriminately with their staves, women and children not being spared, and many inoffensive persons being struck. One woman who was standing on High Bridge with her husband is said to have been subjected to an attack which brought on premature labour; a man and his daughter were bundled out of the private passage of their house; another man was struck as he was leaving Chapel, and a diminutive hump-backed lad is alleged to have been pursued by some of the 'rurals' into a petty and there beaten. Nearly all the police were injured, some so seriously that they were unable to perform their duties for more than a month. Seven persons appeared before the City Magistrates on the following morning charged with assaults on police officers, and one man was convicted of throwing a stone at Captain Bicknell.

On the evening of 13 February, a crowd again assembled in Lincoln, believed for the purpose of taking revenge against the County Police, but all the County men had been sent home. The mob therefore attacked various private houses, and order was not restored until about 9 p.m., when military aid arrived.

On the following evening a detachment of soldiers was sent to Washingborough to protect Captain Bicknell's house there, as it was rumoured that the mob intended paying him a visit. No attack was made, however, and the position gradually improved.

The last words on the subject were spoken by Captain Bicknell in his reports to the Courts of Quarter Sessions in April 1862 when he expressed the view that the total inefficiency of Borough Forces threw all the real work on the County Police on such occasions, and said that if the City of Lincoln and the Boroughs were unable to manage their own population with their own police, they had the poser of consolidating with the County and thereby obtaining a right to efficient protection. He concluded by saying that he would probably refuse any future applications for assistance.

Accounts

One of Captain Bicknell's first tasks when establishing the Force was to set up a system of accounts. It was necessary to keep separate books and accounts for each of the three Parts of the County, and a further set for Headquarters, the expenses of which were shared in the ratio Lindsey 7, Kesteven 4, Holland 3. This allocation of establishment charges continued until 1926.

Although Captain Bicknell asked the Magistrates to arrange for credit to be given to him at a bank in Lincoln to enable him to meet expenses incurred in running the Force, there was, apparently, no system of providing superintendents with funds from which to meet incidental expenses. The superintendents had to collect bills for such expenses each quarter, pay them, and send in the receipts to the Chief Constable. After approval at Quarter Sessions the Chief Constable sent cheques to reimburse the superintendents, who could not really afford to pay the bills in the first place as they amounted to nearly half of their yearly pay. Consequently they were compelled to get creditors to receipt their bills before they got the money, or to borrow the money to pay the bills. It is hardly surprising that under such a system troubles soon arose.

In October 1861 a superintendent was discharged because his conduct in money matters had become so reckless and was so notorious in his division and throughout the county that he could no longer be retained in his appointment without detriment to the service. He subsequently appeared at the Lincolnshire Assizes where he pleaded guilty to four charges of having forged receipts and begged for leniency. The Judge, who had earlier told the Grand Jury that if the superintendent were found guilty the case would call for very severe punishment, told him that some time ago he would have forfeited his life for these offences, and then sentenced him to ten years penal servitude.

Captain Bicknell had his own method of punishing any superintendent whose accounts were not made out correctly; he

would call him into Headquarters at his own expense to make any necessary corrections.

Stations and houses

Although Captain Bicknell was fortunate in having at his disposal a considerable number of lock-ups which had been built in the period 1843-56, many of them were only single-storey buildings, and required extending before they were really suitable for the purposes of the new police force. One of his most pressing needs was for a Headquarters Station. The first Headquarters building was situated at the corner on Monson Street and High Street, Lincoln. It was occupied on 25 March 1860 and cost, with the land on which it was built, about £2400. It consisted of offices, store-room and committee room, with a clerk's house, reserve sergeant's house, and a yard of sufficient size for drill.

In his Report for 1861 Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary included the Headquarters in a list of stations recently built which could be followed as examples by other counties. Also included in the list were the new stations built at Gainsborough and Bourne.

During the early years of the Force many new stations were built, including the first one erected at Scunthorpe, which was paid for in a rather unusual manner. In 1860, following the discovery of ironstone in the Scunthorpe area, application was made to the Lindsey Quarter Sessions for additional constables to be stationed there. An arrangement was made whereby an extra constable, stationed at Scunthorpe, was added to the strength of the Lindsey Force, and he was treated in every respect as a normal member of the Force. The owner of the land on which the ironstone was being mined was, however, charged by the Chief Constable the full cost of employing this constable. In 1865, the Chief Constable reported that a lock-up was required at Scunthorpe, and he stated that having saved the money paid for the extra constable for several years, he hoped that he would have in hand nearly enough to pay for the building. From later reports it appears that this is in fact what happened.

Throughout Captain Bicknell's term of office as Chief Constable, and indeed until 1910, stations and lock-ups were whitewashed, as required, by members of the Force. In a General Order issued on the subject in July 1858 it was stated that:

The work is to be done by the Police Constables, and they are to be informed that this, or any other similar service which will save expense to the County, is to be cheerfully rendered by them.

Medical charges and mutual assistance scheme

Although there is no record of the early members of the Lincolnshire Constabulary meeting with opposition from members of the public, there was, as already indicated, considerable violence used by poachers in clashes with the police, and records show that officers frequently met with strong resistance from persons they caught in the act of stealing. It seems probable that Captain Bicknell anticipated this use of violence, and realised that doctors' bills might be frequent and expensive. One of the first schemes which he introduced on being appointed Chief Constable was one whereby the sum of sixpence a month was deducted from the pay of each member of the Force, and in return any medical expenses incurred were paid by the police authorities. The scheme continued even though at times the Chief Constable threatened that it would have to be ended because the expense to the authorities was far in excess of the money subscribed by members of the Force. The deductions from pay rose later to ninepence a month.

In 1869, the members of the Force agreed upon a mutual assistance scheme. The conditions remain today principally the same as when it was first introduced, namely, that upon the death of a serving officer, a subscription of one day's pay is collected from the other members of the scheme and paid to the widow or other person nominated. In 1872, the scheme was extended to provide for a small subscription to be made on the death of the wife of a serving member of the Force.

The scheme was brought into use within a short time of being formulated, as a result of the death of a serving inspector. The subscriptions in the early days of the Force amounted to about £50.

Discipline and efficiency

Captain Bicknell was reported to be a strict disciplinarian, a quality which was, no doubt, essential in the early days of the Force, when misconduct was frequent. A General Order issued on 1 April 1857 announced that a constable had been dismissed for being drunk and for playing dominoes for ale in a public house. It was stated that his dismissal was being reported to every Chief Constable in England, no doubt to prevent him from obtaining an appointment in any other force, and that any further cases would be referred to the Magistrates. A further case soon arose, and at Boston Petty Sessions that May a constable was sentenced to twenty-one days imprisonment for being drunk at a public house at Kirton and absent from duty.

Most of the early disciplinary charges were connected with drink and women, and make interesting reading today. In 1860 a constable was dismissed for keeping a single woman at his lodgings and refusing to marry her after obtaining the Chief Constable's permission to do so. In 1876 a constable was dismissed for allowing a prisoner to read his Instruction Book,

and in 1880 a constable was dismissed for travelling by rail without paying the fare and appropriating the money. In the same year an inspector was discharged for fraud and forgery, and a sergeant was dismissed for allowing him to escape from the police station.

Despite the frequent disciplinary charges, and the large number of dismissals from the Force, the Lincolnshire Constabulary soon gained a first class reputation. In his report for 1857, Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary reported the Force efficient in numbers and discipline, and for 1860 he described it as a Force of more than ordinary importance and far above average as to discipline. In the following year he stated that the Force was composed of 'as fine a body of men as any in the service,' a description which Captain Bicknell must have read with a feeling of great satisfaction and pride.

Deputy Chief Constables

A Deputy Chief Constable was not appointed until 1860, and Captain Bicknell informed the Courts of Quarter Sessions that he had delayed the appointment in order that he 'might give the claims of all due consideration and from several excellent officers select the one I believe in most respects best fitted for the office.' Despite his delay, Captain Bicknell did not appoint a satisfactory deputy.

The officer he had selected for the post was John Scanlon, a native of County Down, who was 27 years of age when he joined the Lincolnshire Constabulary in 1857 as a First Class Constable. He had previously served in the Irish Constabulary. He was made Sergeant a month after his appointment, became Inspector in charge of the Brigg Division in April 1858 and Superintendent the same October. He held office as Deputy Chief Constable for four years, and was then reduced to First Class Superintendent for appearing before the Chief Constable in a state of drunkenness. On 24 December 1864, for neglecting his books and his duty and general misconduct he was called upon to resign, which he did with effect from 19 January 1865.

His experiences with John Scanlon probably discouraged Captain Bicknell, as he did not appoint another Deputy Chief Constable until 1874. The Officer selected then was James Martyn who had joined the Force in February 1857 with the rank of Superintendent. He held office until July 1901, when he retired at the age of 70, with forty-four years service.

Captain Bicknell

From his appointment as Chief Constable, Captain Bicknell displayed a special aptitude in all matters of police administration. The energetic way in which he set about the task of organising the Force was the subject of the most favourable comment by Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary in 1859. His advice was frequently sought by other county police authorities,

and it is said that he was not infrequently consulted by the Home Office.

He was always concerned about the training of his men, and one of his first tasks must have been the preparation of an Instruction Book, to which there is reference in police records in 1858. In 1875 he issued a revised Instruction Book which contained general orders relating to the Lincolnshire Constabulary, instructions regarding enquiries into various types of crime, and also a digest of statutes. Some of the orders make strange reading today. For example:

Constables are not to appear at theatres, cricket matches, fairs etc., in uniform unless on duty. If they wish to go to any place of public amusement, they must obtain permission of their superintendent, and wear their plain clothes.
and, referring to each member of the Force,
He, with his wife and children, is to attend divine service every Sunday, unless there be good reason to the contrary; and his children are to be sent to School.

At about the same time, Captain Bicknell published a book called Bicknell's Police Manual which he referred to in the preface as a handy-book of reference for police constables at a price within their means. The first edition met with a favourable reception, and the second edition was published in 1877 and cost 2s. 6d. It was very similar to the Instruction Book issued in 1875, but the instructions applicable only to the Lincolnshire Constabulary were omitted. That the Manual was considered to be a work of some merit may be judged from the remark made by the Judge at the Derby Summer Assizes, 1880. He quoted from the work and said: 'This is an excellent manual, and policemen in possession of it could have no excuse for acting improperly, the law being clearly laid down.'

The last edition appears to have been the 11th which was published in 1894, and by this time it was known simply as The Police Manual. Apparently it had been copied by other authors, for when writing to the publisher about the 11th edition, Captain Bicknell said that he hoped it would sell well, and added, 'but there is more than one pirate'.

An oil lamp for police duty, known as 'The Crescent Lamp' was patented by Captain Bicknell, and was reported to be in use all over England and in the colonies. In 1894, he stated that 10,000 lamps were in use, and it was said that they had nearly superseded all others. In July, 1890, the Chief Constable of Edinburgh wrote to Captain Bicknell with a view to using the Crescent Lamp in conjunction with a liquid heater which he had invented. Captain Bicknell would not agree to this and said 'I wish you every success, but do not think that the men in this country will be allowed to boil coffee on their beats.' Crescent lamps remained in use in the Force until after the First World War.

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
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The Crescent or Bucknell Soap, which was patented by Lincolnshire's First Chief Constable, Captain Bucknell, proved to be very popular with Policemen as they were able to warm their supper on it.

Towards the end of the 1800's over 10,000 'Bicknell' lamps were in use in the United Kingdom and Colonies.

The Crescent (or Bicknell) Lamp

In submitting his resignation in October, 1901, Captain Bicknell stated that in consequence of frequent attacks of illness he found himself unequal to the active performance of the duties required in the interests of this large and important county. Throughout his service, as shown by the various examples already quoted, his letters and orders were brief but left no doubt as to their meaning. If one further instance of this is required, the order which he issued on 4 February 1859 dealing with the horses provided by some of his superintendents, is surely a classic example:

Several are of such a wretched description as to be positively dangerous to sit behind and accidents have already occurred with damage to the County Carts. Officers who receive the £40 per annum horse allowance must provide a stout, safe, serviceable animal, 14 hands 3 inches high. Young unfirmed horses bought with the expectation of profit will not be approved - nor will old worn out screws be any longer tolerated.

Captain Bicknell, the founder of the Lincolnshire Constabulary, retired on pension on 31 January 1902 having completed forty-five years service, a record which is not likely to be broken. His men esteemed him in no ordinary degree, and in June 1887 they presented him with his portrait in oils. In 1894 he refused to supply a portrait of himself for publication in the Police Review, saying that police officers' duties should be dealt with as unobtrusively and quietly as possible.

He died at Lincoln on 10 June 1904 at the age of 85 years, and was buried at the Canwick Road Cemetery, with police acting as bearers.

RESPONSIBILITY WITHOUT AUTHORITY: THE EXPERIENCE OF NIGERIA
POLICE FORCE OFFICERS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF NATIVE ADMINISTRATION
POLICE FORCES IN NORTHERN NIGERIA 1919-1966

Kemi Rotimi¹

From early in colonial times and until 1970 there existed two types of police force in Nigeria. The Nigeria Police Force, NPF, had nationwide jurisdiction and was controlled by the central government based in Lagos. In the Northern and Western regions there existed the parallel Native Administration Police Forces, NAPFs. The NAPFs were based on local government units within the regions. They ceased to exist from 1970 when policing was co-ordinated under the NPF. This paper examines the relationship between the two types of force in the Northern region.

The NAPFs were raised in the Northern region from 1907 through the adaptation of the pre-colonial dogari police institution in the emirates. The forces were created in pursuit of the British administrative policy of ruling the territory 'through native chiefs on native lines'. Their creation was intended to achieve, among others, the objectives of securing the doubtful loyalty of the emirs and chiefs; building up the native administrations; and keeping down the costs of administration. There was a decided preference by the administrative officers to police much of the region exclusively with the NAPFs; so between 1907 and 1915 a spirited attempt was made to exclude armed Government Police from the emirates. The attempt was not successful, so the two types of force had to co-exist. But then, steps were taken to ensure that the NAPFs² were not overshadowed by the Government Police Force (North).

The first attempt to define the desired relationship between the two types of force was made in 1919. The administration of the Northern region was then headed by H.S. Goldsmith, who was Lieutenant-Governor between 1917 and 1921. Goldsmith saw to the fashioning in 1919 of what may be called a 'code' to govern the relationship between the Government and the Native Administration policemen. He found a willing ally in the acting Inspector-General of the Government Police Force (North) (IGP), Captain

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1. Dr Rotimi teaches history at the Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria.
 2. Details on the formulation of a policing policy for Northern Nigeria are in E.O. Rotimi, 'A history of native administration police forces in Nigeria, 1900-70', PhD thesis, Ife, 1990, Chapter 1. The present Nigeria Police Force emerged from the amalgamation of the armed Government Police Forces of the Northern and Southern Protectorates in 1930.

A.G. Uniacke. The policy, which embodied six suggestions, was circularised in a government memorandum to all Residents under the title 'Co-operation between Dogarai and Government Police'.³ The IGP began by stating that he was not in favour of placing NA police in a township under 'the entire control of a Police Officer' because it would 'undermine... the authority of the District Officer and Native Administration'. He made six suggestions all of which, in sum, amounted to subordinating the Government policeman to these three people in sequence: the NA policeman, the Government policeman's own superior officer and the District Officer whenever the issue was of a local interest. The ubiquity of the expression 'a Native Town under Native Administration' shows how determined the administrators were to keep Government policemen from native administration areas of influence. The sixth suggestion, for example, ran:

If Police are tracking an offender and the offender takes refuge in a Native Town under Native Administration the Constable should still continue to follow up the offender and should call the first Dogari he sees to help him so that the person being followed may be arrested.

The Secretary to the Northern Provinces government, SNP, signed off his memorandum by adding that:

His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor shares the views expressed by Capt. Uniacke; and that Police Officers in the Provinces should be instructed to follow the procedure suggested by the Acting Inspector-General of Police.⁴

The separate administrations of the Northern and Southern Protectorates of Nigeria were amalgamated in January 1914. Part of that amalgamation entailed the merging of duplicated government departments. The task was vigorously pursued by Governor Hugh Clifford when he succeeded Sir F.D. Lugard in 1919. This aroused great suspicions in the Northern administrators who feared that the move could undermine the native administration system that they were operating. As at the end of Clifford's tenure in 1924, the police had yet to be amalgamated. Clifford had advised that the Police should continue separate because recruiting, training and even function were different between North and South and that they needed to be at the disposal of the Lieutenant-Governor and his political staff.⁵

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3. Secretary, Northern Provinces (SNP), Kaduna, to all Residents, 17 December 1919. National Archives, Kaduna (NAK), ZarProf. 1858.
 4. Ibid., The IGP's comments were embodied in the memorandum.
 5. J. White, Central Administration in Nigeria 1914-1918, Irish Academic Press, Dublin, 1981, pp. 33-8.

Clifford was succeeded as Governor in Lagos by G. Thomson in 1925. In the same year, a new Lieutenant-Governor, H.R. Palmer, took office in the North. Palmer had been in the Northern service since 1904 and had played a key role in the emergence of the NAPFs in the region; indeed, he had been a strong advocate for the exclusive policing of the emirates by the NA police.⁶ It was this strong apostle of the native administration system that Governor Thomson had to confront in the latter's effort to take Clifford's centralising measures a further mile. In the face of opposition from Lieutenant-Governor Palmer and his counterpart in the South, Governor Thomson did amalgamate the police in 1930; hence, the birth of the Nigeria Police Force.

Palmer and his subordinates saw it all coming and decided not only to build up the NAPFs in the emirates but also to extend their network in the southerly, more acephalous provinces of the Northern region. The details of the re-organisation exercise which began in 1925 are not necessary here.⁸ The highlights include, one, the change in nomenclature from the inherited pre-colonial label of dogarai (s. dogari) to yan doka (s. dan doka). Two, the forces earned some respectability by the institution of the princely-liaison officer scheme. Under it, children of the nobility, especially those with royal connections, were encouraged to join the forces as officers. Three, a formal training programme in police duties was instituted in 1929 at the Government Police Training Depot in Kaduna. Four, the administrators tried unsuccessfully to arm the NA police. All of these measures were intended to make the NA police compare favourably with the armed Nigerian Police.

Notwithstanding the efforts at parity, the NAPFs had great need for the assistance of NPF officers in the matters of training and administration. But the operation of the 1919 code, fashioned to govern NAPF/NPF relations in the Northern region, tended towards the marginalisation of the NPF. That code was, somewhat indirectly, challenged in 1936 when the IGP of the NPF, Major A. Saunders, prepared a memorandum on the NPF but devoted some

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6. For details of Palmer's contributions to the formulation of a policing policy for Northern Nigeria, see Rotimi, 'History', Chapter 1.
 7. For more on the amalgamation process, see T.N. Tamuno, The Police in Modern Nigeria 1861-1965, University of Ibadan Press, Ibadan 1970, pp. 63-6.
 8. See Rotimi, 'History', Chapter 2.
 9. Hausa word for 'enforcers of the law'. Doqari is Hausa for 'bodyguard'.

paragraphs to the NAPFs.¹⁰ He specifically addressed the issue of NAPF/NPF relations, and on the terms and conditions under which the services of European NPF officers should be allowed to NAPFs. The background to his comments merits some attention.

Earlier, in 1932, the Northern Nigerian government had approached the NPF headquarters for the secondment of an officer to help with the general improvement of the Ilorin NAPF. Because there had been no official guidelines on the matter the then IGP, C.W. Duncan, prepared a memorandum for government's consideration. He was, in principle, not opposed to the idea of secondment and he laid down eleven conditions for it, two of which are of immediate relevance here. One was that officers so seconded, 'will receive their instructions from and correspond direct with the Resident of the Province'. This was indeed the very first condition he stipulated. The other was that:

An officer seconded to the service of a Native Administration will for the time being be the servant of the Native Administration. Should he desire to address the Inspector-General on any matters relating to himself, he will do so through the Resident.

The central government endorsed the proposals and gave approval to the secondment of Major R.G.H. Wilson to the Ilorin NAPF. The appointment took effect from 1 April 1932.¹² It appears that Major Wilson's secondment was acceptable to the Northern Nigerian government because the two conditions excerpted above were in line with the administrative principles in the region.

The experiment was so successful¹³ that many more requests were made both from the North and the West in 1934 and they were granted. The Kano, Sokoto (in the North) and Ibadan (in the West) NAPFs were some of the beneficiaries.

The contemporary experience of two NPF officers within the period under review deserves mention. G.A.V. de Boissierre served in the North between the early and mid-1930s. A very zealous police officer, he struggled while in Zaria and Kano for greater co-operation between the two forces without tangible results. In

10. IGP, NPF, Lagos, to Chief Secretary to the Government (CSG), Lagos, 22 October 1936. National Archives, Ibadan (NAI), CSO 26/4/31861, Vol. 1.

11. IGP, NPF, Lagos, to CSG, Lagos, 25 February 1932. NAI, CSO 26/3/20546/S.2.

12. The appointment was published in Gazette Notice No. 471 (No. 32 of 16 June 1932). NAI, CSO 26/3/20546/S.2.

13. SNP, Kaduna, to CSG, Lagos, 21 November 1932. NAI, CSO 26/3/20546/S.2.

fact, on one occasion he fell foul of indirect rule principles and had to apologise for his excess of zeal. The Emir of Zaria had complained to the District Officer about the increasing involvement of ¹⁴men of the NPF in matters that were the concern of the yan doka. He attributed the interference to failure on the part of the head of the local NPF detachment, who happened to be de Boissierre, to observe the rules. De Boissierre had ¹⁵to apologise for any inconvenience caused the Emir by his lapses.

A colleague of de Boissierre, Captain B.F. Sharp, was about that time on secondment to the Kano NAPP. Sharp had a hard time with the Galadiman Kano who was the councillor in charge of police.¹⁶ The Galadiman did not like the way Sharp was by-passing him in the conduct of NA police affairs and he complained to the Resident sometime in August 1935. The Resident had to remind Sharp that he was just an adviser and an education officer; he was not in executive charge. Sharp felt a little peeved and made his feelings known, but the Resident, while placating him, still maintained his stand that commitment to administrative principles took precedence over professional excellence.

This then was the climate within which NPF officers worked in the North. When Major Saunders assumed office as IGP of the NPF in 1936 fresh requests were made from the North and the West for seconded NPF officers. The request to which he immediately replied in the negative was referred to him by the office of the Chief Secretary to the Government (CSG), Lagos, on behalf,¹⁷ of Western NAPPs in the Abeokuta, Ijebu, Ondo and Oyo provinces.

His reasons were later embodied in the memorandum, earlier cited. He was opposed to secondment but would not mind a loan. Secondment, according to him, had:

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14. DO, Zaria, to the CP, NPF, Zaria, 14 July 1934. NAK, ZarProf. 1858.
 15. CP, NPF, Zaria, to DO, Zaria, 19 July 1934. NAK, ZarProf. 1858.
 16. The account here is a summary of unreferenced minutes on the row between Sharp and the Galadiman Kano. NAK, KanoProf. 795/S.6.
 17. IGP, NPF (on tour at Ibadan), to CSG, Lagos, 4 June 1936. NAI, CSO 26/3/20546/S.2.

the police disadvantage of effectively debarring the Inspector-General from exercising any control, supervisory or advisory, over the work of the officer so appointed.

A loan would obviate that disadvantage. The kernel of his arguments on the issue was that for him to co-operate, there must be the assurance that both he and his loaned officers would be allowed a reasonable measure of control: he, of his officers and they, of the NAPFs to which they had been loaned. The general reaction of both the Northern and Southern administrations was that Saunders' proposals were unrealistic because they would mean a subordination of the NAPFs to the NPF, a prospect that ran counter to the grain of native administration principles.¹⁹ The Northern administration followed up its reaction to Saunders' 'heresy' by restating the Uniacke 'code' of 1919. It warned that it was not the business of the head of the NPF in the region (an Assistant Inspector-General of Police) to suggest an inspection of the NAPF in any native administration area whenever he was on tour.²⁰ He was 'not to seek permission to inspect Yan Doka but if invited to do so and time permits to accept the opportunity.'

At the annual conference of Residents for 1937, the arguments on the issue of NAPF/NPF relations boiled down to three.²¹ One, it was contended that with all the inadequacies of the NAPFs their men were still to be preferred to those of the NPF. Two, if one type of force must give way to the other, it should be the NPF that should cease to function. But three, if the NPF must have an upper hand, it should be in the more acephalous, southerly communities derogatorily called 'certain backward areas'.

In 1939, Saunders' successor, Colonel A.S. Mavrogordato, again submitted a memorandum specifically on NAPFs to the central government.²² On NAPF/NPF relations, he was of the view that NPF officers should be 'detailed' for duty with NAPFs instead of

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18. IGP, NPF, Lagos, to CSG, Lagos, 22 October 1936, Chapter 20, p. 292 of his memo. NAI, CSO 26/4/31861, Vol. 1.
 19. SNP, Kaduna, to CSG, Lagos, 7 December 1936; SSP, Enugu, to CSG, Lagos (undated). NAI, CSO 26/4/31861 Vol. 1.
 20. SNP, Kaduna, to all Residents, 3 December 1936. NAK, MakProf. 57/S.2.
 21. Record of the proceedings of conference of Residents, 1937. NAK, CFR 3/1.
 22. CP, NPF, Lagos, to CSG, Lagos, 18 March 1939. NAI, OyoProf. 1/1078 Vol. 2.

being 'seconded' to them.²³ He was quite vague in his use of these terms but, unlike his predecessor, he was more flexible and showed an awareness of the sensitivity to any suggestion that might tend to imply the loss of control by native authorities of their forces. In the North, his remarks were merely noted without comments at the Residents' conference for that year.

The year 1944 was very significant in the history of NAPFs in Nigeria. That year, the central government in Lagos approved the first set of rules ever to govern matters of appointments into the organisation and discipline of men of the NAPFs.²⁴ Drafted primarily for the Northern NAPFs they were also approved for those of the West. Largely similar, the significant difference was in the matter of control. The Northern version gave primacy to the native authority, acting in the first instance through its Chief of Police (Sarkin Yan Doka) in matters of discipline whereas the Western version subordinated the native authority to the NPF officer-in-charge of the NAPF.²⁵ For the North the rules merely represented a formalisation of the status quo.

The point should be made that the Northern administration did not bar NPF officers from supervising or training the NA police; what it frowned on was any attempt to exercise operational control of the forces. In a 1948 memorandum on the supervision of NAPFs, government warned that NPF officers should realise that they occupied 'exactly the same position in regard to the Native Authorities as do the officers of other departments'.²⁶ The NPF officer, like the administrative officer, was essentially a teacher with the primary duty 'to train the Native Authority to manage its own affairs in the most efficient way possible.' Government was aware that this was a more difficult task than 'the exercise of direct control' which could not be permitted so that 'the established policy of indirect administration is (not) forsaken.' For the avoidance of doubt the government firmly ruled that 'it is not therefore the duty of the Police Officer directly to control a Native Authority Police Force'. He was to 'supervise such a force on behalf of the Native Authority' as an adviser. In the discharge of his duties, he was the Resident's

23. Ibid., p. 6.

24. Native Authority Police Force Rules, 1944.

25. Ibid. Paragraphs 28, 29 and 35 were amended in the Western version to confer the native authority's powers on the NPF officer-in-charge. For details on moves before the promulgation of the Rules to confer control of the Western NAPFs on the NPF see Rotimi, 'History', Chapter 2.

26. SNP, Kaduna, to all Residents, 29 November 1948. NAK, MakProf. 57/S.4.

lieutenant and it was through him that he would route his advice to the native authority.

The next few paragraphs will focus attention on the experience of NPF officers, acting as advisers to NAPFs, in the period of active decolonisation between 1952 and 1960. The period witnessed the advent of party politics and party governments controlled by the new political elite in the regions.²⁷ Party politics was dominated in Northern Nigeria by the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC). Indeed, it was that party that controlled power in the region from 1952 through independence in 1960 and until 1966 when the First Republic collapsed. With respect to the NAPFs, the NPC government preferred the management style that had been in existence long before its advent to continue. The native authorities were to continue to exercise operational control of the forces. This disposition is understandable in view of the fact that the elite of the ruling party had been spun by the native authority system and still held positions in it. Provisions were made for the management of the NAPFs in the Native Authority Law of 1954.²⁸

The absolute control of the native authorities over their forces had never been in dispute and the law did not tamper with it. Part 8 of the law dealt with NAPFs. Section 114 referred to an NPF adviser as a 'deputed police officer'. He was expected to:

advise the Native Authority on matters relating to the composition, strength, discipline, training, equipment and employment of a force and shall be entitled to examine all records kept by or relating to a force, and to inspect the force or any part or detachment of it.

Section 126 dealt with the key issue of the exercise of operational control by a deputed police officer. It stated thus:

27. On parties and party politics in the era of decolonisation, see R.L. Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, Princeton University Press 1963; B.J. Dudley, Parties and Politics in Nigeria, Frank Cass, London, 1968; C.S. Whitaker Jnr, The Politics of Tradition: Continuity and Change in Northern Nigeria, 1964-1966, Princeton University Press 1970.

28. A detailed exposition on the law is in M.J. Campbell, Law and Practice of Local Government in Northern Nigeria, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1963. For critiques of the law and the NA system, see A. Gboyega, Political Values and Local Government in Nigeria, Malthouse Press, Lagos, 1987, Chapter 4; A.D. Yahaya, The Native Authority System in Northern Nigeria, 1950-1970, Ahmadu Bello University Press, Zaria, 1980.

Native Authority may, with the approval of the Commissioner of Police and the Minister charged with responsibility for Native Authority Police, confer upon a deputed police officer such powers of operational control over a force, or any part of a force, as it may consider expedient and thereupon all members of the force, or of the part of the force over which the deputed police officer exercises operational control, shall obey any lawful orders given by him as if he were their superior officer in the force.

It may be quickly remarked that the privilege conferred on a deputed officer in this section was most rarely enjoyed. In general, responsibilities continued to be borne without authority by the deputed police officers, especially in the large emirates.

The provisions of the 1955 Native Authority (Police Declarations) Order-in-Council and the 1959 Native Authority Police Force Rules as they related to the control and administration of the NAPFs showed clearly that the operational control of the forces rested with the appointing native authority while the administration rested with the Chiefs of Police. Deputed NPF officers were advisers and no more. As the following examples will show, deputed NPF officers came into conflict with the Chiefs of Police or native authorities whenever they were thought to be exercising more powers than had been conferred on them.

Perhaps the clearest example of the ordeal of NPF advisers in the 1950s was from the Zaria NAPF. Here, the severest limitations were placed on the influence of NPF advisers in their relationship with NAPFs. In 1954, the NPF adviser complained about the participation of the Chief of Police, Muhammadu Sani Maigamo, in active politics. He argued that Maigamo's membership of the regional House of Assembly was adversely affecting the discipline of his men through lack of supervision. As a politician, he further contended, Maigamo would not be able to discharge his duties 'without fear or favour.' His example had encouraged other members of the force to engage in active politics. He, therefore, wanted Maigamo removed.²⁹ The reaction of the administrative officers was that government policy at the time favoured Maigamo's participation in politics.³⁰ Maigamo left office later in that year when he was appointed a district head. The Maigamo saga demonstrated that the power to hire and fire was that of the Emir and no NPF adviser could force a decision either for or against, however sound the administrative

29. CP, NPF, Kaduna, to Resident, Zaria, 1 July 1954. NAK, ZarProf. C.5/1953 Vol. 1.

30. DO, Zaria, to Resident, Zaria, 31 July 1954. NAK, ZarProf. C.5/1953 Vol. 1; Resident, Zaria, to CP, NPF, Kaduna, 9 August 1954. NAK, ZarProf. C.42.

officers might consider his arguments. The NPF adviser confronted a greater problem with Maigamo's successor as Chief of Police, Mallam Mamman Sule.

Between 1955 and 1957 when he lost office, Sule was a thorn in the flesh of all NPF advisers (four of them) who worked with the Zaria NAPF. He was incompetent, corrupt and unamenable to correction, not to talk of discipline. But all the complaints by the NPF advisers were ignored by the native authority because Sule was treated by the Emir Jafaru as a son. In fact, he was of slave origin but taken into, and reared in, the palace by an earlier Emir. Jafaru liked him very much because he (Jafaru) had no male child until 1955.³¹ Apparently overconfident of the Emir's support over any wrong that he might be accused of, he overstretched his luck and was eventually removed from office in 1957 for official corruption.³² In the period between the elevation of Sule's predecessor to a district headship and his own appointment, the NPF adviser had been granted operational control of the NAPF, which was a rare privilege. Sule was appointed in an acting capacity but the NA soon began to press that he be confirmed so that the NPF could cease their control of the force. The Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP), NPF, who was in charge of the NPF detachment in Zaria province was sounded out for an independent assessment of Sule by the office of the regional Commissioner of Police, Kaduna.³³ In the SSP's opinion, Sule was not yet ripe for confirmation.³³ The SSP found him 'considerably wanting in the performance of normal daily duties and responsibilities'. He cited four cases: one of inept crime detection resulting in irresponsible tampering with the liberties of ten persons he accused of murder but, as it turned out, he had no shred of evidence; two of absenteeism; and one of laxity in repressing protests by building trade employees in the native authority area. He noted that he had information that 'he regards his present post as a birthright and of passing interest until his ultimate objective of a District Headship is achieved'. He concluded darkly: 'I consider the ADVICE to be imparted by any present or future ASP posted here will amount to just so much wasted time.' (Emphasis in the original.) The NPF adviser at the time was one Audu Bako. He was the first Nigerian officer to be posted to Zaria province as adviser to NAPFs. Sule confirmed his

31. DO, Zaria, to SDO, Zaria, 30 December 1955; Resident, Zaria, to CP, NPF, Kaduna, 6 March 1956. NAK, ZarProf. C.5/1953 Vol. 1; Interview with Alhaji M. Abbas, last Chief of Police, Zaria NA, 11 September 1988.

32. Nigerian Citizen, 27 February 1957, 10 April 1957, 21 September 1957.

33. Ag. SSP, NPF, Zaria, to CP, NPF, Kaduna, 5 November 1955. NAK, ZarProf. C.5/1953 Vol. 1.

disregard of the adviser shortly after the SSP's assessment by going on leave without informing the officer. When the adviser protested to the District Officer, the DO was helpless. He said that Sule, being sure that the Emir would 'take up the cudgels on his behalf in case of trouble', would not have bothered to mention his intention to go on leave to the adviser, not even to 'a European ASP, much less to the unfortunate Audu Bako for whom I have considerable sympathy'.³⁴ He recounted the circumstances in which Sule lost his job in 1950 or 1951 as Chief Scribe in the NA office and how the personal intervention of the Emir saved him from prosecution on a criminal charge. That was the man later appointed to head the police.

Audu Bako was succeeded in 1956 by a European officer. He, too, found it difficult to work with Sule. He reckoned that if operational control of the force was granted to him, the standard of the men could be raised. The Commissioner of Police, Kaduna, put the request to the Resident of Zaria province.³⁵ The Resident considered the request ill-timed and not feasible.³⁶ He, in fact, blamed the adviser more for the adviser's plight saying that although he was zealous he was unintelligent. The Resident frowned at the adviser's wording of his instructions to the Chief of Police 'in the tersest of terms'. The Resident also stressed the links of Sule with the palace and soberly admitted that Sule was 'confident of the support of the Emir in any disagreements with the ASP or, for that matter, myself'. The affected officer later wrote a detailed report on Sule with proofs of his³⁷ laziness, unco-operativeness, deceitfulness and secretiveness. Much more correspondence was exchanged between the administrative officers in Zaria and the NPF authorities in Kaduna but Sule continued in office until 1957.

Outside the emirate areas where the NPF advisers had a greater latitude to operate they still encountered problems that made their work difficult. The relationship between the NPF adviser and the Jos NA council (in the more acephalous southerly part of the region) in 1956-57 will serve as illustration. Incidentally the officer affected was the same Audu Bako who had had a rough time in Zaria in 1955. Here, the adviser, Bako, tried to take

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- 34. DO, Zaria, to SDO, Zaria, 30 December 1955. NAK, ZarProf. C.5/1953 Vol. 1.
 - 35. CP, NPF, Kaduna, to Resident, Zaria, 17 February 1956. NAK, ZarProf. C.5/1953 Vol. 1.
 - 36. Resident, Zaria, to CP, NPF, Kaduna, 6 March 1956. NAK, ZarProf. C.5/1953 Vol. 1.
 - 37. ASP (NPF) Adviser, Zaria, to SDO, Zaria, 16 March 1956. NAK, ZarProf. C.5/1953 Vol. 1.

advantage of the favourable climate offered by the democratisation of the NA system in an acephalous community. But so high had local Birom (the dominant ethnic group) nationalism risen that the council could not be indifferent.

Bako was committed to professionalism in police matters³⁸ but had chafed under the Zaria NA's endorsement of Mamman Sule's rascality. His deployment to a province where no absolute ruler reigned had been construed by him to mean an unlimited opportunity to operate. But the Birom of Jos had never liked the staffing of the Jos NAPP by Hausa and other non-indigenes of the area. The politics of the 1950s further aggravated their discontent. But Audu Bako cared little for political sentiments.

Two issues generated a row between the council and Bako in 1957. In the first case, the council tried to check the irregularities that attended the payment of salaries to the men of the NAPP. Hitherto, it was the duty of the Chief of Police to collect his men's salary from the treasury and pay. But he was in the habit of paying in his house instead of the office for some apparently sinister reasons.³⁹ Many of his men had complained to the hearing of council officials. It is strange that this practice, for which one Chief of Police in Jos and his deputy had lost office in 1937 still continued in 1957.

The council notified Bako of its intention to change the mode of payment. With effect from the end of May, an accountant from the NA treasury would supervise the payment of police salaries at their office⁴⁰ - with the assistance of any policeman of Bako's choice. Bako did not like what smacked of dictating to him his duties and political interference in a professional matter. He quoted sections of the rules and the law to back his contention that the Chief of Police⁴¹ was the only one authorised to handle the payment of salaries. The council should therefore not overreach itself.

The second issue was the long-standing agitation by the council to have an indigenous head of the police. The incumbent, Mamman

38. Interviews with (a) Mallam Ibrahim Shira, retired CSP, NPF, 1 September 1988, (b) Alh. M. Abbas (cited above), (c) Sallau Udu, retired Chief of Jos NAPP, 7 September 1988, (d) Alh. M.D. Yusufu, IGP, NPF 1975-79, 12 September 1988.

39. Ag. Admin. Secretary, Jos NA, to ASP (NPF) Adviser, Jos, 16 May 1957. NAK, JosProf. S.71.

40. Ibid.

41. ASP (NPF) Adviser to Admin. Secretary, Jos, NA, Jos, 20 May 1957. NAK, JosProf. S.71.

Doso, was a stranger. He was Hausa from the present-day Niger Republic.⁴² The highest ranking Birom member of the force, Sergeant Sallau Udu, had just completed a course at the Police College, Kaduna. He had been sent on the course with a view to taking over on completion. So, simultaneously with the proposed change in the mode of payment was a request that the adviser should set the necessary machinery in motion for appointing Udu as Chief of Police while Dosu would become his deputy.⁴³ The council spelt out their duties.

Again, Bako rebuked the council for dabbling illegally in a matter that was outside their jurisdiction. He enumerated the dangers inherent in their actions which included a fall in standard of discipline and a weakening of morale. He then advised the members always to seek the opinion of the adviser before taking decisions and desist from merely communicating what he regarded as instructions to him.⁴⁴

The council did not take kindly to Bako's reprimands. In a strongly worded reaction its secretary contended that it had always endeavoured to keep Bako in the picture of things in spite of his obvious shortcomings. The council asserted its primary responsibility for maintaining the police force and its unwillingness to grant Bako unrestrained control of the force. It castigated Bako for his choice of words which was considered not 'responsible enough.'⁴⁵ The Resident intervened to advise that the council should seek a better working relationship with

42. Interviews with his subordinates in that Force: (a) S. Udu (already cited), (b) P.M. Tiyyi, last Chief of Police, Jos NA, 8 September 1988, (c) T.A. Yusuf, retired DCP, NPF, 14 September 1988.

43. Admin. Secretary, Jos NA, to ASP (NPF) Adviser, 16 May 1957. In the interview with Udu, he denied knowledge of the details of the correspondence between the council and the adviser. But he was well aware that the council was determined to get rid of the alien Chief of Police. He spoke with passion on the domination of the NCO positions in the force by non-indigenes. He confessed that he reversed the trend when he was Chief of Police between 1959 and 1965.

44. ASP (NPF) Adviser to Admin. Secretary, Jos NA, 20 May 1957. NAK, JosProf. S.71.

45. Admin. Secretary, Jos NA, to ASP (NPF) Adviser, Jos, 28 May 1957. NAK, JosProf. S.71.

the adviser.⁴⁶ He observed that the council was in the habit of asking for the adviser's opinion when decisions had been taken rather than before.

Not long after the row, Bako left office. In his handing-over note, he advised his successor against succumbing to pressure for the ouster of Doso and the appointment of Udu. He chose to misrepresent the report on Udu at the end of his Kaduna course by declaring that he had been adjudged unfit to head a high grade force like that of Jos.⁴⁷ He lauded Doso for his achievements in spite of all odds and doubted if a suitable replacement could easily be found. The administrative officers in Jos were, however, more responsive to Birom nationalist sentiments. They therefore, did little to prevent the council from replacing Doso with Udu.

In post-independence years, relations between the NPF advisers and the NAPFs did not change. While the regional government continued to associate the NPF with the management of the NAPFs through training and supervision, it did not yield ground on the thorny issue of who had operational control of the forces. But unlike in the years before independence when it stridently asserted that operational control of the forces lay with the native authorities, it desired to be seen in the post-independence years as the wielders of ultimate control. However pure the motive for closer co-operation might be, any move from the NPF was usually treated with much circumspection.

Sometime in June 1961, the Commissioner of Police, NPF, alerted the government about an increasing crime wave throughout the region, especially in Sokoto and Borno provinces.⁴⁸ He proposed to start Nigerian Police 'Crime Branches' in Sokoto and Maiduguri towns. Just so that his intentions might not be misconstrued, the Commissioner of Police stated that the object of the branches was 'not to supersede' in any way the powers and functions of the NA police, rather they were 'to assist' them in difficult cases. He requested to know whether the ministry had any objections to the scheme. The government welcomed the scheme but it warned

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46. Resident, Jos, to Admin. Secretary, Jos NA, 1 June 1957. NAK, JosProf. S.71.
47. Handing-over note by A. Bako to his successor dated 12 July 1957. A contrary version of the report on S. Udu was given in SSP, NPF, Jos to DO, Jos, 22 October 1957. NAK, JosProf. S.71.
48. CP, NPF, Kaduna, to Permanent Secretary (PS), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Kaduna, 24 June 1961. NAK, MIA 701.

that under no circumstances should the Nigerian Police usurp in any way the powers of the Native Authority Police.⁴⁹

As part of the regional government's efforts to boost the efficiency and bearing of the NAPFs, it endeavoured to win the confidence, loyalty and co-operation of the Chiefs of Police through generous preferments. Conscious of their enhanced status, Chiefs of Police, especially those of the larger, high grade forces did not wish to play second fiddle to the NPF advisers posted to the provincial headquarters. So whenever advice from the latter conflicted with their best judgements they tended to ignore them, much to the displeasure of the advisers. From the reports prepared by the provincial NPF advisers for 1961, it is observed that those in charge of Kano and Sokoto did not find it easy working with the Chiefs of Police. The remark on Kano was that:

Although this force has the distinction of having the highest paid Wakilin Yan Doka (Chief of Police) it has been necessary to ask that he should spend more time with his Force and less time travelling around in connection with various Boards and Commissions of which he is a member.⁵⁰ Despite several requests this advice is still disregarded.

The particular Chief of Police under reference in the report was Mallam Ado Bayero (now Alhaji Ado Bayero, Emir of Kano).

In a bid to strengthen their position in the management of the NAPFs, the NPF made many requests for the conferment of operational control on their officers who were serving as advisers to many of the NAPFs in 1963 and 1964. After the exchange of much correspondence among officials of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the office of the Attorney-General and that of the Premier, two circulars were sent to all Provincial Secretaries (formerly known as Residents) from the Ministry of Internal Affairs on when, how and to whom operational control should be conferred.

In the first circular, it was noted that under section 126 of the Native Authority Law 1954 a native authority might confer powers of operational control over its police force on a deputed Nigerian police officer subject to the approval of the Commissioner of Police, NPF, and the Minister of Internal Affairs. Care must, however, be taken that the conferment was done only in circumstances where continued control by the native

49. Secretary to the Premier to PS, Min. of Internal Affairs, Kaduna, 7 July 1961. NAK, MIA 701.

50. ACP 'F' Dept, NPF, Kaduna, to PS, Min. of Internal Affairs, Kaduna, 16 October 1961. NAK, MIA 702.

authority would result in a security risk. Even then, the period of operational control must not be unduly prolonged.⁵¹

The second circular laid great stress on the role of the Minister of Internal Affairs and made the process a little more cumbersome. A native authority that had conferred the operational control of its force on a Nigerian Police officer in its area would have to submit a fresh operational control order form each time there was a change in the Nigerian police officer posted to that area. For the request to get ministerial approval, the appointment must be made 'by name' and 'NOT office'. It was acknowledged that this latter condition was administratively inconvenient but it could not be waived because it was the duty of the minister to ensure the maximum co-operation between the⁵² deputed Nigerian police officer and the NAPF he would control. Everything goes to show the increased interest of the regional government in the management of the NAPFs.

The military terminated the First Republic on 15 January 1966. One of their first administrative acts was to grant the operational control of the regionally controlled NAPFs to the NPF.⁵³ This grant of operational control by military fiat excited great interest in the NPF officers in the North. It was a novelty there unlike in the Western region where their counterparts had since the 1930s enjoyed such privilege. But their efforts to implement the administrative order brought them into conflict with civil servants in the regional ministries of Internal Affairs and Local Government.

The officer-in-charge of NA police affairs at the NPF regional headquarters at the time, Audu Bako, Assistant Commissioner of Police, became pitched against the civil servants. Bako, it will be recalled, had had brushes with the native authorities in Zaria and Jos in the 1950s when he served as NPF adviser to the NAPFs in those places. For him, therefore, the military order was a most welcome development. His boss at the time, M.D. Yusufu, CP, was equally interested in the NPF exercising control over the

51. PS, Min. of Internal Affairs, Kaduna, to all Provincial Secretaries, 24 June 1964. NAK, MIA 727.

52. Ibid., 20 August 1964.

53. A.H.M. Kink-Greene, Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: A Documentary Sourcebook, Oxford University Press 1971, Vol. 2, pp. 127-8. Details on the eventual abolition of the NAPFs are in Rotimi, 'History', Chapter 4.

NAPFs. But they underestimated the reaction of the civil servants.

The grant of operational control of the NAPFs to the NPF was just the first step in the long-term plan of the military government to scrap the forces and harmonise policing under the NPF. In February, 1966, the government set up a study group on police and prison reforms headed by a senior federal civil servant, Yusufu Gobir. At the instance of the Northern regional military government, a position paper on the absorption of NA policemen into the NPF was prepared by the NPF regional headquarters.⁵⁴ It was most probably intended for submission to the study group on police and prison reforms. It contained two proposals. One, that the NAPFs should be absorbed into the NPF. Two, that a scheme initiated in the dying days of the old regime - which was intended to operate the forces on provincial, instead of on native administration, basis - be concluded with the operational control of the forces vested in the Inspector-General of Police who might delegate his powers to the regional Commissioner of Police. Since it was envisaged that the NA police would ultimately be absorbed into the NPF, it was recommended that provincialisation should proceed apace. The NPF would have overall control but act in liaison with the ministries of Internal Affairs and Local Government.

The indications are that provincialisation was not immediately implemented but the study group on police and prison reforms subscribed to the idea.⁵⁶ Audu Bako, who had been holding regular meetings with Chiefs of Police and who had been involved in the provincialisation scheme even in the civilian era, showed some eagerness to have the scheme implemented.⁵⁷ He met with an angry retort from the civil servants in the ministries of

54. Secretary to the Military Government, Kaduna, to PS, Min. of Internal Affairs, Kaduna, 14 February 1966. NAK, MIA 707 Vol. 2.

55. A. Bako, ACP, 'F' Dept, NPF, Kaduna, 'Absorption of NAP Forces into NPF', 28 February 1966. NAK, MIA 707, Vol. 2.

56. That the idea was acceptable to the study group was contained in a joint memo by the ministries of Local Government and Internal Affairs to be tabled at an Executive Council meeting in August 1966. NAK, MIA 707 Vol. 2.

57. DCP 'F' Dept, NPF, Kaduna, to PS, Min. of Local Government, Kaduna, 28 November 1966. Bako was promoted Deputy Commissioner of Police about June 1966 but he continued in office as officer-in-charge of NAPFs at the NPF regional headquarters.

Internal Affairs and Local Government who advised him to exercise some caution.⁵⁸

As it turned out, almost every action taken by Bako was queried by the civil servants. He desired a more cordial relationship with the officials, so in February 1967 he wrote to the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Internal Affairs cataloguing his frustrations. He began by noting that:

I have noticed in the last six months, that the majority of actions taken by this office does (sic) not meet kindly with your approval on the grounds that the procedure is incorrect. I quote some examples to illustrate my points.⁵⁹

He recounted that he had always endeavoured to carry the ministry along in his actions either by copying all correspondence to the Permanent Secretary or through personal contact. Since those measures were considered inadequate, he would welcome the Permanent Secretary's views on the 'standard administrative procedure' to be adopted in dealing with matters affecting the two departments. After all, the ultimate goal was to improve the standard of NAPFs in the region.

The reply from the ministry did not disguise the fact that the non-co-operation was deliberate. The Permanent Secretary noted that while he did not intend to interfere in the technical aspect of NA police operation, he would insist that the responsibility for NA police was the ministry's. He (and not Bako) was answerable to the Government of Northern Nigeria on the £500,000 allocated for the NA police forces in Northern Nigeria. He chose to remind Bako that he was suffering under a misconception borne out of the failed unitary government idea of the Ironsi regime. He said:

We have had no problems prior to 1966, and I presume the change in your attitude over these forces, is probably due to the 'Operational Control' of all the NA Police Forces said to have been conferred on the Commissioner of Police. But as far as I understand this, the 'Operational Control' is definitely not 'General Control'. I believe matters such as conditions of service, recruitment and promotion of members of the force do not fall within this term. The

58. PS, Min. of Internal Affairs to DCP 'F' Dept, NPF, Kaduna, 3 December 1966; PS, Min. of Local Government to DCP 'F' Dept, NPF, Kaduna, 3 December 1966. NAK, MIA 707 Vol. 2.

59. DCP 'F' Dept, NPF to PS, Min. of Internal Affairs, Kaduna, 22 February 1967. NAK, MIA 702 Vol. 3.

usual powers of the Commissioner over all NA Police Forces in the Region are of course there. (Emphasis added).⁶⁰

Bako sought to enlighten the Permanent Secretary on the implications of having operational control conferred on the NPF. He noted that:

Without operational control, the Commissioner advises Native Authority Police Forces on welfare, training, promotions etc. With operational control the power to direct is conferred upon the commissioner inclusive of operational powers used for riots, internal security etc.⁶¹

He urged that the Permanent Secretary should 'kindly define under what category is the Commissioner of Police placed on (sic) matters relating to Native Authority Police forces'. If Bako expected that the ministry delighted in exchanging correspondence with him, then he was mistaken. The Permanent Secretary took the matter up with the CP, Hama Maiduguri (who succeeded M.D. Yusufu in 1966) who promised to call Bako to order.⁶² So he directed that no further action be taken on Bako's letter.

Eventually, the NAPFs were not provincialised. They continued to be managed by the Chiefs of Police who worked in close liaison with the NPF officers who served as their advisers. In May 1967 Audu Bako became military governor of the new Kano State.⁶³ In August, the study group on police and prison reforms appointed since February 1966 submitted its report. The implementation of its recommendations, from 1968, marked the eventual abolition of the NAPFs in Northern and Western Nigeria.

Conclusion

This article has examined the practical problems encountered by NPF officers in Northern Nigeria in their bid to assist the regional government with the administration of NAPFs. It is significant that under the three regimes covered by the article - colonial, civilian post-colonial and the military - the NPF officers detailed for service with the NAPFs were either denied,

60. PS, Min. of Internal Affairs to DCP 'F' Dept, NPF, Kaduna, 14 March 1967. NAK, MIA Vol. 3.

61. DCP 'F' Dept, NPF, to PS, Min. of Internal Affairs, Kaduna, 15 March 1967. NAK, MIA 702 Vol. 3.

62. PS to Ass. Secretary, Min. of Internal Affairs, Kaduna, 16 March 1967. NAK, MIA 702 Vol. 3.

63. General Ironsi, the first military head of state, was toppled and assassinated on 29 July 1966. On 27 May 1967 the military government of Major General Y. Gowon broke Nigeria into twelve states.

or could not exercise, commensurate authority over the forces. The decision to ensure that the NAPFs were not subordinated, or be made to feel subordinate, to the NPF which was made quite early in colonial times remained hardly disturbed till the forces ceased to exist.

THE MIDDLESEX CONSTABULARY

Bernard Brown¹

Although Kent, Essex, Herts and Surrey all have a county police force, it may come as a surprise to know that the ancient county of Middlesex never has had a police force of its own. Yet when the first Metropolitan Police divisions were formed on 29 September 1829 the area stretching from St Luke's parish, Chelsea, in the west, to the City of London in the east, all lay in the County of Middlesex.

The original local divisions of the New Police were:

- 'A' or Whitehall Division
- 'B' or Westminster Division
- 'C' or St James Division
- 'D' or Marylebone Division
- 'E' or Covent Garden Division
- 'F' or Bow Street Division.

The New Police, however, was not the first institution to provide law and order in the county as in addition to the original Magistrates' police office at Bow Street there were several others set up in 1792 under 'An Act for the more effectual Administration of the office of a Justice of the Peace in or near the Metropolis'. The 'Metropolis' of this Act was in fact Inner Middlesex, and the police offices so established were in the following parishes:

- St Margarets, Westminster (Queens Square)
- St James, Westminster (Marlborough Street)
- St Marylebone (Marylebone)
- St Leonard, Shoreditch (Worship Street)
- St Mary's, Whitechapel (Lambeth Street)
- St John's, Wapping (Thames)
- St Andrew, Holborn (Hatton Garden).

The latter was often referred to as 'Hateful Garden' due to the Magistrates' reputation in meting out severe sentences.

Rural Middlesex was policed after 1805 by the twenty-seven Bow Street Horse Patrols stationed along the turnpike roads to protect the traveller from highwaymen and footpads. They were:

- On the Staines Road at Hounslow Heath and Bedfont
- On the Bath Road at Hounslow, Harlington and Colnbrook
- On the Uxbridge Road at Hanwell and Hayes
- On the Harrow Road at Harlesden Green
- On the Edgware Road at Edgware and Mill Hill
- On the Great North Road at Finchley, Finchley New Road and Whetstone

1. Bernard Brown is a Sergeant in the Metropolitan Police.

On the Hertford Road at Wood Green, Tottenham and Enfield.

The New Police replaced the former parish watch-men and one particular watch box situated at Berwick Street, Golden Square, standing forlorn and boarded up, had the following inscription chalked upon it:

'The business of this shop
removed to Whitehall Place'

On 1 February 1830 the Metropolitan Police District (MPD) was extended as far east as Bow, where the River Lea divided the County of Middlesex from that of Essex, and northwards to the parish of St Mary's, Stoke Newington. This was as a consequence of a further four divisions being created:

'G' or Finsbury Division
'H' or Whitechapel Division
'K' or Stepney Division
'N' or Islington Division.

On All Fools Day 1830 the 'S' or Hampstead Division was formed with the result that one side of Kilburn High Road was in the MPD while the other was still in the jurisdiction of the Willesden Parish Watch.

The last two original divisions to be formed were the 'T' or Kensington Division, which extended the MPD westwards to Brentford on 13 May 1860, together with 'V' or Wandsworth Division which, although it covered Surrey, also took in the remainder of St Luke's parish, Chelsea, in Middlesex.

It was to be another decade before the MPD was extended out again, and on 13 January 1840 new outer stations were opened in 'K', 'N', 'S', 'T', and 'V' divisions, thereby engulfing the whole of Middlesex (and part of Hertfordshire) for the first time. 'K' and 'N' Divisions went beyond the confines of Middlesex and entered Essex, although in return Essex established stations at Tottenham, Edmonton and Enfield. 'S' Division opened new stations at Stonebridge, Edgware and South Mimms, while 'T' Division established posts at Staines, Uxbridge, Pinner and Harrow. Finally 'V' Division was extended out to Sunbury where a station-house was established.

The MPD was to remain unaltered for the next quarter of a century, until 28 October 1865, when two new exterior divisions were created. The new 'X' or Paddington Division was made up of Notting Hill, Acton, Hanwell, Hillingdon, Harefield, Harrow, Greenford and Ruislip stations transferred from 'T' Division, together with Paddington and Harrow Road (ex 'D' Division) and Willesden (ex 'S' Division). The 'Y' or Highgate Division was created out of the Highgate, Somers Town and Kentish Town stations - formerly part of 'S' Division - while 'N' Division gave up Caledonian Road, Tottenham, Hornsey Southgate, Enfield Town, Enfield Highway and Edmonton.

Apart from the amalgamation of the 'E' and 'F' Divisions on 9 October 1869, the police of Middlesex continued unchanged for the next decade and a half until 1886 when two new divisions were created. The first took place on 1 April upon the formation of a new 'F' or Paddington Division consisting of Paddington and Notting Hill (ex 'X' Division), Kensington (ex 'T' Division) and part of Molyneux St sub-division (ex 'D' Division). Later in the year, on 1 August, a further new division known as the 'J' or Bethnal Green Division was formed. Although lying mainly in Essex it included Bethnal Green and Hackney (ex 'N' Division) and part of Hoxton sub-division (ex 'G' Division). It was a 'J' Division officer, PC 97 'J' Neil who, in the early hours of 31 August 1888 found the mutilated body of Mary Ann Nichols in Bucks Row (now Durward Street), Whitechapel - a victim of Jack the Ripper. In fact, all but one of the Ripper murders occurred in Middlesex. Indeed, part of Middlesex Street (Petticoat Lane) divides the MPD from the City of London.

In 1889 a huge slice of the county stretching from Hammersmith in the west to Bow in the east, and northwards to Hampstead Heath, ceased to be part of Middlesex upon the creation of the London County Council. Once again Kilburn found itself as a border town and it was possible to stand in the centre of the road with one foot in rural Middlesex and the other in 'the smoke'. Just like Middlesex, the new County of London did not possess its own police force as it was entirely in the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Police.

Middlesex was kept in a crescent shape stretching from Staines to Enfield and remained so for the next seventy-five years when on 1 April 1965 the unthinkable happened when the great county of Middlesex (or what remained of it) simply ceased to exist with the creation of the Greater London Council. The new GLC affected the Metropolitan Police in as much as all divisions were realigned to conform with the new London boroughs.

- 'A', 'C' and 'D' Divisions became responsible for the City of Westminster, which absorbed the former boroughs of Paddington and St Marylebone.
- 'B' Division was responsible for the new borough of Kensington and Chelsea which had been separate in LCC days.
- 'E' Division became part of the new Camden, made up of the former boroughs of Hampstead, Holborn and St Pancras.
- 'F' Division took over Hammersmith and Fulham which again had been separate LCC boroughs.
- 'G' Division now policed the new London borough of Hackney, created out of the Metropolitan boroughs of Hackney, Shoreditch and Stoke Newington.
- 'H' Division took in the new borough of Tower Hamlets, comprising the old Stepney, Bethnal Green and Poplar Metropolitan boroughs, while
- 'J' and 'K' Divisions were banished to the Essex side of the Lea, having nothing more to do with the old county whatsoever.

'N' Division, known as the Islington Division since its inception in 1830, remained responsible for the borough of that name, though somewhat enlarged by the inclusion of the former Metropolitan borough of Finsbury.

In outer Middlesex no fewer than eight new London boroughs were created to engulf the former Middlesex boroughs and urban districts. The changes threw up many anomalies.

Barnet, formerly in Herts, became a new London borough policed by 'S' Division (formerly Hendon, Finchley and Friern Barnet). In exchange, Potters Bar was transferred to Herts (now part of Hartsmere), but still within the MPD.

'T' Division was realigned to conform with the new London borough of Hounslow which was made up out of the Middlesex boroughs of Feltham, 'Heston and Isleworth' and 'Brentford and Chiswick'. Beyond the GLC area Sunbury and Staines (now part of Spelthorne) suddenly found itself not in Middlesex but in Surrey, while Twickenham, north of the river, became part of the new borough of Richmond-upon-Thames, with a curious Middlesex, Surrey, postal address.

'X' Division became responsible for two new London boroughs. Hillingdon replaced the old Middlesex boroughs of Uxbridge and 'Hayes and Harlington' together with the urban districts of Yiewsley and West Drayton and Ruislip-Northwood, while the old boroughs of Ealing, Acton and Southall formed the new London borough of Ealing.

The new London Borough of Haringey, consisting of the former Middlesex boroughs of Hornsey, Wood Green and Tottenham, came under 'Y' Division as did the new London borough of Enfield, created from the separate boroughs of Enfield and Edmonton.


It is hard to believe that Broadwater Farm, where PC Keith Blakelock was murdered during the 1985 riots, only two decades earlier had been part of tranquil Middlesex.

To police the new London boroughs of Brent and Harrow a new police division known as 'Q' Division was created out of the former Middlesex boroughs of Wembley, Willesden and Harrow.

In March 1982, although existing only as a postal district, Middlesex was actually enlarged when the London Borough of Hillingdon was extended into part of Denham parish, South Bucks, whereby the Metropolitan Police 'X' district took over territory from the Thames Valley Police, this area having been first policed by the Buckinghamshire Connstabulary in 1857.

Although the GLC was abolished in 1986 Middlesex was never restored to county status, despite the fact that the Middlesex Guildhall Crown Court (built in 1913) still lies in the heart of

the metropolis overlooking Parliament Square. The county now remains only a fond memory, a postal address for a few police stations within the MPD, first established in Middlesex over 160 years ago - RIP.



THE SPEEDY DISPATCH OF PATRICK HERBERT MAHON

John Dibley

The purpose of this short article is not to rehearse all the details of this crime committed by Patrick Herbert Mahon on that strip of Sussex shore called The Crumbles. Much has been written elsewhere. On examining a copy of the original file I was struck by how quickly the events happened.

On the afternoon of 1 May 1924, a private investigator gave information to Chief Inspector Percy Savage of the Metropolitan Police, about Patrick Mahon. Mrs Mahon suspected her husband's infidelity and a cloakroom ticket found in his clothing was handed to police. The investigator had checked a left baggage locker at Waterloo Station and found therein a bag which contained a cook's knife and bloodstained clothing.

The same day Chief Inspector Savage went to the station and located the bag. Observation was maintained at the station and at 6.40 pm on 2 May, Mahon called to collect the bag. He was arrested. At 8.30 p.m. that day, Chief Inspector Savage interviewed Mahon, who admitted facts relevant to the murder.

Chief Inspector Savage left London at 4 a.m. on 3 May, with two Inspectors, one of whom was the official photographer. On arrival at Eastbourne Savage established that the house where Mahon committed his crime was near Pevensey in the East Sussex Constabulary area and so telephoned Superintendent Sinclair at Hailsham. They arranged to meet at the address at 8.30 a.m. that morning. Savage returned to London late on the evening of 3 May and consulted Superintendent Wensly.

On the morning of 4 May, as had been arranged with the Director of Public Prosecutions, he travelled to Pevensey with pathologist Sir Bernard Spilsbury. On arrival they met the Chief Constable, Colonel G.M. Ormerod DSO, and Superintendent Sinclair. Sir Bernard and Chief Inspector Savage returned to Town 'at a late hour on Sunday night'.
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On 5 May, Mahon made a further statement to the Chief Inspector. That same evening, Savage took Mahon by car to Hailsham Police Station where he was handed over to Superintendent Sinclair, and charged with murder.

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1. See, for example, Jonathan Goodman, The Seaside Murders, and D.G. Browne and E.V. Tullett, Bernard Spilsbury, His Life and Cases.

Savage's report, which is dated 6 May 1924, goes on to say 'He will appear before the Bench at Hailsham Petty Sessions at 4 p.m. this afternoon 6th May'.

The inquest was opened on 7 May, at the bungalow where the death of Emily Kaye occurred.

There were remand hearings on 15, 22, 29 May and 5 and 6 June. On the last mentioned date Mahon was committed for trial at the Sussex Assizes at Lewes. The inquest was concluded on 11 June when the Coroner's jury returned a verdict of wilful murder against Mahon.

The file was despatched to Lewes by Assistant Commissioner Norman Kendal on 18 June 1924. Colonel Ormerod received it on 19 June, and acknowledged its safe receipt by letter that same day.

Mahon's trial commenced on 8 July and he was found guilty and sentenced to death.

After an unsuccessful appeal he was hanged at Wandsworth Prison on 9 September 1924.

Perhaps four months from beginning to end is not too unusual in the annals of murder but related to current practices, workloads and the much improved technology, the speed and efficiency of the officers in 1924 is to be commended.

OBITUARY - RN LIST FOR 1905

Capt. FRANCIS JOSEPH PARRY, R.M.L.I., retired, died at Stonehouse, Gloucestershire, on the 14th Feb., aged 70. He joined the corps in September, 1854, and served with the R.M. brigade in the Crimea at the siege and fall of Sebastopol, and at the surrender of Kinburn (medal with clasp and Turkish medal); also with the 2nd R.M. battalion at the capture and occupation of Canton, 1857-1858. He subsequently joined the Land Transport Corps, with which he served in the White Cloud Mountain Expedition in June 1858; he also took part in the campaign of 1860, being present at Sinho, Tangku, and the Taku forts, &c. (medal with three clasps). He retired in 1869 to take up the position of Chief Constable of Nottingham, being subsequently appointed Chief Constable of Derbyshire, and Inspector of Constabulary in the South of England.

THE SPECIAL CONSTABULARY IN WALTHAMSTOW (1940-43)

Peter J.E. Pleydell

I am a serving Special at Walthamstow. Like many other people in the Metropolitan Police, I am trying to get used to the new style Sector Policing. In preparation for this, members of the Metropolitan Special Constabulary have been allocated to Sectors, with the ultimate aim of attaching us to teams. We have lost the use of the office previously allocated to us, and now work from the Sector offices with our Regular colleagues.

I was not present on the day when our belongings were re-sited. As would be expected, a great deal of waste accumulated over the years was disposed of as confidential rubbish. One item which was not disposed of was placed in my locker for me to find on my return, in the knowledge that it would interest me. It is a large, buff coloured book. On the spine it is labelled MSC¹ JW² Occurrence Book 55. The book contained a number of loose inserts, some of which go back to the 1920s. I have included four of these relating to the Second World War as Appendices to this article.

The book contains an alphabetical list of names of Officers and their details, including whistle numbers. It also contains lists of Leave Teams for 1940. Each Officer was attached to one of seven leave teams. The rotas for these are shown. Each team would have, on average, one day off duty each week. In some weeks, however (approximately one in four) they would have two consecutive rest days, followed by a full week without leave.

The body of the book begins on 10 April 1940, and runs clearly up until the beginning of 1944, when it becomes less informative, being more or less a record of correspondence in and out.

In the early part of the book, each double page has on the left a daily list of Officers on duty, with the times they were physically in the station and the reason (typically shown as 'Office' - presumably Station Officer, 'Refreshment' or 'Records'). The opposite page is headed 'Occurrences', and is ruled off at the end of each day, opposite the corresponding duty list on the left page.

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1. Metropolitan Special Constabulary
 2. Walthamstow

From the contents of these pages, it is possible to discern something of the people named on them, their sense of purpose and direction, and the conditions under which they served.

Much of the contents are mundane, such as the notes regarding expense claims and the weekly entry 'D.O. received'.³ What interested me more was the feeling of camaraderie which comes through the official language, and the slow but sure changes in organisation which reflected the progression of the war.

Sports

At the beginning of the book, there are fairly frequent references to sporting activities:

Wednesday 24 April 1940

Darts match played off with Claybury. Walthamstow winners.

Thursday 16 May

Message received from JS⁴ 8.45 pm. Darts Match to be played at Leytonstone on Tuesday 7/5/40. Team as before.

Friday 17 May 1940

Message received from S/Inspr Cogswell re/ next round of divisional darts to be played at Mitre Hotel, Stamford Hill, High St. sent DHQ 7.45 pm.

Saturday 18 May 1940

Darts match cancelled for 8 pm. Monday to be played on Wednesday 8 pm. Roberts Sports Club, Wadham Rd., E.17.

Wednesday 22 May 1940

Darts Final played at Roberts SC 8 pm between this station and JC⁵. JC winners.

As the year progressed, and the reality of the Blitz loomed ever more imminent, there is less mention of such activities - until we reach an entry for Monday 31 March 1941.

JW lost to JC at Billiards. JW beat JD⁶ at darts.

(It would seem that Walthamstow MSC were better at darts than billiards.)

3. Divisional Orders

4. Leytonstone

5. Chingford

6. Chigwell

Strength and Equipment

In the early part of the book there are weekly statements of the strength of the MSC unit at Walthamstow.

Sunday 14 April 1940	Inspr	Sergt	Constables
Station Strength			
Full time	1	2	20
Part time		1	15
Off pay		1	4
Not available			2
		Total strength	46

As could be expected, as the war progressed men were continuously leaving to enlist in HM Forces. There are numerous references to such reasons for resigning.

Saturday 27 April 1940

SC Hodge joins HM Forces Sunday 28/4/40. Off pay as from midnight Sunday.

The last such reference was regarding Special Inspector Coe, whose name appears so many times in the early pages of the book.

Monday 1 November 1943

Inspr Coe informed Staff Inspector that he would be resigning from Full Time Service as from midnight Monday 8th November 1943, as he will be joining Royal Navy on 9th November 1943.

Presumably for reasons of men enlisting in the Forces, the number of MSC Officers continued to decline throughout the latter part of 1940 and onwards.

Sunday 16 February 1941	Inspr	Sergt	Constables
Station Strength			
Full time	1	2	18
Part time		1	13
Not available	1 Sub Insp		
		Total strength	36

By 14 November, the total strength had fallen to 14. The dedication of members of the Special Constabulary comes across in the following entry:

Monday 27 May 1940

S.C. Murphy reports inability to undertake duty at the moment owing to working 7 days a week on Government work. This man will, however, report if required during non-working time. Present working hours 8 am - 8 pm approx.

Apparently though, it was not only for reasons such as this that duties were not being performed. Some Specials were considered not to be fulfilling their obligations to the full.

Tuesday 27 August 1940

Letters written to 4 S/Cs re/ non-performance of duty.

Wednesday 5 November 1941

Report sent to DHQ re men who have not performed a minimum of 104 hours duty over a period of 13 weeks.

There were opportunities too for transfer between part- and full-time service.

Monday 24 June 1940

N.B. Part time Special Constables over 30 years of age may make application on Form 730, through O/C and SC Insp, for transfer to M.S.C. full time strength. Appointments to F.T. service will be subject to Station requirements from time to time. This order does not apply to men who are already in reserved occupations.

There was a dilemma to be faced regarding prevailing standards of recruits, and the need to maintain the required strength.

Monday 29 September 1941

Phone conversation with Staff Inspector re/ acceptance of men who continuously wear spectacles. Decision re spectacles cannot be altered. 2 applicants to be informed.

The nature of the dilemma is clearly seen in the relationship with the War Reserve PCs who applied to join the MSC.

Tuesday 18 June 1940

PS Head 9th interviewed WRPC Hook at Walthamstow. Unsuitable for entry into MSC owing to height.

Obviously, Sergeant Head's assessment of the candidate was not considered satisfactory by Inspector Coe, for two days later the following entry occurs:

N.B. Any War Reservist or others making application for part time service, who does not conform to M.S.C. standards must be seen by Insp Coe + not turned away.

And sure enough, on 3 July Forms A & B were noted as having been sent to Divisional Headquarters regarding two War Reservists. The entries follow their progress into the ranks of the Metropolitan Special Constabulary.

Sunday 18 August 1940

4 MPWRs now attested as S/Cs shown as not yet supplied with uniform on form L.W.

Wednesday 21 August 1940

DHQ notified of Identity N^{os} issued to four new S/Cs.

Thursday 22 August 1940
Equipment received for all 4 S/Cs.

It was important that resources should not be wasted on training and equipping recruits who would see little or no service before being conscripted into military service.

Monday 29 September 1941
Future part time recruits must be between 41 + 55 years of age, unless they are definitely in a reserved occupation. See latest reserved list before accepting any new recruit.

There would appear to have been shortages of equipment in the early stages. Particularly difficult to obtain, so it would seem, were greatcoats. Typical of the entries is the one following the duty return for 12 May 1940.

Without greatcoats 1 full time 2 part time.

Equipment more specifically designed for war use was also in short supply.

Sunday 19 May 1940
SC Inspr informed all Helmets + Respirators at JC now ok. Only shortages on sub-division are 15 Eye Shields + 21 Field Dressings.

Of course, Officers had to be instructed in the use of war equipment.

Friday 3 May 1940
All Ranks to note new process for use of anti-dim on Respirator eye pieces. See notice on lockers.

More mundanely, three days later an entry records:

Box key issued to SC Lawer 181J for Traffic Point. SCs Lawer 181J + Lissamore 182J issued with white Traffic Gauntlets for month from MP store.

War duties

As 1940 progressed, the reality of war became more apparent.

Thursday 25 April 1940
Phone call from Chief Insp at DHQ. All men, both full + part time, must carry Steel Helmet. JC informed.

Thursday 30 May 1940
4 copies of War Duty Hints and 4 S/C Lapel Badges received from S/Insp Clow.

It is evident that all Special Constables were expected to gain proficiency not only in First Aid, but also in Air Raid Precautions and the use of firearms.

Saturday 11 April 1940

Notice sent to SCs re/ First Aid + ARP lectures. ARP lectures to be held in Decontamination Room on Tuesday + Wednesday of next week between 7.45 + 9.30 pm.

Wednesday 4 September 1940

To DHQ: - Particulars of non-instruction in arms.

Sunday 23 February 1941

Pistol Instruction - Whipps Cross Drill Hall.

It is possible that there was a reluctance on the part of some Specials to attend, since two days later was another entry regarding firearms.

Memo from DHQ

All part time Special Constables must report to the Rifle Lounge, Whipps Cross Drill Hall at 10.30 am on Sunday 2nd or 9th March for Revolver Instruction.

That the non-firearms part of their training was put to use is not in doubt.

Sunday 13 October 1940

In future on Form LW all Air Raid duties must be shown in Column D in red ink.

Although it is not stated that the damage recorded below occurred in an air raid, it would seem likely that this was the case.

Friday 1 November 1940

Respirator container + steel helmet together with covering letter re/ damage in fire received from S.C. 395 Ruston and forwarded to Commandant for directions.

On 12 December, there is an entry regarding a death. The book makes no mention of whether this was the result of enemy action, or some other cause.

Memo received re/ death of S/Inspr King. 2/- donation forwarded to Commandant.

Specials were encouraged to make contributions to the War Damage Police Fund, which presumably was intended as a mutual fund to assist wounded Officers, and the families of any dead.

Monday 18 November 1940

Notice received re/ Part Time Constables War Injuries.

Wednesday 11 December 1940
£2.11.0 paid re War Damage Relief Fund.

Saturday 29 March 1941

N.B. Ref P.O. 27/3/1941. All new recruits are to be informed of Met. Police War Damage Police Fund. They are eligible for the Fund on payment of 1/- and any further subscription asked for by the Commissioner. Subscriptions will commence again from April 1st at the rate of 3^d per week.

It is notable too that, despite the war, people were still able to travel for their holidays. Places as diverse as Northampton and Cornwall are entered as holiday addresses.

Callout Procedure

It is evident there were emergency callout procedures in existence. Appendix 1 indicates that 'System A' relied upon each man informing another before making his way to the Station. The Appendix refers to a practice callout for a date which I am unable to ascertain from the Occurrence Book. However, on Thursday 31 July 1941, there was a practice callout for part-time MSC Officers. The reported result was 1 Inspector, 1 Sergeant and 8 Constables attending the Station for duty. The ensuing report to the Commandant observed that men should be told:

that chin straps may be worn at the back of head when respirators in the alert position.

The report made a further observation.

Confirmation that JC & JA system was in operation was not obtained because in actual emergency I would not waste Police time phoning, but would visit both stations.

In conclusion, I have found the Occurrence Book to be an invaluable source of information, and cannot fault the words written in the Book by the Chief Commandant when he visited Walthamstow Police Station on 16 May 1940.

Visited and all correct. The methods of recording the duties of Officers is very commendable.

7. Waltham Abbey

Particulars of calling-out trial under System "A".

Information received at Station:-
 Insp. Coe Informed at :-
 P.S.C. at Chingford Informed at:-

Left Station to call on men at:- 7.30pm

Returned to Station at :- 8.5pm

		Time.			Arrived at Station.	Means of traveling.	Other Particulars.
		Informed	left Home.	Called next man.			
Monk	5min	7.34					
Gilbert.	1min						
Sgt. Smith.	5min	7.38	7.45		7.50	Cycle.	
S/C. Morton.	5min	7.44	8.5pm	8.10pm	8.20	Cycle	
S/C. Weaver.	10min	8.10	8.20	8.26	8.40	Cycle.	
S/C. Hartridge	10min	8.25	8.30		9.15	Walking	
S/C. Granlick.	10min	7.46		7.55	8.00pm	Walked	
" Dunning.	10min	7.55	8.12pm	8.20pm	(8.35pm) 9.10pm	"	
" Maynard	15min	8.20		8.30pm	9.40 (cont)	bus - walked	
" Garratt.	X						
" Tomlin.	20min	8.10pm	8.20		9.40		
" Pesce.	10min	8.27	8.40		8.50	Walked.	
" Teyler.	X						
" Clarke.	10min						
" Baldwin.	10min	9.00			9.10	Walked	
" Sale.	20min	7.54	7.59	8.20pm	8.38pm	Walked	
"	15min	8.20pm	8.20pm		8.38pm	bus	
Sergt. Buckingham	20min	7.56	8.20pm	8.20pm	8.40pm	Walked.	
S/C. Stent.	X						
S/C. Resker.	15min	8.15	8.20	8	7.40pm	Walked.	Relieved

Appendix 1
 Record of Trial Callout
 (Date unknown)

Rank Name	Size in Respirator	Boots
1st Lieut. Coe	N	2 1/2
1st Lieut. Broman	N	2 1/2 Broman
1st Lieut. B. L. Head	N	B. L. Head.
Buckingham	N	2 1/2 Buckingham 208
Pepper	N	2 1/2 Pepper
R. Smith	N	2 1/2 R. Smith
1st Lieut. Raver	N	2 1/2 Raver
Arbenson	N	2 1/2 Arbenson
Watson	N	2 1/2 Watson
T. A. W. Reber	N	2 1/2 T. A. W. Reber
E. C. Longdale	N	2 1/2 E. C. Longdale
E. B. B. Reber	N	2 1/2 E. B. B. Reber
Berry	N	2 1/2 Berry
A. J. Clarke	N	2 1/2 A. J. Clarke
Batstone	N	2 1/2 Batstone
Bartram	N	2 1/2 Bartram
Miller	N	2 1/2 Miller
Stump	N	2 1/2 Stump
Stent	N	2 1/2 Stent
Worsell	N	2 1/2 Worsell
White	N	2 1/2 White
T. Taylor	N	2 1/2 T. Taylor
Marriott	N	2 1/2 Marriott
Hodge	N	2 1/2 Hodge
Plant	N	2 1/2 Plant
Amick	N	2 1/2 Amick
Christ	N	2 1/2 Christ
Groomfield	N	2 1/2 Groomfield
Kissel	N	2 1/2 Kissel

Appendix 2

Officers' Respirator Sizes

(Date unknown)

M.S.C. Part Time Walthamstow. Times when S/Cs' are available

	<u>Monday to Friday.</u>	<u>Weekends.</u>
S/Insp. Clow.	7pm.-8am.	5pm.Saturday - 8am. Monday.
Sergt. Smith.	6pm.-8.30am.	6pm. Friday - 8.30am. Monday.
" Buckingham.	8pm.-8am.	same as week-days.
S/C. Baldwin.	8pm.-7am.	3pm.Saturday - 7am.Monday.
" Dunning.	4pm.-5am.	4pm. " - 5am. "
" Granlick.	6pm.-8am.	
" Gilbert.	Managing own business available almost any time.	
" Hartridge.	7.30pm.-8.30am.	2pm. Saturday -8.30am.Monday.
" Monk.	5.30pm.-9am.	12.30pm. " - 9am. "
" Morton.	7pm. - 7.30am.	10pm. Friday - 7.30am. "
" Neale.	4pm. - 6.am.	5.30pm. Saturday- 6am. Monday.
" G. Resker.	7pm. - 8.am.	3.p.m. " - 7am. "
" Pesco.	10pm. -10.am.	10.p.m. " - 10am. "
" Stent.	6pm. - 8.am.	4.p.m. " - 5am. "
" Taylor.	7pm. - 9.am.	2.p.m. " - 5am. "
" Tomlin.	8pm. - 9.am.	2.p.m. " - 3am. "
" Weaver.	7.30pm. 8.am.	5.p.m. " - 3am. "
" Clarke.A.J.	7.30pm.-8-30am.	10.p.m. " - 6-30am. "
" Maynard.	7.p.m. -7.am.	2.p.m. " - 7.am. "
" Garrett.	8.p.m. - 8.am.	6.p.m. " - 6.am. "

Appendix 3

Part Time Specials - Availability

(Date unknown)

Equipment issued to Part Time Special Constables.
on Walthamstow Sub-division.

	<u>Field</u>				
	<u>Helmets.</u>	<u>Respirators.</u>	<u>Eyeshields.</u>	<u>Dressings</u>	<u>Protective Clothing</u>
J.W.	20	20	19	15	20
X J.C.	17	15	3	2	11 X
J.A.	2	2	N11	N11	N11
<u>Actual shortage.</u>					
J.W.	N11	N11	1	5	N11
J.C.	N11	1	13	14	5
J.A.	N11	N11	2	2	2

Appendix 4

Equipment Inventory

(Date unknown)

POLICE AVIATION IN THE UK

Bryn Elliott¹

The earliest confirmed use of aircraft to assist police took place in the summer of 1921 when the Metropolitan Police made use of the wireless-equipped airship 'R33' to cover traffic duty on Derby Day at Epsom and at the RAF Air Pageant, Hendon. In a similar manner the police in Berkshire and Surrey made use of the even larger airship 'R36' over the Ascot Races.

In 1923 the RAF loaned a wireless-carrying Bristol Fighter to the Metropolitan Police to undertake traffic duty over the Derby. In 1924 the army loaned a kite balloon, fitted with a telephone link to the ground, for the same purpose. However, neither of these was successful enough to be repeated.

Although by 1929 a full-time police air unit existed in America, in the UK little was done until 1932, when the availability of an early Cierva autogyro was tested by the Metropolitan Police at the Derby. The machine, and its equipment, was on loan. The Leicestershire Police undertook the first known air chase and arrest of burglars with a Moth bi-plane quickly loaned to police by a local club near Hinckley on 18 June 1932. The Metropolitan autogyros were so successful that they continued in use at the Derby meetings from 1932 to 1938.

The Surrey Police first started limited trials with light aircraft from Brooklands in 1933 with the intention of supporting traffic duties at the Ascot Races.

There was a minor expansion of flying in 1934. The Leicestershire Police undertook continuous flight trials until the war started, and Metropolitan operations expanded as the autogyros were found other traffic duties to deal with. In 1935, the small Reigate Borough force set up its own multi-aircraft Air Support Unit, and although its achievements were very limited, it was the first in the country.

In May 1938 the Lancashire Police undertook air cover for a royal tour of the county using a Leopard Moth, this occasion being almost the last traced use prior to the outbreak of war.

The Lancashire Police also undertook the first known police operations after the war when they covered the Grand National at Aintree. Between 1946 when they used a Royal Navy Auster

1. Constable Elliott is in charge of the Waltham Abbey Police Historical Collection.

observation aircraft and 1957 this race meeting was covered annually by civilian Auster and Miles Gemini aircraft. A military Sycamore helicopter was used in 1954.

Although there was a certain amount of demonstration flying being undertaken, particularly at the Police College, it was not until 1956 that any major developments occurred. Two types of civil helicopter, the Westland S-55 and the Bristol Type 171, on trial with the Civil Defence organisation, were loaned out to a number of police forces, including: Cheshire, Glamorgan, Hampshire, Lancashire, Liverpool, Metropolitan, Nottingham, Southampton, Staffordshire, West Riding and Worcestershire.

From 1954 all police forces had access to Civil Defence flying and observer training with University Air Squadron, initially with the Chipmunk trainer, and later with Bulldog aircraft. In the Metropolitan area, trials were started with light aircraft. Three Austers undertook Bank Holiday and other traffic flights from 1957 to 1961. The Buckinghamshire Police used a Hornet Moth to cover traffic duties at Silverstone in 1956 and 1957.

Elsewhere the Automobile Association made available their aircraft from 1956, giving many county and city police forces access to air cover until 1980. They operated Auster, Dragon Rapide, Apache, Navajo and later, Cessna, aircraft.

The first helicopter ASU was set up by the Durham Police in November 1962, an operation with the Brantly B2 which lasted until ended by a lack of Home Office subsidy in June 1964. Another user of the Brantly was the Oxford City Police, which used their aircraft in experiments carrying dogs in special panniers in 1963. This force and its successor, Thames Valley, continued to use helicopters occasionally from then on.

In 1964 a short Home Office experiment involving the use of a Bell 47J in support of the Cheshire, Lancashire and Staffordshire Police on motorway patrol was deemed expensive and unsuccessful.

From 1966 to 1969 the Ministry of Defence flew a succession of scheduled trial support operations that affected the police forces of Devon & Cornwall, Dorset, Dyfed-Powys, Essex, Gloucestershire, Grampian, Gwent, Hampshire, Kent, Metropolitan, Northern, Oxford, Staffordshire, Surrey, Sussex, Tayside, West Mercia, West Midlands and Wiltshire. Other forces, including Avon & Somerset, received unscheduled assistance, and yet others undertook their own hirings off the civil market. These included Lancashire and Berkshire. A group of three forces, Sheffield, Nottingham and Derby, made their own arrangements with the Sheffield Aero Club from 1966, but its was a short-lived set-up due to ongoing force amalgamations.

The Metropolitan Police were set up the path towards a permanent helicopter unit from hirings started in April 1970. Most other

forces continued air use. For instance in 1971 Lancashire, Thames Valley and Hampshire continued ad hoc hiring of aircraft for special events. Although the latter pair tended to choose helicopters exclusively, the former, with its continued Aintree flying, used fixed wing also.

A specially equipped Wallis autogyro was used a number of times in support of the police from 1975 and the type saw use with Devon & Cornwall, Hertfordshire, Surrey and Sussex in that year alone.

From 1976 a number of other forces started to take a greater part in the development of aircraft use. Greater Manchester and South Yorkshire were followed into the fold by Northumbria, Surrey and Sussex in 1977 with ad hoc hirings. Devon & Cornwall were set upon their course towards a permanent unit in the summer of 1978, they themselves being followed in 1979 by Hampshire with fixed wing aircraft operation and Thames Valley with helicopters.

The first full-time and permanent police Air Support Unit in the United Kingdom was formed by the Metropolitan Police in November 1980. It was eventually equipped with three Bell 222 helicopters. The next formed was the Devon & Cornwall operation.

At the present time more than sixteen forces have direct access to police Air Support Units. As many others continue to use military and civil ad hoc hiring of light aircraft and helicopters as well as the widespread, but limited amount of, Civil Defence training hours still allowed on UAS Bulldog aircraft.

We're repeating Dr Barbara Weinberger's review below with apologies for the missing lines that made nonsense of it last year - Ed.

Mike Brogden, On the Mersey Beat: Policing Liverpool Between the Wars, Oxford University Press 1991, pp 184, Price: £14.95.

This lively account of policing in Liverpool between the wars relies almost exclusively on oral history material gathered from 24 octogenarian and nonagenarian former rank and file police officers, supplemented by extracts from fellow officers' contributions to contemporary police publications (often, it has to be said, in excruciating doggerel). Brogden is concerned to offer an account of what it was like to be a policeman at the time and place chosen entirely from the viewpoint of the beat officer (with some additions from plain clothes and CID men) and without any reliance on official accounts or 'views from above'. What we get is a vivid description of the pains, boredom, deprivations and discipline involved in the daily round, with little light - or any other - relief. At the same time, Brogden has an underlying critical purpose guiding his research. His stated aim is to make a contribution to the sociology of occupations, where that of the police has been conspicuous by its absence, rather than to the social history of policing. His concern with the topic arises from what he sees as the inbuilt contradictions in the policeman's role. These contradictions derive from the fact that a largely working-class body of men were recruited to take action on behalf of the state against other working-class people; his purpose is to discover how these were dealt with by the service and by the men themselves. He is more successful in demonstrating the ways in which the police authorities sought to control their working-class controllers, through the strict time discipline of the beat and the restraints on their private lives, than he is in getting his respondents to discuss the existence or implications of conflicts within their class position on their work and lives. Unfortunately, the lack of a common understanding here makes for rather flat reading of the very lengthy verbatim material.